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ABSTRACT 
 
‘Level-playing field’ is an expression used by regulators in expressing the fair 
treatment of financial institutions. ‘Level-playing field regulations’ is also a 
representation of benchmark-setting in response to the complexity and diversity that 
exists in the financial system. Nonetheless, such a notion has never been precisely 
defined thereby bringing into question the usefulness of this idea. Therefore, the aim 
of this research is to examine the concept of level-playing field regulations.  
 
In particular, this research investigates level-playing field regulations for retail Islamic 
banks in the United Kingdom and Malaysia - two notable examples where level-playing 
field has been expressed in regulatory reforms. A comparative law methodology is 
employed, and a criterion judging whether there is (i) ‘equality before the law’; and (ii) 
‘a fair opportunity to compete’ is established to test whether a level-playing field exists. 
This research is the first to determine the extent to which retail Islamic banks can be 
considered to be operating within a level-playing field.  
 
One of the significant findings from this study is that the regulators in the UK and 
Malaysia have not fully enabled level-playing field regulations for retail Islamic banks. 
It is also inferred that due to the complexity of the financial system, exposure to risks 
and the nature of law, the regulatory environment for the banking system does not 
allow the level-playing field regulations to be effective. Therefore, level-playing field 
regulation is not a useful concept.  
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By challenging the existing regulatory framework, this research provides pivotal 
insights to regulators and scholars on the criterion, challenges and impact of level-
playing field regulations. This research will encourage the reconsideration of using this 
concept.  
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GLOSSARY*  
 
Commodity 
Murabaha 
A Murabaha purchase and sale transaction of Sharia 
compliant commodities, whereby the buyer purchases the 
commodities on a deferred payment basis and subsequently 
sells them to a third party on a cash payment basis. 
Diminishing 
Musharaka 
Diminishing Musharaka is a form of partnership in which one 
of the partners (customer) promises to buy the equity share 
of the other partner (financier) gradually until the title to the 
equity is completely transferred to the buying partner. The 
transaction starts with the formation of a partnership, followed 
by the financier leasing his equity share to the customer 
throughout the tenure of the lease, the customer will gradually 
buy the other financier’s share at market value or the price 
agreed upon at the time of entering into the contract. The 
“buying and selling” contract is independent from the 
partnership contract and should not be stipulated in the 
partnership contract since the buying partner is only allowed 
to give only a promise to buy. It is also not permitted that one 
contract be entered into as a condition for concluding the 
other. 
Fatwa A juristic opinion or pronouncement of facts given by the 
Sharia board, a mufti, or a faqih (scholar) on any matter 
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pertinent to Sharia issues, based on the appropriate 
methodology. 
Ijara An Ijara contract refers to an agreement made by an 
institution offering Islamic financial services to lease to a 
customer an asset specified by the customer for an agreed 
period against specified instalments of lease rental. An Ijara 
contract commences with a promise to lease that is binding 
on the part of the potential lessee prior to entering the Ijara 
contract. 
Ijara Muntahia 
Bittamlik 
An Ijara Muntahia Bittamlik (or Ijara wa Iqtina) is a form of 
lease contract that offers the lessee an option to own the 
asset at the end of the lease period either by purchase of the 
asset through a token consideration or payment of the market 
value, or by means of a gift contract. 
Islamic window Islamic window is part of a conventional financial institution 
(which may be a branch or a dedicated unit of that institution) 
that provides both fund management (investment accounts) 
and financing and investment that are Sharia compliant. 
Muḍaraba A Muḍaraba is a contract between the capital provider and a 
skilled entrepreneur whereby the capital provider would 
contribute capital to an enterprise or activity, which is to be 
managed, by the entrepreneur as the Muḍarib (or labour 
provider). Profits generated by that enterprise or activity are 
shared in accordance with the terms of the Muḍaraba 
agreement whilst losses are to borne solely by the capital 
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provider unless the losses are due to the Muḍarib’s 
misconduct, negligence or breach of contracted terms. 
Murabaha A Murabaha contract refers to a sale contract whereby the 
institution offering Islamic financial services sells to a 
customer a specified kind of asset that is already in their 
possession at cost plus an agreed profit margin (selling price). 
Musharaka A Musharaka is a contract between the institution offering 
Islamic financial services and a customer to contribute capital 
to an enterprise, whether existing or new, or to own a real 
estate or moveable asset, either on a temporary or permanent 
basis. Profits generated by that enterprise or real estate/asset 
are shared in accordance with the terms of Musharaka 
agreement whilst losses are shared in proportion to each 
partner’s share of capital. 
Salam A Salam contract refers to an agreement to purchase, at a 
pre-determined price, a specified kind of commodity not 
available with the seller, which is to be delivered on a 
specified future date in a specified quantity and quality. The 
institution offering Islamic financial services, as the buyer, 
makes full payment of the purchase price upon execution of a 
Salam contract. The commodity may or may not be traded 
over the counter or on an exchange. 
Sharia Divine Islamic law that encompasses all aspects of human 
life as revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah. 
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Sharia supervisory 
board 
A specific body set up or engaged by the institution offering 
Islamic financial services to supervise its Sharia compliance 
and governance system. 
Sukuk (sing. Sakk) Sukuk (certificates) each of which represents the holder’s 
proportionate ownership in an undivided part of an underlying 
asset where the holder assumes all rights and obligations to 
such an asset. 
Takaful Takaful is derived from an Arabic word which means 
solidarity, whereby a group of participants agree among 
themselves to support one another jointly against a specified 
loss. In a Takaful arrangement, the participants contribute a 
sum of money as tabarru’ (donation) into a common fund, 
which will be used for mutual assistance of the members 
against specified loss or damage. 
Urbun Urbun is earnest money held as collateral (taken from a 
purchaser or lessee) to guarantee contract performance after 
a contract is established. 
Wadiah An amount deposited whereby the depositor is guaranteed 
his/her fund in full. 
Wakala An agency contract where the customer (principal) appoints 
the institution offering Islamic financial services as an agent 
(wakil) to carry out business on their behalf. 
Istisna’ An Istisna’ contract refers to an agreement to sell to a 
customer a non-existent asset, which is to be manufactured 
or built according to the buyer’s specifications and is to be 
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delivered on a specified future date at a predetermined 
selling price.  
Parallel Istisna’ A parallel contract where the institution offering Islamic 
financial services (IIFS) depends on another party (for 
example, manufacturer/developer) to manufacture a 
specified asset, which corresponds to an existing Istisna’ 
contract between the IIFS and a customer. However, both 
contracts are independent of each other.  
Tawarruq A person who buys a commodity at a deferred price, in order 
to sell it in cash at a lower price. Usually, the sale is to a 
third party, with the aim to obtain cash.1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* The definitions provided in this Glossary are borrowed directly from the list of terminologies and 
definitions provided by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) via 
<http://www.ifsb.org/terminologies.php > accessed: 19 August 2015 
1 Tawarruq definition, via <http://www.islamic-banking.com/glossary_t.aspx> accessed 28 August 
2015 
 
13 
 
CASES 
Affin Bank Bhd v. Zulkifli Abdullah [2006] 1 CLJ 438 
Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 5 MLJ 632 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v. Adnan Bin Omar [1994] 4 BLJ 372 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad v. Emcee Corporation Sdn. Bhd [2003] 1 
CLJ 635 
Lord Mustill in Re D (Minors) [1996] AC 593 
Malayan Banking Bhd v. Marilyn Ho Siok Lin [2006]3 CLJ 821 
MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2002]2 MLJ 673, FC  
Mohamad Alias Ibrahim v. RHB Bank Bhd & Anor  [2011] 4 CLJ 654 
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors [2003] EWHC 
2118 (Comm) 
Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 
289 
Tahan Steel Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Bank Islam [2004] 6 CLJ 25 
The Investment Dar Company KSCC v. Blom Developments Bank SAL (2009) 
EWHC 3545 (Ch.) 
The Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v. Symphony Gems 
N.V. and others [2002] EWHC 982 (Comm)  
The Ulster Bank v. Taggarts  [2013] NIQB 54 
Tinta Press Sdn.Bhd v. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad [1987] 1 CLJ 474 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (UNITED KINGDOM) 
Arbitration Act 1996 
Finance Acts 2003, 2005, 2009, 2007  
Financial Services Act 2013 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities Order) 2001 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No.2) 
Order 2006 
VAT Act 1994 
 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (MALAYSIA) 
Central Bank Act 2009 
Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
Companies Act 2006  
Corporation Tax Act 2009 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia (as at 2007) 
Islamic Banking Act 1983  
Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 2011 
 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (EUROPEAN / GLOBAL) 
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Charter 
 
15 
 
CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ..................................................................................................................... 2 
CONTENTS......................................................................................................................... 15 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................4-5 
ABBREVIATIONS ..............................................................................................................6-7 
GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................... 8-12 
CASES...............................................................................................................................13 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (UNITED KINGDOM) ................................. 14 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (MALAYSIA) .............................................. 14 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (EUROPEAN / GLOBAL) ............................ 14 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION....................................................................................... 20 
1.0 (a) THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM……………25-28 
 
 (b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE IN MALAYSIA………………………………28-29 
 
1.1 RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION ............................................................................. 29-32 
1.2 OBJECTIVE ............................................................................................................. 32-33 
1.3 THE SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH ............................................................................. 33-34 
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 39-40 
1.5 GENERAL METHODOLOGY  ................................................................................... 41-44 
1.5.1 COMPARATIVE LAW ........................................................................................... 44-53 
1.5.2 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS TEST  ............................................................. 53 
1.6 SCHOLARLY CONTEXT  .......................................................................................... 53-57 
1.7 RESEARCH STRUCTURE  ........................................................................................ 57-59 
 
PART I: CHAPTER TWO: IN SEARCH OF ‘LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD’: CHALLENGES AND  
REALITIES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….60-61 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 62-65 
16 
 
2.2 THE RATIONALES FOR BANKING REGULATION ............................................................ 65-66 
(i) Anti-competitive behaviour  .................................................................................. 66 
(ii) Market misconduct  ......................................................................................... 67-68 
(iii) Information asymmetries  ............................................................................... 69-71 
(iv) Systemic stability ............................................................................................. 71-76 
2.3     ARGUMENTS ON BANKING REGULATIONS .................................................................... 76 
2.3.1 ‘More regulation’ argument ........................................................................................ 76 
(i) Bank’s prudential as justification for more regulation  ................................... 76-80 
(ii) Sector’s development as justification for more regulation ............................. 80-81 
(iii) Transparency as justification for more regulation………………………………………  81-84 
 
2.3.2 ‘Less is more’ argument (Simple regulation) .................................................................. 84 
(i) Cost-benefit analysis of regulation as justification for simple regulation ....... 83-87 
(ii) Ex-ante and ex-post as justification for simple regulation…………………………….88-91 
(iii) Buy what you understand as justification for simple regulation ..................... 91-94 
(iv) Platforms for dispute resolution as justification for simple regulation  ................ 94 
(a) Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) .................................................................. 94-95 
(b) Arbitration and mediation ......................................................................... 95-98 
(c) Ombudsman and Courts of law  ...................................................................... 98 
(v) Societal background as justification for simple regulation.................................... 99 
(a) The United Kingdom ................................................................................ 99-102 
            (b)   Malaysia ................................................................................................ 102-104 
(vi) Other international regulatory standards as justification for simple 
regulation…………………………………………………………………………………………………104-105 
2.4 IN SEARCH FOR LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD  .................................................................... 106-112 
2.5 INTERPRETING LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD  ..................................................................... 112-117 
(i) Whether Islamic banks are treated equally before the law ........................ 117-124 
17 
 
(ii) Whether Islamic banks are given fair opportunity to compete alongside 
conventional bank………………………………………………………………………..………….124-126 
2.6 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD: CHALLENGES AND REALITIES  ...................................................... 127 
(i) Legal pluralism ............................................................................................. 127-132 
(ii) Legal change  ................................................................................................ 132-133 
(iii) Level-playing field and the risks to Islamic banks……………………………………..133-143 
(iv) Level-playing field and Islamic banks’ stability………………………………………….143-148 
2.7 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 148-151 
PART 2: LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS FOR ISLAMIC BANKS  .................................. 152 
CHAPTER THREE: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC BANKS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM .............................................................................................................................. 152 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 153-154 
3.1.1 THE PAST AND PRESENT REGULATORY SYSTEM GOVERNING ISLAMIC BANKS ... 154-158 
3.1.2 THE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH – PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR ISLAMIC 
BANKS……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….158-162 
(a) Authorisation ........................................................................................................... 162-163 
(b) Collective Investment Scheme  ................................................................................ 163-173 
(c) Home Purchase Plan ................................................................................................ 173-181 
(d) Sharia Supervisory Board ......................................................................................... 181-189 
(i) Competent requirement .................................................................................... 198-200 
(ii) Relevant Experience .......................................................................................... 200-203 
(e) Islamic Finance Cases before the English Courts ..................................................... 203-212 
(f) The Regulatory Decision Making Process  ............................................................... 212-217 
(g) Sharia-Compliant Liquid Assets  ............................................................................... 218-232 
(h) Taxation.................................................................................................................... 233-237 
(i)    Stamp Duty Land Tax  ...................................................................................... 237-238 
(ii)   Corporation Tax  .............................................................................................. 239-241 
18 
 
       (iii) Value- Added Tax…………………………………………………………………………………………..241-244 
3.3 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 244-249 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC BANKS IN MALAYSIA .. .... 250 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  ....................................................................................................... 251-253 
4.1.2 THE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH – PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR ISLAMIC 
BANKS……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….253-256 
4.2 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD AND THE REGULATORY ACCOMMODATION FOR ISLAMIC 
BANKS………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………265 
(a) Authorisation ............................................................................................................ 265-268 
(b) Sharia Supervisory Board ......................................................................................... 268-273 
       (i)  ‘Fit and Proper’ Criteria ...................................................................................... 273-274 
      (ii)  Competent Requirement.................................................................................... 274-278 
(c) Islamic Finance Cases before the Malaysian Courts ................................................. 278-293 
(d) Sharia-compliant Liquidity Management Regulation ............................................... 293-299 
(e) Taxation – Principles and Policies ............................................................................. 299-301 
 (i) Income Tax  ........................................................................................................ 301-304 
 (ii) Real Property Gains Tax .................................................................................... 304-309 
 (iii) Stamp Duty Tax  ............................................................................................... 309-311 
4.3 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 311-314 
PART 3: LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD AND REGULATING ISLAMIC BANKS .................................... 315 
CHAPTER FIVE: LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD AND THE IMPACT FOR REGULATING ISLAMIC BANKS
................................................................................................................................................ 315 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 316-317 
5.2 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS AND THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS FOR ISLAMIC 
BANKS..................................................................................................................................... 317 
5.2.1 CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE REGULATIONS HAVE CHANGED ISLAMIC BANKS ................ 316 
19 
 
        (i)Capital Certainty Requirement  ........................................................................... 317-318 
(ii) Sukuk .................................................................................................................318-321 
(iii) Taxation  ................................................................................................................... 321 
(iv) Sharia-compliant Liquid Assets ......................................................................... 321-322 
5.2.2 CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE NO REGULATION HAVE CHANGED FOR ISLAMIC BANKS AND 
NO IMPACT TO LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD  .................................................................................. 322 
(i) Sharia Supervision ...................................................................................................... 322 
(ii) Islamic Finance before the English Courts ................................................................. 323 
5.2.3 CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE NO REGULATION HAS CHANGED FOR ISLAMIC BANKS AND 
LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS LESS EFFECTIVE ........................................................... 323 
 (i) Diminishing Musharaka Home Purchase Plan ................................................... 323-326 
5.3 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 326-327 
PART FOUR: CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 328 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 328-329 
6.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS ................................................................................................ 329-348 
6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS .......................................................................................... 348-350 
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS  .............................................................. 350-351 
6.5 FINAL REMARKS ....................................................................................................... 351-356 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 357-377 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.0 (a) THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM AND MALAYSIA 
 
 (b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE IN MALAYSIA  
 
1.1 RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION 
1.2  OBJECTIVE  
1.3 THE SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH  
1.4 TERMINOLOGY  
1.5 GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
 1.5.1 COMPARATIVE LAW  
1.5.2 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS TEST 
1.6  SCHOLARLY CONTEXT  
1.7 RESEARCH STRUCTURE  
 
In recent years, bank regulators have been struggling to design an appropriate 
framework for banking regulations. Banks have the potential to create substantial 
negative externalities by reducing the money supply, especially because the banking 
system is prone to contagion effects when failures occur.2 As a result, the fear of a 
banking crisis is a key consideration for banking regulators. As a consequence, bank 
regulators must regularly monitor and re-evaluate banking regulations in order to 
safeguard bank deposits held by the public. In addition, banking regulators are 
required to ensure that the impact of existing bank regulations is appropriate and 
adequate to the needs of the prevailing financial environment.  
 
                                                 
2 Ethan B. Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, (1994), p.18 
21 
 
With the constant changes and evolution in the financial markets environment, the 
regulatory frameworks governing the banking and financial services institutions, 
nationally and internationally, are expected to be able to accommodate the existing 
and the future financial markets. The banking and financial regulation should not 
remain static, so as to become outdated and ill-equipped. Therefore, there is a 
constant pressure and challenge for the regulators to provide the most suitable 
regulation in meeting the needs of a complex, diverse, competitive, as well as fragile 
financial system. Failure to provide an appropriate regulatory framework ultimately 
exposes financial markets to negative externalities that can lead to severe financial 
crises.  
 
Aware of the complex and diverse nature of the financial system, international and 
national banking regulators have made vast efforts to stabilise and standardise the 
fragile financial system. In light of this, the metaphor of Level-Playing Field regulations 
has been used as a benchmark of uniformity for regulatory standards; representing 
the regulators’ fair treatment for all banks and financial institutions. For instance, 
international agreements such as Basel Accords incorporate the concept of level-
playing field regulations so that banks can remain competitive. Therefore, the role of 
Basel Accords, as an international standards setter, is to strengthen the capital 
position of banks in a manner consistent with a level financial playing field. 3 In another 
example, the rise of the Islamic banking sector has also seen the creation of an 
international standards setter for Islamic finance, namely the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), which provides international regulatory standards in order to 
level the playing field for Islamic banks in financial services sector dominated by 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p.105. See, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Charter, Article 2  
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conventional banks.4 Similarly, national regulators have used the concept of level-
playing field regulations when treating all the banking institutions operating in their 
jurisdiction within their own regulatory architecture.  
 
Throughout the past decade, there have been various regulatory changes in the 
banking sector (which is rather a series of experimental reforms) to accommodate the 
growing complexities in the financial system.5 Several factors have been identified as 
an influence to the phenomena of this increasing complexity within the financial 
system. These factors include: innovation of financial products offerings, differences 
in market size, information technology, political-cultural-historical backgrounds, 
differences in regulatory approaches, the establishment of various types of banking 
and financial institutions, as well as the globalisation of banking and financial system.  
 
Banking regulators and policy makers have always encouraged financial innovation 
and competition among market players. 6 As such, the banking and financial system 
continues to evolve as a result of the latest financial innovations and competition. One 
notable example of financial innovation in the market place is Islamic finance. Islamic 
financial products, which are distinct in nature from conventional financial products, 
have achieved notable growth. For example, since its beginning in 1975, Islamic 
finance is reported to have reached USD1.87 trillion in financial assets in less than 40 
                                                 
4 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) Annual Report 2015 
5 Howell E. Jackson, ‘Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation,’ (2001), 
p.656 
6 See, ‘The Digital Tipping Point: Banks Must Focus on Innovation to Harness Opportunities and 
Address A New Generation of Competitors’ via <https://www.bba.org.uk/ > accessed: 23 July 2015, 
‘The FCA and Innovation’ via <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/the-fca-and-innovation> accessed 28 July 
2015 
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years.7 Islamic banking has contributed heavily to this growth, almost doubling in size 
(measured by banking assets) in recent years – from USD417 billion in 2009 to 
USD778 billion in 20138. The significant growth of Islamic finance in the financial 
system has merited a response from banking and financial regulators across 
jurisdictions to develop regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks. In a short space 
of time, Islamic finance has become an important market player in various jurisdictions. 
Islamic banking, for example, comprises almost half of the total banking sector in 
Saudi Arabia (49%) and Kuwait (45%)9. As a result, banking and financial regulators 
have become more receptive to the specific risks attached to Islamic banks in terms 
of their products and institutional operations as well as their impact on the stability and 
resilience of the financial system.10 Therefore, in some jurisdictions, regulatory reforms 
have been made to accommodate Islamic finance and, moreover, in jurisdictions 
where the Islamic financial sector has had a significant impact, there have been 
examples of large-scale revisions of the national regulatory architecture (This has 
occurred mostly in countries with a Muslim-majority population, while in most secular 
countries, regulatory reforms are made from time to time within the conventional 
financial regulatory framework).11  
 
 
                                                 
7 Supra, Note. 3. There is no empirical evidence to show the comparative total assets between Islamic 
and the conventional sector. However, the source from the UK Business Insider shows that the total 
global financial assets are reported to be at USD 294 trillion as at 2013. See, Business Insider, 
<http://uk.businessinsider.com/global-financial-assets-2015-2?r=US&IR=T> accessed: 15 July 2015  
8 EY (2014) World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2014-15, EY, Bahrain: Manama, p.14  
9 Ibid. 
10 Supra, Note. 3, p.4 
11 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011  
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The creation of specific regulatory accommodations for Islamic financial products or 
the sector as a whole demonstrates that banking regulators have acknowledged the 
sector’s significance as well as appreciating how the risks related to Islamic banks 
affects the stability of the financial system. The innovation of Islamic financial products 
can also be observed as a contributing factor to a more diverse financial system. This 
has therefore added to the complexity and uncertainty which already exists in the 
financial system; and this ultimately increases the challenge for banking regulators to 
develop appropriate regulatory standards.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the level-playing field regulation which has been used as a 
concept by global and national banking regulators represents the concept of fairness. 
It is used as a metaphoric term to represent the standardisation of rules that are 
believed to be functional within the complex and diverse financial system. The 
international agreements such as the Basel Accords which aim to provide level-playing 
field regulations for all banks, in fact, do not consider the nature of the Islamic banking 
sector, hence IFSB Guidelines were established to compliment the lack of level-
playing field regulations in Basel Accords. Therefore, arguably, the level-playing field 
regulations which are created by longstanding global banking regulators such as the 
Basel Committee have not fully enabled the concept of level-playing field regulations.  
 
Scenarios such as these have therefore raised the question of the extent to which the 
level-playing field regulations have been usefully applied into the complex financial 
system whilst simultaneously enabling the regulators to encourage financial innovation 
and competition. In other words, are regulators able to reconcile the existing forces 
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that exist in the financial system and the level-playing field regulations as well as 
encouraging financial diversity. This can be illustrated in the following diagram:  
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
This scenario has therefore led this research to investigate the level-playing field 
regulations, by giving specific reference to Islamic banks. The countries in focus are 
the United Kingdom (the UK) and Malaysia. 
 
(a) The development of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom  
The Islamic banking sector in the UK has been continuously develop since its first 
product were made available in the UK market where the first retail product is reported 
to have reached its consumers in the 1990s when the Gulf Cooperation Council 
introduced Islamic mortgages through Murabaha and Ijara transactions.12 
Nevertheless, investment products have in fact reached the Middle Eastern private 
investors earlier, where in the year 1980s the commodity Murabaha transactions were 
                                                 
12 The CityUK, ‘The UK: The Leading Western Centre for Islamic Finance’, (November 2015)  
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introduced by Al Baraka International Bank. During these periods, the Islamic banking 
products were consumed by the Middle Eastern customers and not until recently, the 
Islamic banking products are also consumed by the locals consisting of Muslims and 
non- Muslims.13  
 
The Islamic banking sector continues to offer its products in the UK market where the 
latest report has revealed that at least 20 Islamic financial institutions are operating in 
the UK and five of them are fully Sharia-compliant.14 With the existing numbers of 
Islamic banks operating in the UK, it has also been reported that the country is now 
accommodating the largest number of Islamic banks in comparison with any other 
Western countries.15 In 2004, the first Sharia-compliant bank in the UK was the Islamic 
Bank of Britain (IBB),16 which is now rebranded as Al Rayan Bank (hereinafter referred 
to as Al Rayan17), followed by the the Bank of London and the Middle East (2007), 
Gatehouse Bank (2008), Qatar Investment Bank (UK) (2008) and Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank (2013)18.  In 2012, seventeen ‘Islamic windows’ were established by the 
                                                 
13 See, Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman, and Ali Ravalia.,  ‘Islamic 
Finance’, (2007), p.6 
14 See, Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman, and Ali Ravalia.,  ‘Islamic 
Finance’, (2007), p.10, Report: The CityUK, ‘Islamic Finance’ (2012), p. 3 and Report: Global Islamic 
Finance Report (2012). Sharia-compliant technically means the adherence to Islamic principles. More 
explanation can be found in the terminology section.  
15 Supra, Note 12. The number of Islamic financial institutions in other Western countries such as the 
United States of America (10), Australia and Switzerland (4) and France (3). 
16 Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman, and Ali Ravalia.,  ‘Islamic Finance’, 
(2007), p.10, Report: The CityUK, ‘Islamic Finance’ (2012), p.6 
17 The change of name took place in December 2014 following the acquisition by Masraf Al Rayan QSC 
(MAR) via <http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/>accessed 19 April 2015 
18 United Kingdom Trade & Investment, ‘UK Excellence in Islamic Finance’, (2014) via 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/> accessed 6 August 2015 
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conventional banks.19 Notably, the Islamic banking sector has collected USD 3.6 
billion worth of assets as at the end of the year 2014.20  
 
While the figures are seen as promising, it has also been observed that the number of 
Islamic banking windows in operation has decreased.  For example, in 2012, HSBC 
terminated its ‘Islamic window’ operation (HSBC Amanah) in most countries including 
the UK, except for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.  It is reported that the termination was 
due to their worldwide strategic review, which included a decision to restructure their 
Islamic banking business.21 These facts have therefore shown that there is a mixed 
demand of the Islamic banking sector in the UK, on the one hand, the number of 
Islamic banks and market remains the leader among the Western world, on the other 
hand the termination of Islamic window operation in the UK has shown that the 
demand for Islamic banking does not always exist. 
 
In terms of the Sukuk market, London is the international centre for Sukuk issuance. 
The UK is reported to be the first Western country to issue a sovereign Sukuk worth 
£2.3 billion.22 To date, the total of 57 Sukuk have been listed on London Stock 
Exchange with the total value of USD51 billion.  
 
                                                 
19 Supra, Note. 9. Islamic windows banks in the UK includes : ABC International Bank Ahli United Bank 
Bank of Ireland Barclays BNP Paribas Bristol & West Citi Group Deutsche Bank Europe Arab Bank 
HSBC Amanah IBJ International London J Aron & Co. Lloyds Banking Group Royal Bank of Scotland 
Standard Chartered UBS United National Bank. See, Report: TheCityUK, ‘Islamic Finance’, (2012), p.4  
20 The CityUK, ‘The UK: The Leading Western Centre for Islamic Finance’, (November 2015) 
21 HSBC Amanah via <http://www.hsbcamanah.com/>, and NewHorizon Magazine (Issue : Oct – Dec 
2012), p.6  via < http://www.islamic-banking.com/> accessed: 10 September 2014  
22 The CityUK, ‘The UK: The Leading Western Centre for Islamic Finance’, (November 2015) 
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With regards to the market size of Islamic financial sector in the UK, there is no 
available data which shows the exact figure of the sector performance. However, a 
report has revealed that the market size of the Islamic financial sector globally only 
represents 1% of the global banking assets.23  GCC countries and MENA countries 
are leading the Islamic financial sector at the global level with 38 per cent and 35 per 
cent respectively, whereas the UK categorised together with other countries totalled 
the market size for only 4.8 per cent.24 The latter figure, therefore, indicates that the 
market size of the Islamic financial sector is relatively small compared to any other 
regions.   
 
(b) The development of Islamic finance in Malaysia  
It has been reported that the first Islamic financial institution in Malaysia was formed 
in 1963 with the establishment of Tabung Haji (the Pilgrimage Fund), however, the 
formation of the latter was not meant to carry the retail banking business. Tabung Haji 
was established as an Islamic financial institution to assist the Muslims in raising their 
personal savings for pilgrimage activities. Only 20 years later that the first Islamic bank 
called Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) was established in 1983 and the second 
fully-fledged Islamic bank was established in 1999; namely Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Berhad.25  Since then, the Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia has continued 
to flourish and now numbers 16 fully-fledged Islamic banking and financial institutions 
(IFIs), 11 Islamic windows, four international IFIs, and 16 Takaful (Insurance) 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. Islamic financial market size in Asian region consists of 22% and Sub-Saharan Africa is 1%. 
25 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011, p.164 
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companies.26 To date, the Islamic financial market in Malaysia consists of 74.9 per 
cent of the total Islamic finance market size).27 
 
The rationale and motivation of this research are highlighted in the next section.   
 
1.1 RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION  
 The growth of Islamic finance: Islamic finance is an example of financial 
innovation which has grown rapidly in the global financial market and has made 
a significant impact to the evolution of the financial system. Regulatory 
authorities across borders have provided specific regulatory accommodation 
which is believed to be able to provide a level-playing field for Islamic banks. 
However, the extent to which the level-playing field regulations for Islamic 
banks have been enabled by regulators is questionable.  
 
 Unique financial system risks: The nature of Islamic finance is rather unique 
thus Islamic banks are exposed to some risks which are different in dimension 
than the risks to which conventional banks are exposed. This raises the 
question of how can regulators devise level-playing field regulations to 
accommodate the risks exposed to Islamic banks. 
 
 
                                                 
26 ‘Malaysia’s Islamic Finance Marketplace’, (2013) via  <http://www.mifc.com/index> accessed: 10 
October 2013 and EY Global Takaful Insights, (2013), p.62 
27 The CityUK, ‘The UK: The Leading Western Centre for Islamic Finance’, (November 2015)  
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 Comparative study: The choice of the UK and Malaysia as comparative study 
is based on two main factors. Firstly, the same legal approach is practiced by 
both countries – that is, the common law system.  In spite of this, a different 
angle of the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks in the UK and 
Malaysia is applied. In the UK, the approach to level-playing field regulations 
for Islamic banks in their regulatory accommodation is within the conventional 
regulatory framework.  Whereas in Malaysia, a dual–regulatory framework is 
established to represent the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks. 
This comparative study is therefore essential where it highlights two countries 
with the same legal system and idea of treating Islamic banks on a level-playing 
field, with differing approach and interpretation. Hence, the research questions 
and analyses the extent to which the two common law countries have enabled 
the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks in their respective 
jurisdictions.  
 
Secondly, while both countries have undergone a different emergence of the 
Islamic financial sector, this comparative study is important noting the similarity 
of the fact that both countries’ mission are to become the global hub for Islamic 
finance sector. Notably, the UK being one of the leading financial centres in the 
world has undergone a later development trajectory of Islamic finance in 
comparison to Malaysia. Retail Islamic products in the UK only began to reach 
the consumers in 1990s from the South East Asian banks and Middle Eastern 
banks while the first Islamic retail bank in Malaysia has started its operation in 
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the year 1983.28 Additionally, there is the difference in market size of the Islamic 
financial sector in both countries (Islamic finance in the UK – 4.8 per cent of the 
total Islamic finance market size and Islamic finance in Malaysia – 74.9 per cent 
of the total Islamic finance market size).29 However, a common factor is 
established with the fact that the growth of the Islamic financial sector in the UK 
and Malaysia has evolved rapidly - making both of the countries of different 
economic scale to be one of the leading Islamic financial hubs in the world (the 
UK for the Western countries and Malaysia for the South East Asian countries). 
Their success, albeit the existing differences (Islamic finance arrival in both 
countries and its market size), makes this comparative study as significant. In 
particular, this study examines the approach taken by the regulators of the two 
successful common law countries for the regulatory accommodation of retail 
Islamic banks.  
 
 Managing complexity and diversity: Banking regulators have been 
encouraging financial innovation and competition in their financial systems 
which have resulted in diversity and complexity in the global financial system. 
However, the question arises as to how the regulators have enabled the level-
playing field regulations where the nature of Islamic banks is different than the 
nature of conventional banks.  
 
                                                 
28 Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman and Ali Ravalia, ‘Islamic Finance in 
the UK: Regulation and Challenges’, (2007), p. 6 
29 The CityUK, ‘The UK: The Leading Western Centre for Islamic Finance’, (November 2015) (n.27) 
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 ‘Level-Playing Field’ regulations: To the best of my knowledge, there is an 
absence of in-depth research on the level-playing field regulations for Islamic 
banks. For example, the elements that can be said to constitute ‘level-playing 
field regulations’. Also, there is no defined parameter as to what level-playing 
field regulations could mean with regards to Islamic banks and whether the 
regulators can enable the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks. 
Therefore, an investigation on this subject can highlight whether the level-
playing field regulations are a useful concept and whether there is a need of 
more banking regulations for Islamic banks in terms of a separate regulatory 
framework. This research builds up a theory of the level-playing field regulations 
and analyses the regulatory framework governing Islamic banks in the UK and 
Malaysia from the context of level-playing field regulations.  
 
1.2 OBJECTIVE  
In light of the issues discussed earlier, the principal objective of this thesis is to 
examine the level-playing field regulations governing Islamic banks in the UK and 
Malaysia by using the methods as set out in Section 1.5. 
 
The principal research question raises three general subsidiary questions. Firstly, the 
extent to which the regulatory accommodation governing Islamic banks in the UK and 
Malaysia reflects with the notion of level-playing field regulations. In this regard, two 
test questions are used to analyse the principal question (see, Section 1.5.2). This 
research seeks to explore the areas through which the level-playing field regulations 
for Islamic banks expose the latter to any specific risk.  
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In turn, the second subsidiary question is to examine whether the level-playing field 
regulations for Islamic banks is indeed a useful concept. As highlighted in the 
introductory section, the uncertainties and complexities in the existing financial system 
has led the global and domestic regulators to establish benchmark regulations which 
serve to create a level-playing field for the banking and the financial services 
institutions. Meanwhile, the regulators have also been promoting market 
competitiveness and financial innovation. Therefore, this research seeks to analyse 
the extent to which the regulators reconcile the level-playing field regulations with the 
complexities and uncertainties that exist in the financial system. In light of these, the 
third subsidiary question is to examine the need of more banking regulations for 
Islamic banks for a better level-playing field.  
 
1.3 THE SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH  
This research focuses on the regulations governing Islamic retail banks which typically 
involves deposit-taking business involving private depositors, (as opposed to 
wholesale banks which involve corporates and governments as clients) and small 
financings.30  
 
When referring to the level-playing field regulations, the context of regulation referred 
to involves the aspect of prudential regulation. Prudential regulation is a significant 
feature within the topic of banking regulations. Its role is to deal with the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions in order to protect depositors, regardless of the 
bank’s impact on the economy.31 Prudential regulation helps to protect depositors who 
                                                 
30 Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking in Theory and Practice, (1996), p.24 
31Charles E. Goodhart, et al, Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?,(1999), p.5.  
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often have very little information on the nature of the firm’s business and therefore they 
are not in the best position to judge the safety and soundness of financial institutions. 
Moreover, due to the fact that banks are exposed to various types of risks, an 
appropriate prudential regulation for banks is crucial to maintain the stability of the 
financial system.  
 
While this research mainly focuses on the aspect of retail banking, note that in the 
later chapters (Chapter 3 and 4), the discussion on Sukuk (commonly known as 
Islamic bond) and taxation is discussed. This is because, Sukuk is used by retail 
Islamic banks for their liquidity management and taxation supports retail Islamic 
mortgage product. Therefore, it is felt that such discussion is important to highlight the 
context of level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks.   
 
1.4 TERMINOLOGY 
This section describes terminology that is used throughout this research.  
 
The United Kingdom and the English common law  
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland comprises of three separate 
legal systems – England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.32  The English 
law refers to the law of England and Wales as they share the same legal system – the 
common law.  
 
The UK has no codified constitution, and its constitutional arrangements are derived 
from various sources of law – (i) the legislation (which is produced through the 
                                                 
32 J. M. Smith (ed), “England and Wales” in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, (2006), p.242  
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parliamentary system), (ii) delegated legislation (such as Orders in Council, statutory 
instruments, bylaws, regulations), (iii) case law, (iv) custom and (v) law reform 
(decided by the Royal Commission or the Law Commission).33  The UK legal system 
upholds the notion of parliamentary supremacy which means that the constitutionality 
of primary legislation shall not be questioned by the English courts. However 
subsidiary legislation may be declared ultra vires.34  
 
The UK’s regulatory framework  
The UK’s regulatory framework refers to the regulatory governance by the Bank of 
England (BOE), Financial Policy Committee (FPC), Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  
 
The PRA is a new subsidiary of the Bank of England, replacing the former Financial 
Services Authority (FSA). The PRA is responsible for prudential regulation of all 
deposit-taking institutions, insurers and investment banks. Its general objectives are 
“to ensure that the business of the firms it regulates is carried on in a way which avoids 
any adverse effect on the stability of the UK financial system”35 and “to minimise the 
adverse effect that the failure of one of the firms it regulates could be expected to have 
on the stability of the UK financial system.”36   
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. Ultra vires: “Beyond the powers. Term relating generally to the excess of legal powers or 
authority; specifically, the exercise by a corporation of powers beyond those conferred on it explicitly 
or implicitly.” See, L.B Curzon and P. H Richards (eds), The Longman Dictionary of Law, (2007), 
p.596 
35 Bank of England, ‘The Prudential Regulatory Approach to Banking Supervision’, (June 2014), p.8  
36 Ibid.  
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The FCA is the conduct regulator for PRA-authorised firms and prudential regulator 
for many other UK firms. Its general objectives are “to maintain and ensure the integrity 
of the market, regulate financial services firms to treat the consumers fairly and ensure 
the market’s competitiveness.”37  
 
The BOE has the overall responsibility for financial stability in the UK and the FPC is 
primarily responsible for assisting the BOE to achieve its financial stability objective. 
Further, it is given the powers of recommendation and direction to the FCA and PRA 
to address systemic risk. 38  
 
The banking and financial services institutions in the UK are also subject to European 
Union law.39 The governing legislation for the regulatory framework in the UK is the 
Financial Services Act 2012 and the legislation for financial services and markets is 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  
 
Another terminology used to refer to the UK’s regulatory framework is ‘conventional 
regulatory framework’ whereby Islamic banks in the UK are governed alongside the 
conventional banks within the same regulatory framework (as opposed to the 
Malaysian regulatory framework where Islamic banks are governed separately).  The 
terms ‘UK regulatory framework’ and the ‘conventional regulatory framework’ are used 
interchangeably.  
 
                                                 
37 ‘History of the Financial Conduct Authority’ via <http://www.fca.org.uk/> accessed: 13 July 2015  
38 Supra, Note. 35, p.5-6 
39 Ibid. 
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Malaysia and the Malaysian Dual Regulatory Framework  
Similar to the UK legal system, Malaysia is a common law jurisdiction. However, unlike 
the UK which has no codified constitution, Malaysian constitutional governance is 
based on its written constitution which is called the Federal Constitution. 
 
The financial services system in Malaysia is based on a dual regulatory framework.40 
It consists of a conventional or civil statute known as the Financial Services Act 2013 
(FSA 2013) that governs the conventional banks including Islamic banking divisions 
(also known as ‘Islamic windows’).41 Fully fledged Islamic banks are governed by the 
Islamic Financial Services Act 2013.42 The FSA 2013 and IFSA 2013 do not supersede 
one another. Therefore, when referring to the term ‘Malaysian regulatory framework’, 
it implies a dual banking framework in which the Islamic financial sector and the 
conventional financial sector operate on a parallel footing.43  
 
Sharia and Sharia-compliance  
The usage of the term Sharia is rather broad, and it goes beyond its literal meaning. 
Sharia literally means “the road to the watering place, the path to be followed.”44 It is 
technically defined as “the Canon law of Islam, the totality of Allah’s commands”45 or 
otherwise regarded by Muslims as “matters which would not have been known but for 
the communications made to us by the Lawgiver”.46 This broad definition includes 
                                                 
40 Section 27 Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
41 Section 15 Financial Services Act 2013 
42 Preamble, Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
43 Section 27 Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
44 M.H Khan, The School of Islamic Jurisprudence (1997), p.5 
45 Ibid. 
46 Nicolas P. Aghnides, Mohammedan Theories of Finance (1916), 23. 
38 
 
“revelations made by the Hebrew Prophets and Jesus,”47 however a valid revelation 
in Islam is only complete and legitimate when such revelation is made through Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH).48  
 
Sharia however cannot be precisely considered as ‘Law’ or code of conduct per se, 
as it encompasses all human activities on which “human happiness, prosperity and 
progress depend.”49 Muslims believe that Islam establishes public good, public 
interest, justice, mercy and wisdom and to them, these are the key to success in this 
World and the Hereafter.  Hence, Sharia imposed dual obligations towards the 
believers, on the one hand, in relation to God and on the other, in relation to society.50     
 
In the Islamic finance industry, sharia-compliance refers to acts based on Islamic 
principles. This includes the prohibition of (i) charging interest (Riba) – Riba literally 
means “an excess” and is interpreted as “any unjustifiable increase of capital whether 
in loans or sales”.51 This is based on the arguments that the prohibition of Riba or 
interest is against social justice, equality and property rights.52 Notably, the Sharia 
allows the earning of profits (as the religion encourages successful entrepreneurship) 
by justifying the extra profits determined ex ante (prior to the conclusion of the 
agreement), and not ex post (after the agreement is concluded); (ii) the prohibition of 
non-ethical investment activities (such as alcohol, prostitution or gambling); and (iii) 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Syed Abul Hassan Najmee, Islamic Legal Theory and the Orientalists, (1989), p.19 
50 Ibid. 
51 Hossein Askari, Zamir Iqbal, Noureddine Krichene and Abbas Mirakhor, The Stability of Islamic 
Finance: Creating a Resilient Financial Environment for a Secure Future, (2010), p.4-5 
52 Ibid. 
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the prohibitions of speculative behavior (Islamic finance prohibits transactions 
involving uncertainties including gambling, and any transactions involving high levels 
of risk).53 Theoretically, the reference to Sharia-compliance indicates that transactions 
are considered lawful under Sharia principles and non-Sharia compliance refers to 
unlawful transactions as prescribed by Sharia. In practice, Sharia-compliance is a 
transaction that is considered lawful (only) according to the legal opinion (fatwa) of a 
particular scholar or group of scholars. Therefore, a transaction can be considered as 
lawful (Sharia-compliant) by one scholar or group of scholars in a board of the same 
sitting while other scholars may consider it unlawful.  
 
Islamic Banks, Islamic financial sector, the inherent nature of Islamic banks  
The usage of the term ‘Islamic banks’ in this research refers to Islamic banks’ retail 
banking business in accordance with Sharia. The terms ‘Islamic banking and financial 
services institutions’ is used to indicate all types of Islamic banks, that is, both retail 
and wholesale Islamic banks. ‘Islamic financial sector’ includes the Islamic banking 
and financial services sector as a whole. 
 
Islamic banks typically offer savings and current account deposits, financing products 
such as home finance and personal finance, internet banking, cheque books, and debit 
cards.54 Some Islamic banks (such as Bank Islamic Malaysia Berhad and HSBC 
Amanah) also offer credit cards.55  
 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance, (2012), p.41 
55 See the products via <http://www.bankislam.com.my/> and <https://www.hsbcamanah.com.my/> 
accessed: 10 July 2015  
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The reference to the inherent nature of Islamic banks is based on Sharia-compliance 
requirements as well as the nature of Islamic banks, which considers the bank-
customer relationship in terms of profit-loss sharing. In principle, under profit-loss 
sharing transactions the status of the creditor is as an investor and the debtor as a 
manager (or sometimes referred to as the entrepreneur).  This is distinct from 
conventional finance principles where the status of the bank is as creditor (lender) and 
the customer as the debtor (borrower). Thus, in Islamic finance, the investor and the 
manager share the profit and losses as agreed upon the conclusion of the agreement. 
Another nature of Islamic finance is that money is considered as actual capital when 
it is joined with other resources in undertaking a productive activity.56 Islam recognises 
the time value for money only when it acts as actual capital and not ‘potential’ capital 
(where there is no productive activity). Finally, the Islamic finance nature represents 
the discouragement of any transaction, which is against social justice such as 
exploitation of the contractual parties and any act which leads to informational 
asymmetry in general.57  
 
Level-playing field regulations  
The reference to the term level-playing field regulations indicates two contexts. First, 
the criteria of what constitute as level-playing field regulations as described in Section 
1.6.  Second, level-playing field regulations represents the view or idea of the UK 
and/or Malaysian regulators in respect of providing regulatory accommodation for 
Islamic banks.  
  
                                                 
56 Supra, Note. 32,p.4-5 
57 Ibid. 
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1.5 GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology for this thesis is qualitative and primarily literature-based. 
As such, primary and secondary sources of information are referred to in carrying out 
the investigation and analysis. A small amount of primary data is used merely to 
support the arguments presented in this research. The investigation is made by 
gathering the data from interviews held with market players, mainly Islamic bankers. 
In particular, a set of research questions (pilot questions) were prepared for the market 
players pertaining to the performance of Islamic banks, the regulatory accommodation 
for Islamic banks in relation to the concept of level-playing field regulation (including 
the challenges and benefits for Islamic banks) and how Islamic banks were treated by 
the regulators. However, their views are rather personal, and do not necessarily 
represent the Islamic financial sector as a whole. The primary data gathering is then 
analysed and extracted to suit the discussion pertaining to the level-playing field 
regulations. For instance, the market players’ views on the level-playing field 
regulations on authorisation process are discussed accordingly within the section on 
authorisation of the UK and Malaysian chapter.  In sum, the usage of the primary data 
is carefully selected to suit the discussion in the relevant chapter.  
 
Secondary data comprises of the most significant source of information in this legal 
research. These include law cases, general statements of the law, journal articles, 
official publications, statutory instruments and trusted online resources. The usage of 
secondary data is in fact, the primary source of this thesis. The research method-data 
analysis such as law cases were used to analysed the extent of judicial treatment 
towards Islamic banks. In particular, the law cases were used to identify whether 
Islamic banks were given any special treatment by the judicial courts.  
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In both chapters (the UK and Malaysia), the law cases that were chosen as an 
authority are those that represent significant law judgment on Islamic banking issues, 
and analysis were made in relation to the question of level-playing field based on the 
court’s judgment. General statements of the law from regulatory authorities were also 
used in order to determine and interpret a particular legal treatment over issues 
discussed in this research. Journal articles were carefully selected from the 
internationally recognised publications to develop and support the research discussion 
as well as a supporting reference for this research. Official publications from the 
banking and financial regulators in the UK and Malaysia, were used to analyse the 
regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia. In particular, the 
extent of the regulators’ treatment on Islamic banks and to what extent their treatment 
represents the concept of level-playing field. Additionally, official publications were 
also gathered from the international regulatory authorities for the banking and financial 
institutions worldwide.   
 
In examining the regulation for Islamic banks, statutory instruments in the UK and 
Malaysia were used. Statutory instruments governing the Islamic banks such as the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), 
Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 and Financial Services Act 2013 (Malaysia) have 
helped this research to identify the particularities of the regulatory accommodation for 
Islamic banks. For example, the regulation pertaining to authorisation process of 
Islamic banks and taxation helped this research to analyse whether the existing 
regulatory accommodation reflects the concept of level-playing field for Islamic banks.  
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In some aspect of this research, other secondary data such as online resources were 
used. The usage of the online resources as a reference in this research was used to 
further support the discussion of this research. For instance, the discussion on taxation 
in this research depends somewhat heavily on online resources for the fact that there 
is limited information on other secondary data. Moreover, the general news on Islamic 
banks was gathered from trusted online websites. In sum, the usage of the secondary 
data is considered as significant source of data which helps this research to reach its 
findings based on the primary and subsidiary research questions. Therefore, given 
that the nature of the research, and its primary function, the use of secondary data is 
considered the most appropriate and authoritative.  
 
With regards to the research design of this thesis, the usage of all the materials from 
the primary and secondary data was used as the tool to construct the whole structure 
of this thesis. While there is an absence of detailed research on the level-playing field 
regulations for Islamic banks and its criterion, the discussion on the topic of level-
playing field in other fields provides inspiration for the author to construct this research 
in a detailed manner. The references to primary and secondary data have inspired the 
author to extract the potential factors to determine what constitute as level-playing field 
regulations (its criterion) for Islamic banks in an orderly manner. The criterion is then 
used to identify the extent of the level-playing field regulations. Subsequently, the 
chosen examples of the regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks (for example, 
authorisation process, liquidity regulation, taxation, judicial cases, etc) were 
incorporated with the discussion on the possible criterion of level-playing field 
regulation (for example, the question of whether the authorisation of Islamic banks 
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represents formal equality or substantive equality and whether such regulations 
represents a level-playing field regulations).  
 
With regards to the chapters’ allocation in this thesis, the discussion on level-playing 
field regulations and the rationale for banking regulations were allocated as the 
beginning chapter of this thesis. This is to provide the readers on the foundational 
issues for banking regulation and the idea of level-playing field regulations. The 
examination of the level-playing field regulations for the UK and Malaysia is allocated 
in separate chapters for systematic arguments and presentation. The arguments and 
analysis developed from chapter two to four is further analysed in chapter five. Finally, 
the conclusion chapter concludes the findings as founded from the analysis of all the 
earlier chapters.  
 
Additionally, since the research involves a comparative legal study on the regulation 
governing Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia, a comparative law methodology is 
employed. Therefore, the next section provides the definition, scope, strengths and 
weaknesses of comparative law. 
 
1.5.1 COMPARATIVE LAW 
The history of the comparative law study begins as early as the Greek period where 
Plato compared the legal structures of the Greek city-states and Aristotle made a 
comparative enquiry on 153-city state constitutions.58 Comparative law study has been 
established since then, from the Roman Empire, until today. The area of comparative 
law study has now expanded from purely legal studies to economic, social, cultural 
                                                 
58 Stanley N. Katz (ed), The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, (2009), (vol.2),  p.97 
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and religious studies across borders.59 Comparative law has been defined by various 
scholars in different ways, albeit the substance remains similar. There is no exhaustive 
and binding definition for the term ‘Comparative law’.  The most celebrated definition 
is by Zweigert and Kötz, where comparative law is described as an “intellectual activity 
with law as its object and comparison as its process”.60 Others define comparative law 
as “the study of the relationship of one legal system and its rules with another”61; 
“simultaneously studied side by side.”62  
 
Comparative law pertains to hermeneutic (the understanding of the institutional setting 
out of which the law arises and is used), explanatory (explaining the law, explaining 
the differences and similarities), empirical (determining the best legal means), logical 
(coherence, structuring concepts, rules and principles), instrumental (concept-
building) and critical evaluation.63 
 
The significance of comparative law comprises the juxtaposition and harmonisation of 
the rules of the legal systems of the world and it involves the extra element of 
internationalism.64  Its purpose is not only law reform, or to offer itself as a research 
tool, or to promote international understanding, but to fulfill its essential task of 
furthering the universal knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon of law.65  
                                                 
59 Ibid., p.100 
60 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, (1998), p.2 
61 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, (1993), p.6 
62Jaako Husa, “Comparative Law, Legal Linguistics and Methodology of Legal Doctrine” in Van Hoecke, 
Methodologies of Legal Research, (2011), p. 210 
63 Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research, (2011), Preface. 
64 Supra, Note 61, p.4 
65 Ibid. 
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Thus, “comparative law affords us a glimpse into the form and formation of legal 
institutions which develop in parallel, possibly in accordance with laws yet to be 
determined, and permits us to catch sight, through the differences in detail, of the 
grand similarities and so to deepen our belief in the existence of a unitary sense of 
justice.”66 It is used to provide ideas for the necessary changes to the legal systems 
or institutions to be harmonised, to smooth the process or suggest the creation of a 
model law or a unified law.67  With regards to this research, the usage of comparative 
law methodology helps the analysis on the similarities and differences of regulatory 
accommodation from the context of level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks in 
both countries - the UK and Malaysia. The comparative law methodology also enables 
this research to highlight the international understanding on the level-playing field 
regulations for Islamic banks in a different regulatory architecture of these two 
common law systems and to analyse the effectiveness of the level-playing field 
regulations in both legal systems.  
 
Comparative legal research enables the international harmonisation of law to be 
developed to achieve international legal standards through the concept of legal 
transplants. Legal transplants denote “the moving of a rule or a system of law from 
one country to another, or from one people to another.”68 From this concept, this 
research considers the possibility of adopting a legal transplant by borrowing a positive 
aspect of a particular legal framework from a foreign legal system (e.g., Malaysia) into 
the domestic legal system (UK). 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67Esin Örücü, “Developing Comparative Law” in Comparative Law Handbook,  (2007),  Esin Örücü 
and David Nelken (eds), p. 56 
68 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, (1993), p. 23 
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In comparative law, there are two units of comparison that can be useful for research 
analyses.69 One unit involves the comparison of spirit and style of different legal 
systems; concentrating on the methods of thought and procedures they use. This is 
referred to as ‘macro comparison’. Thus, instead of concentrating on individual 
concrete problems and their solutions, the principle for macro comparison denotes 
“the research method of handling legal materials, procedures for resolving and 
deciding disputes or the roles of those engaged in law.”70 Macro comparison is also 
extended to the comparative analysis between legal systems with other existing 
systems: the societal, cultural, political and economic.71  
 
‘Micro comparison’ deals with specific legal institutions or problems, that is, the rules 
used to solve actual problems or particular conflict of interests.72 It can be suggested 
that the two units cannot stand on their own. Both of the units are interrelated in 
carrying out the comparing process. As Örücü states,  
“…macro comparison and micro comparison should merge, since the micro 
comparative topic must be placed within the entire legal system. Hence, macro 
comparative unit, that is, the totality of the legal system in context, is the frame within 
which all is contained and evaluated.”73  
Zweigert and Kötz state,  
“The dividing line between macro comparison and micro comparison is admittedly 
flexible. Indeed, one must often do both at the same time, for often one has to study 
                                                 
69 Supra, Note. 58, p. 4 
70 Supra, Note. 68, p. 56-58 
71 Ibid. 
72 Supra, Note. 61, p. 5 
73 Supra, Note. 67, p. 57 
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the procedures by which the rules are in fact applied in order to understand why a 
foreign system solves a particular problem in the way it does.”74 
 
In light of the above, the method of this research calls for the usage of both categories.  
The usage of macro-comparison helps this research to compare how the UK and 
Malaysia are treating Islamic banks within their regulatory framework. Macro 
comparison also helps this research to compare the legal procedures adopted by both 
countries and identify the regulators’ approach in resolving the issues of Islamic 
banking. Additionally, adopting macro-comparison method enables this research to 
describe the regulator’s motivation of regulating Islamic banks and ultimately helps 
this research to reach its findings. Whereas the usage of micro-comparison enables 
this research to examine the specific regulatory area affecting Islamic banks and helps 
the discussion of a particular regulatory area from the context of level-playing field 
regulations. In light of this, micro-comparison method facilitates this research in 
reaching its conclusion on the effectiveness of the level-playing field regulations in 
both states as well as the usefulness of the idea of the level-playing field regulations 
in general.  
 
In sum, the usage of comparative law methodology will help this research to 
contextualise the legal framework as a whole and to critically evaluate what has been 
discovered from the comparative analysis. Additionally, the method of contextualising 
helps this research to examine the conceptual structure within which legal problems 
emerge and the extent to which the rules are operated.75  
                                                 
74 Supra, Note. 60, p. 5 
75 Ibid. 
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It has been suggested that in order to fulfill the requirements of scholarly comparative 
legal research, “it is not only to consider the similarities and differences, but also to 
observe what is actually there.”76 Therefore, based on what is provided in the 
regulatory framework, this research takes a step further by identifying the lacunae in 
the law and elicit potential risks behind the existing regulation.  
 
Comparative law study as a methodology for legal research has its advantage and 
disadvantages which will invariably affect this research project. To start with, I shall 
discuss some of the disadvantages before moving on to the advantages. 
 
Comparative law has no power to lay down rules to assist the comparatist in decision 
making77 as any study of comparative law will be subjective, and no objective test will 
demonstrate that the aspects considered were the most appropriate.78  Thus, 
comparative law research is often regarded as superficial,79 “unsystematic, 
incomplete, a thing of shreds and patches.”80 With respect to this research, the 
comparative analysis of chapter three and four differs in certain aspect pertaining to 
the type of regulation for Islamic banks. This is for the fact that a particular type of 
regulation does not exist in either one of the two countries. For instance, chapter three 
(the UK chapter) discussed the regulation on Home Purchase Plan whereas there is 
no discussion as such in chapter four (the Malaysian chapter). (This is due to the fact 
that there is no such regulation as such in Malaysia). In certain aspect, there is no 
                                                 
76 Supra, Note 58, p. 50 
77 Bernhard Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law, (1990), p.7 
78 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, (1993), p.11 
79 Ibid. 
80 Supra, Note. 58, p.39 
50 
 
discussion on a particular type of regulation although such regulation does exist. For 
instance, the regulatory decision making process as examined in the chapter three is 
not examined in chapter four because there is no pertinent issue with regards to the 
level-playing field regulation to be discussed (although there is decision-making 
process do exist in  the Malaysian regulatory framework).  
 
The legal system of the world varies from one country to another, from one institution 
to another, and none of them are the same. In the field of comparative law studies, 
finding the exact counterparts in different systems is hardly possible. Grossfeld asserts 
that the difficulty in comparative legal studies relates to the suitability of comparisons. 
In particular, how one chooses which legal institution to be compared with, and in 
which legal system. He sees that this problem is something which is not too acute with 
Western European cultures, but difficulties arise when one is making comparison with 
Africa and Asia. Thus, he argues that to decide whether an institution is transferable, 
or what adaptation is possible, is an issue in comparative law study.81  
 
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, there is no standard methodology for a comparative 
lawyer to adopt,82 therefore the task to determine a meaningful comparison is harder 
– as Zweigert and Kötz assert, “incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in 
law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill the same function.”83 
With regards to this research, the ‘comparable thing’ refers to the regulatory 
                                                 
81 Ibid., p. 38 
82 Supra, Note. 60, p. 50 
83 Ibid, p. 34 
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institutions for the banking institutions in the UK and Malaysia. The regulatory 
institutions are deemed to have the same function.  
 
 
The variations mentioned above are the factors that contribute to the difference in legal 
culture. Even if one finds that the countries in comparison are from the same legal 
family,84 (for example, the UK and Malaysia as common law family), what makes the 
law regulated in such a manner depends on the regulatory culture of each country and 
the intention of the regulator. Therefore, the regulatory framework for Malaysia may 
not be appropriate for the UK and vice versa.  In short, clear cut answers from 
comparative legal research can rarely be provided.85 In particular, this research is 
unable to suggest which regulatory framework is more suitable to be adopted for the 
regulations of Islamic banks, but in some aspect of the regulatory accommodation, it 
does suggest how well the regulations accommodate Islamic banks within the context 
of level-playing field. This research supports the sayings that comparative law study 
is nothing more sophisticated than empirical observation86and “comparative law 
cannot be evaluative because it ‘gives no guidelines’ as to which legal solution might 
be the better one”.87 
 
                                                 
84 Legal families have been introduced by scholars to arrange the mass legal systems of the world.  
85 Nicholas Foster, “Comparative Commercial Law” in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative 
Law Handbook (2007), p. 280 
86 Mitchel De S.-O.L’ E. Lasser, The Question of Understanding, (2003), p.199.  Pierre Legrand argues 
that “even the most sophisticated comparative analysis originating from one tradition will, ultimately fail 
to cross epistemological boundaries.” Pierre Legrand, “Alterity: About Rules for Example” in Peter Birks 
and Arianna Pretto (eds), Themes of Comparative Law, (2004), p.22 
87 Ralf Michaels quoted in James Gordley, ‘ The Functional Method’ in Giuseppe Monateri (ed), 
Methods of Comparative Law, p.109 
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In spite of all this, comparative law research provides certain advantages. 
Comparative law analysis may improve the legal development of a particular country. 
It may expose foreign views on the domestic law and help the domestic legal system 
to learn from other foreign legal systems, although not necessarily to absorb or 
implement foreign law.88 Comparative law analysis will enable domestic legal 
institutions to elicit the essentials of the domestic law. Grossfeld opines that 
comparative law “relieves us the aridity of national self-contemplation, shows us how 
it may be misunderstood abroad, and helps us to reach the foreign ear.”89   
 
Additionally, the comparative law analysis will facilitate the domestic legal system to 
consider “whether it is possible to accept foreign solutions with modifications or without 
modifications”.90 In other words, the facilitation of comparative law analysis will help 
this research to identify the positive approach of one legal system to another. 
 
Another comparative aspect of this research involves the institutional and public policy 
comparisons with regards to the level-playing field regulations and its effectiveness for 
the Islamic banking sector between the UK and Malaysia. In particular, this research 
is comparing the institutional and public policy aspect as part of the analysis. As the 
conclusion chapter shows, more success in the level-playing field regulation for Islamic 
banks can be inferred from the Malaysian model due to its dual regulatory framework 
which derived from the government’s institutional and public policy. Whereas the UK 
model which treats Islamic banks within a single regulatory framework (as part of the 
                                                 
88 Supra, Note. 58, p.113 
89 Ibid. 
90 Supra, Note. 60, p. 16 
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government’s institutional and public policy) shows that there are more substantive 
issues that give rise to some challenges for Islamic banks.  
 
1.5.2 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS TEST 
 
In examining whether the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks has been 
enabled by the regulators in the UK and Malaysia, two test questions are referred to:  
 
(i) Whether Islamic banks are treated equally before the law; and  
(ii) Whether Islamic banks are given a fair opportunity to compete alongside the 
conventional banks. 
 
As the following chapter argues, the two questions above reflect the elements that 
should exist concurrently in the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks. The 
detailed prescription of this test is discussed in the next chapter under Section 2.3. It 
has also been stated in the next chapter that another approach to determine whether 
the playing field is level, is by asking when the level-playing field can be regarded as 
distorted. In other words, the answers to the above questions reflect an obvious, not 
a mere, negative outcome. This approach is also mentioned further in the next chapter 
under Section 2.3. 
 
1.6 SCHOLARLY CONTEXT 
Earlier research has influenced the direction and focus of this study. Earlier literature 
inspired the existing research on Islamic banks with respect to the regulatory 
accommodation and the inherent nature of Islamic banks. The previous studies have 
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shown that the theoretical nature of Islamic banks and its practices have exposed 
Islamic banks to certain types of risk. It has been commonly argued that the stability 
of Islamic banks can be adversely affected with the existence of the risks identified. 
 
To my knowledge, thus far there is no research which has dealt with the concept of 
level-playing field regulations in a detailed manner and whether banking regulators 
have enabled the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks. This research, 
therefore, combines the discussion in the existing literatures and focuses on 
investigating the areas which have not been explored by authors in their published 
works. 
 
Aldohni91 provides an insight into the legal aspects of the Islamic financial sector in 
the UK and Malaysia. He described the legal accommodation for Islamic banks in 
these two countries as well as analysing the legal impediments arising from such legal 
accommodation. He proposed that more regulation should be given to Islamic banks 
to enable the sector to develop. His comparative research can be said to be similar to 
this research (in particular, the subject of Islamic banking and the countries in focus 
are the same); nevertheless, his research does not focus on the context of level-
playing field regulations. Rather, his work aims to provide a general overview of the 
practices between the two countries without aiming to examine a specific theme within 
the comparative study.   
 
                                                 
91Abdul  Karim Aldohni, The Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking, (2010) 
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Housby92 provides a general overview of the products and services provided by 
Islamic financial institution in the UK. Based on her overview of the products and 
services, she describes the strengths and weaknesses of the current products and 
services available in the market without venturing into further theoretical details. Her 
work also highlights several issues which concerns the British Muslims who are the 
main consumer of Islamic financial services in the UK. Due to the scope that she 
focuses on, however, the regulatory framework governing Islamic banks in the UK was 
disregarded.  
 
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of literature published93 on the 
general overview of the history, theories, principles and practice of Islamic banking. 
These literatures focus on providing a theoretical understanding on the nature of 
Islamic finance and its operations without further discussion on issues related to 
Islamic banks.  
 
Growing volumes of literature94 have provided in-depth analysis on the type of risks 
attached to Islamic banks. Comparative analyses have been made between the 
                                                 
92 Elaine Housby, Islamic Financial Services in the United Kingdom, (2011) 
93Fuad Al-Omar and Mohammed Abdel- Haq, Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice and Challenges (1996) 
OUP: Karachi;  Muhammad Taqi Usmani,  An Introduction to Islamic Finance, (2012), Muhammad 
Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, (2007), Brian Kettell, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, (2008), 
Hans Visser, Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice, (2009), Sami Hassan Homoud, Islamic Banking, 
(1985) 
94 Dahlia El-Hawary, Wafik Grais and Zamir Iqbal, ‘Diversity in the Regulation of Islamic Financial 
Institutions’, (2007), Alejandro López Mejia, Suliman Aljabrin, Rachid Awad,Mohamed Norat and Inwon 
Song, ‘Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks’, (2014), Nafis Alam, ‘Impact of Banking Regulation 
on Risk and Efficiency in Islamic Banking’, (2013), Pejman Abidefar, Philip Molyneux, Amine Tarazi, 
‘Risk in Islamic Banking’, (2012), Martin Čihák and Heiko Hesse, ‘Islamic Banks and Financial Stability: 
An Empirical Analysis’, (2008), Sundarajan and Luca Errico, ‘Islamic Financial Institutions and Products 
56 
 
operational aspects of Islamic financial intermediation in practice with its conceptual 
foundations. Moreover, comparative analyses have been conducted between Islamic 
and conventional banks. These literatures highlight the risks and challenges which 
Islamic banks are exposed to through the legal framework, corporate governance and 
supervision. Risks, which Islamic banks are exposed to, were identified as impacting 
upon Islamic banks differently as compared to conventional banks. It was also found 
that in certain types of risk, Islamic banks can be more heavily affected than the 
conventional banks while in some other instances, the conventional banks suffer more 
risk than Islamic banks. In their research on the risks and challenges facing Islamic 
banks, authors have suggested that an appropriate regulatory framework is essential 
for the stability of Islamic banks.  
 
Blair et al.95 and Henderson96 provide an in-depth description on the regulatory 
governance for the Islamic financial sector in the UK. In particular, the authors 
highlighted the aspect of authorisation and categorisation of Islamic financial products 
within the UK’s conventional regulatory framework. Several regulatory issues were 
raised with respect to the conventional regulatory framework governing Islamic banks 
in the UK. The authors found that the conventional regulatory framework does not fully 
compliment the operational aspect of Islamic banks.   
 
                                                 
in the Global Financial System: Key Issues in Risk Management and Challenges Ahead’, (2002), 
Khadidja Khaldi and Amina Hamdouni, ‘Islamic Financial Intermediation’, (2011), Simon Archer and 
Rifaat Abdel Karim, ‘Corporate Governance, Market Discipline and Regulation of Islamic Banks’, (2006) 
95 Michael Blair, George Walker, Robert Purves, Financial Services Law, (2009) 
96 Andrew Henderson, ‘ Islamic Financial Institutions’ in Craig R. Nethercott and David M. Eisenberg 
(eds), Islamic Finance: Law and Practice, (2012)  
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Greuning and Iqbal97 provide a detailed analysis on the risks which Islamic banks are 
exposed to. They identify that the nature of Islamic financial intermediation, which 
deviates from its theoretical aspects, threatens the stability of Islamic banks. 
Comparative analyses were made between the operations of Islamic banks and the 
conventional banks. Their analyses have shown that various types of risks could 
potentially affect the operations and stability of Islamic banks if they are not fully 
addressed.  
 
Several studies98 have discussed the concept of level-playing field in separate fields 
such as international financial regulation, economic justice, international law, and US 
financial regulation. In each study, authors have discussed the concept of level-playing 
field and made an attempt to interpret the concept of level-playing field with regards to 
their research subject. In sum, it can be inferred that the concept of level-playing field 
represents fair treatment.  
 
1.7 RESEARCH STRUCTURE  
 
Part 1: Level-playing field regulations  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Part one comprises of chapter two which prepares 
a foundation for the discussion of whether there is a need to regulate Islamic banks 
                                                 
97 Hennie Van Greuning and Zamir Iqbal ‘Banking and the Risk Environment’ in Simon Archer and 
Rifaat Abdul Karim (eds), Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge (2007)  
98 Alan Morrison and  Lucy White, ‘Level-Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation’, (2009), 
Surya P. Subedi, ‘The Notion of Free Trade and the First Ten Years of the World Trade Organization: 
How Level is the “Level-Playing Field?”’, (2006), Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Economic Justice in an Unfair 
World: Towards a Level-Playing Field’, (2007), Helen A. Garten, U.S Financial Regulation and Its 
Implications for the Global Marketplace, (2001) 
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more than what the existing regulations have provided for. This chapter provides the 
examination and analysis on the rationale for banking regulations, and whether there 
should be more regulation for Islamic banks. It was found that level-playing field 
regulations is not a useful concept, not only because the regulators have failed to 
enable the level-playing field regulations but also because the rationales underlying 
banking regulations have made the concept of level-playing field regulations for 
Islamic banks unworkable. Additionally, this chapter discuss the various 
interpretations of the notion level-playing field.  This chapter interprets the notion level-
playing field regulations for Islamic banks and establishes several factors which are 
seen to be a challenge for the level-playing field regulations.  
 
Part 2: Level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks  
Part two of this thesis consists of chapters three and four.  Chapter three analyses the 
regulatory accommodation governing Islamic banks in the UK. Examples of regulatory 
accommodation are examined within the context of level-playing field regulations.  This 
chapter highlights the regulatory governance for Islamic banks within the conventional 
regulatory framework and concludes that the UK’s regulators have not fully enabled 
the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks.  
 
Chapter four analyses the regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks in Malaysia 
under its dual regulatory framework. Similar to the approach used in the previous 
chapter, this chapter examines the regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks within 
the context of level-playing field regulations. It is found that while the Malaysian 
regulatory framework appears to create level-playing field regulations for Islamic 
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banks, there remain certain aspects of the regulatory accommodation in which the 
level-playing field regulation is not fully enabled.  
 
Part 3: Level-playing field and the impacts of the regulation on Islamic banks 
Following from the examination and analyses on the level-playing field regulations 
governing Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia, chapter five of this thesis discussed 
the impacts of the level-playing field regulations on Islamic banks. From the lists of 
impacts of the existing regulatory accommodation, it is found that the UK and 
Malaysian regulators have not enabled the level-playing field regulations in totality 
within the conventional regulatory framework (UK) and the dual regulatory framework 
(Malaysia).   
 
Part 4: Conclusion  
The final part of this thesis is contained in chapter six where a conclusion is drawn out 
based on the examination and analyses of the earlier chapters. The conclusion 
chapter highlights the issues addressed in the preceding chapters regarding the level-
playing field regulations for Islamic banks. The research concludes that several factors 
are responsible for preventing the level-playing field regulations from being a useful 
concept. These factors include the challenges and realities of the financial system, the 
concept of level-playing field regulations which poses challenges and risks towards 
Islamic banks, the failure of regulators to enable the level-playing field regulations, and 
the rationales of banking regulations which effectively make level-playing field 
regulations unworkable. The findings of this research build some direction for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: IN SEARCH OF ‘LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD’: CHALLENGES AND 
REALITIES  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
2.2     THE RATIONALES FOR BANKING REGULATION  
 (i) Anti–competitive behaviour  
 (ii) Market misconduct  
 (iii) Information asymmetries  
 (iv) Systemic stability  
 
2.3 ARGUMENTS ON BANKING REGULATIONS  
2.3.1 ‘More regulation’ argument  
 (i) Bank’s prudential as justification for more regulation  
 (ii) Sector’s development as justification for more regulation 
 (iii) Transparency as justification for more regulation 
2.3.2 ‘Less is more’ argument (Simple regulation) 
(i) Cost-benefit analysis of regulation as justification for simple regulation 
(ii) Ex ante and ex post as justification for simple regulation  
(iii) Buy what you understand as justification for simple regulation 
(iv) Platforms for dispute resolution as justification for simple regulation 
 (a) Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
 (b) Arbitration and mediation 
 (c) Ombudsman and Courts of Law  
(v) Societal background as justification for simple regulation 
 (a) The United Kingdom  
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 (b) Malaysia  
(vi) Other international regulatory standards as justification for simple 
regulation 
 
2.4 IN SEARCH OF LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD 
2.5 INTERPRETING LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD 
 (i) Whether Islamic banks are treated equally before the law  
(ii)Whether Islamic banks are given a fair opportunity to compete 
alongside the conventional banks  
2.6 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD: CHALLENGES AND REALITIES 
 (i)  Legal pluralism 
(ii) Legal change 
(iii) Level-playing field and the risks to Islamic banks 
(iv) Level-playing field and Islamic banks’ stability 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the first chapter, it was highlighted that the notion of ‘level-playing field’ has been 
the concept used by the UK and Malaysian regulators in indicating their regulatory 
treatment towards all the banking and financial services institutions.99 Despite this, it 
is also important to question the rationale of banking regulations and whether the idea 
of level-playing field regulations is necessary for Islamic banks to be subjected to more 
regulations. Therefore, the subsequent section analyses the rationale for banking 
regulations and considers whether Islamic banks should be subject to more 
regulations.  Based on the rationale for banking regulations and the justifications for 
more/simpler regulations for Islamic bank, this chapter argues that: (i) simple 
regulations for Islamic banks are more desirable (especially in the UK context) (ii) 
level-playing field regulations could not be enabled based on the rationales and 
justifications for more/simple regulations. 
 
This chapter also concludes that while it is important to address the risks exposed to 
Islamic banks, it is not necessary to have a separate regulatory framework to create a 
level-playing field. What is needed is an appropriate regulation for Islamic banks which 
could help the sector to develop. As such, this chapter suggests that a simple 
regulatory framework for Islamic banks is more desirable.  
 
 
                                                 
99 Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman and Ali Ravalia, ‘Islamic Finance in 
the UK: Regulation and Challenges’, (2007), p.17,  HM Treasury, ‘The Development of Islamic  Finance 
in the UK: The Government’s Perspective’, (2008), p.3,  BNM, ‘New Opportunities, New Market and 
New Frontier in Islamic Banking & Finance’, (Governor’s speech), (August 2004) via 
<http://www.bnm.gov.my/> accessed: 5 July 2015 
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Additionally, this research also argues that in reality, there is complexity and diversity 
in the financial system through the financial innovation and competition that the 
banking regulators have always encouraged. The notion of level-playing field is seen 
to be the benchmark for regulating the banking and financial institutions in order to 
neutralise or balance the complexity and diversity in the financial system by regulators 
globally and domestically. In the UK, the principle of “the avoidance of giving any 
special favours to one group of financial services over the other”100 reflects the concept 
of level-playing field used by the financial regulators in the banking and financial 
regulatory framework. For the Malaysian banking and financial regulatory framework, 
the treatment of level-playing field can be inferred from the dual regulatory framework 
through which the conventional and Islamic banks operate.  
 
However, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, such a form of expression is unclear. 
Level-playing field is an open-ended concept. There is no clear-cut understanding of 
what is a level-playing field, or the level-playing field of what, for there is an absence 
of a standard definition on what constitutes as a level-playing field. And determining 
what level-playing field could mean is important for the fact that such an expression is 
repeatedly used by financial regulators in indicating their approach towards the 
treatment for banking and financial services institutions that they govern (some of the 
examples on the level-playing field treatment are provided in the later part of this 
chapter). As such, the expression can be said to have its significance with regards to 
the regulators’ approach towards regulating banking and financial services. 
Interpreting what level-playing field could mean and the understanding of the basic 
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functions of law is essential – so that certain basic criteria can be established.  What 
can be inferred later in the chapter is that the concept of level-playing field is seen to 
collide with the uncertainties in the system that we live in. The concept of a level-
playing field regulation for Islamic banks is argued to be a useless concept. This is 
due to the challenges and realities that are discussed in this chapter.  
 
Apart from the reality of the complexity and diversity in the financial system mentioned 
in the preceding chapter, this chapter further argues that the challenges arises from 
the vagueness in interpretation of the notion of a level-playing field itself.  Secondly, 
the nature of the law (which also includes legal pluralism and legal change) and the 
objectives of banking regulation do not coincide with the concept of level-playing field. 
Thirdly, the concept of a level-playing field regulation is unable to address the risks 
Islamic banks are exposed to. Fourthly, the concept of level-playing field regulation is 
challenged when it could not be associated with the stability of Islamic banks. Hence, 
while the notion of level-playing field (which is regarded as the metaphor of fairness) 
is considered to be a valid expression, its value is questionable. 
 
This chapter consists of six main sections. It begins with highlighting the rationales of 
banking regulations and followed by the arguments on banking regulations. The third 
section shows the variations of interpretations on level-playing field. Following the 
discussion, analysis and conceptualisation of the notion of a level-playing field within 
the context of Islamic banks are presented. These are contained in the fourth section. 
Additionally, this section provides a brief highlight on the general nature of law and the 
general criteria of equality and fairness. Note that the discussion on the nature of law, 
justice and fairness is merely to highlight its basic concept, thus it is beyond the 
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objective of this chapter to discuss in great-depth any philosophical or jurisprudential 
sense of law and fairness. Similarly, note that a philosophical discussion is not 
intended in interpreting the level-playing field but rather how it affects the practical 
aspect of applying the regulations. The fifth section discusses the challenges and 
realities that seem to collide with the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks. 
The final section concludes.  
 
2.2 THE RATIONALES FOR BANKING REGULATION 
A large body of literature has argued that banking regulations help to create 
financial stability, development and growth.101  Regulation, in a broader context, 
refers to:   
 
“Legal rules which seek to steer the behaviour of mainly private citizens and 
companies but also of central and local government as well as public agencies.”102 
 
The rationales for banking regulation can be viewed from two perspectives - legal 
and economic.  From the legal perspective, there are four main rationales for 
regulating banks: to avoid externalities which could result in anticompetitive 
behaviour; to avoid market misconduct; to minimise information asymmetries and to 
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avoid systemic instability.103  From an economic perspective, financial regulation 
(which includes banking institutions) ‘seeks to address a variety of problems that 
occur when finance is left solely to market forces.’104  
 
The next part discusses the four main rationales for banking regulations from the 
legal perspective.  
 
(i) Anti-competitive behaviour 
It has been argued that regulation plays a role in monitoring anti-competitive 
behaviour among banking institutions.  This regulatory objective aims to eliminate 
any existing monopoly in the financial sector.  Without an appropriate regulatory 
framework, financial institutions may exert unfair and undue influence over 
information that they generate.105  One of the roles of banking regulations, 
therefore, is to help Islamic banks and conventional banks to have fair access to 
information ‘to promote a fair and open competition, and reasonable access to 
systems and information.’106  In this regard, regulation can encourage banking and 
financial institutions to compete on a level-playing field.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Douglas W. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth and the Role of Law (2007) (SOAS e-
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(ii) Market misconduct  
  Banking regulation is essential to eradicate market misconduct by banking and     
financial institutions. This is due to the fact that customers’ money is always at risk 
and fraud in the banking sector is common.107  
 
In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority through its conduct of business 
regulation requires all banking institution to deliver ‘clear, fair and not misleading 
information to the customers’.108  Conduct of business regulation focuses on ‘how 
firms conduct their business with customers’ and they are designed ‘to establish 
rules and guidelines about appropriate behaviour and business practices in dealing 
with customers’.109  It has been argued that the issues pertaining to customer 
protection within the financial sector are more crucial than in other professions. 110 
 
For Islamic banks, conduct of business regulations is important to build market 
confidence for this new financial sector.  It is vital in order to monitor the behaviour 
of Islamic banks so that non-Sharia-compliant risk can be mitigated.  The fact that 
the Islamic financial sector is relatively new in the financial market means an 
appropriate conduct of business regulation is essential for the development of 
Islamic banks.  While the Islamic finance sector is relatively new, the sector has 
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been hampered by allegations before the courts of law that their business 
transactions are non-Sharia compliant (Cases are mentioned in the previous 
chapters.)  The existing evidence proves that such allegation imply that there is a 
lack of clear information delivered to customers when the issue of non-Sharia 
compliance was raised.  As a result, the non-Sharia-compliant cases pose risks to 
the reputation of the Islamic financial sector and market confidence in Islamic 
banks.  
 
While there is no specific research to examine the extent to which market 
confidence is affected due to the non-Sharia-compliance issues of Islamic banks, 
nonetheless, recent research has demonstrated that market confidence and 
customers’ loyalty towards Islamic banks may vary over time.111  One of the main 
reasons is the quality of conduct of business (service quality) of Islamic banks.  
Surveys have shown that there is always a tendency for customers to switch banks 
due to this factor apart from other factors such as the diversity of products offered 
and attractive profit returns.112  Due to this, it has been argued that proving the 
Sharia-compliant aspect of Islamic banking products per se is not sufficient to 
sustain market confidence.  Islamic banks are expected to convince customers that 
their conduct of business is based on different values from the conventional 
banks.113  Banking regulation, therefore, plays an important role in promoting 
market confidence within the Islamic financial sector.  
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(iii) Information asymmetries  
Another rationale for banking regulation is to avoid information asymmetries.  
Information asymmetries can cause market inefficiency in terms of outcomes and 
choices.114  The nature of information asymmetries is that the financial market may 
under-produce relevant information because ‘information’s public goods nature can 
make it difficult for those investing in better and new information to appropriate an 
adequate financial return.’115  Information asymmetries cause two main problems: 
adverse selection and moral hazard.116   
 
Adverse selection is the problem created by asymmetric information before the 
transaction occurs.  It arises when the potential borrowers who are most actively 
seeks out loans generally have private information (regarding their personal 
attributes and prospects of borrowing) which is more accurate than the information 
possessed by the lender (bank).117 The lender (bank) would be at a disadvantage 
with regards to the asymmetric information. Lack of efficiency in terms of the 
borrowing evaluation can happen due the asymmetric information. Adverse 
selections can increase the probability that bad credit risks will get loans.  As a 
consequence, lenders may decide not to give any loans, even to good credit 
risks.’118  Whereas moral hazard represent ‘a situation where the prospect of 
compensation to cover risks and losses increases the likelihood and size of the 
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losses because risky behaviour cannot be monitored and priced appropriately, and 
excessive losses are compensated.’119 
 
A notable example of the information asymmetry and moral hazard problem can be 
seen in the unrestricted Mudaraba contract where the investment deposits’ capital 
value and rate of return is not guaranteed.  This type of PLS contract represent the 
circumstances where the ‘Islamic bank manages depositors’ fund at their own 
discretion.’120  This contract may become an incentive for bankers to take excessive 
risk and to fund the operation of Islamic financial institutions without adequate capital 
without the knowledge of the depositors. An appropriate banking regulation, therefore, 
that can reduce the information asymmetry problems (which focuses on the clear and 
concise disclosure of key data and information) inherent in unrestricted Mudaraba 
contracts may allow depositors to have more options for choosing an ideal bank for 
investment according to risk preferences. 121 
 
While the definition of information asymmetry and example above shows that  financial 
institution may conceal certain important information to investors, however, it can be 
argued that information asymmetry may also happen to Islamic banks as a result of 
the PLS modes of financial intermediation.  For example, the PLS modes of Islamic 
financial intermediation such as Mudaraba or Musharaka exposes Islamic banks to a 
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high degree of asymmetry information.122  The element of adverse selection exists in 
the equity-based financial contracts where borrowers have more information on the 
quality of the project than the Islamic bank.  In other words, individuals have incentives 
to under-state the actual profit they made.  Moreover, the fact that in most Islamic 
financial contracts is partnership based contract, the focus on information asymmetry 
issue is crucial for the stability of the Islamic banks as well as for the depositors’ / 
investors’ protection.  
 
(iv) Systemic stability 
Aside from information asymmetries, the insolvency of financial institutions could 
trigger systemic instability.  This is mainly due to the  fact that ‘the financial system 
is subject to waves of confidence’ and regulation is necessary to prevent banking 
panics.123  As a result, widespread panic deposit withdrawals or runs on individual 
banks can ultimately cause a systemic crisis through a domino effect.124  Banking 
regulation helps to promote systemic stability by maintaining an orderly payments 
system, ensuring the soundness and stability of the financial system as well as 
fulfilling depositors’ demand.125   
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It has been argued that since the UK’s Islamic banks share the same interbank 
market with the conventional banks, Islamic banks will be affected by market 
imperfections from the same financial system.126  Indeed, an example is the case 
of the former Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) where it is reported that the illiquidity of 
the bank was much affected by the recent financial crisis.127  While the argument is 
tenable, the facts show that the illiquidity of IBB since its first year of operation did 
not trigger a systemic crisis.128  Arguably, the main reason why IBB’s illiquidity did 
not cause a systemic crisis is because IBB was rather small in the context of the 
UK financial system. 
 
The former IBB’s case further supports Llewellyn’s contention that ‘systemic issues 
do not relate to all institutions.’129  Only if the institution is large or prominent could 
it trigger banking panics that potentially affect the economy as a whole.130  Based 
on the Financial Stability Board interpretation, there are three factors which are 
taken into consideration as systemically important for financial institutions.  These 
are: their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness and the existence of 
these three factors would ‘cause significant disruption to the wider financial system 
and economic activity.’131  
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With regards to the market size of the Islamic financial sector in the UK, there is no 
empirical evidence to show the actual size of the sector in comparison with the 
conventional financial sector.  It is, however, reported that Islamic financial assets 
in the UK as at the end of 2011 show that the UK’s Islamic financial sector holds 
only one per cent out of total Islamic financial assets globally132 and recent reports 
have revealed that the UK’s Islamic financial assets have reached USD 19 billion.133  
Based on the existing facts, it can be argued that the size of the Islamic banking 
market in the UK and globally is relatively small.  The facts also suggest that it is 
most likely that there is a low probability of a systemic occurrence.  Additionally, the 
illiquidity of most Islamic banks and Islamic windows operating in the UK during the 
past ten years support the argument that Islamic banks in the UK are unlikely to 
cause a systemic crisis.134  On top of that, based on the list of Global Systemically 
Important Banks (G-SIBs) issued by the Financial Stability Board; it is found that 
none of Islamic banks are on the list. 135 
 
In terms of credit risk, previous research has found that Islamic banks have lower 
credit risk than conventional banks - especially small, highly-leveraged Islamic 
banks.136  Similarly the researchers found that in terms of insolvency risk, ‘small 
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Islamic banks also appear to exhibit greater stability than conventional banks, as 
they are more capitalised.’137  They continue to suggest that ‘in terms of loan quality, 
(implicit) interest income and (implicit) interest expense, Islamic banks are less 
sensitive to domestic interest rates compared to conventional counterparts.’138  The 
results of their findings, however, have also shown that ‘the sensitivity of Islamic 
banks’ solvency position to interest rates is not significantly different from that of 
their conventional counterparts’ and there is no significant difference between large 
Islamic and conventional banks. 139 
 
 
In support of the above findings,  an earlier empirical analysis of 77 Islamic banks 
and 397 conventional banks in 21 countries (predominantly Muslim countries) 
between the years 1993 to 2004 used a Zscore model to show that small Islamic 
banks tend to be financially stronger than small conventional banks.*140  It is also 
observed that large conventional banks tend to be financially stronger than large 
Islamic banks and small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than large 
Islamic banks.  The findings of the analysis were based on different variables such 
as bank size, the structure of the balance sheet and system-wide variables.  The 
analysis suggests that Islamic banks are relatively more stable when operating on 
a small scale, while they are less stable when operating on a larger scale.  It is, 
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therefore, contended that as Islamic banks become larger, the more complex it 
becomes for Islamic banks to adjust their credit risk.  The researchers further argue 
that one of the possible explanations for this is the concentration on investment 
scale where ‘small Islamic banks tend to concentrate on low-risk investments and 
fee income, while large Islamic banks do more PLS business.’141  The research also 
concluded that there is no significant impact from a bigger presence of Islamic 
banks on the soundness of other banks in a country’s financial system. 142   
 
The above findings have shown the stability of Islamic banks in comparison with 
conventional banks.  It is found that small Islamic banks tend to be more stable than 
small conventional banks and there is no significant difference between large 
Islamic banks and conventional banks.  Earlier, the lack of liquidity of IBB also 
proved that systemic crisis is not necessarily triggered by the poor performance of 
a UK Islamic bank.  There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to prove that failure of 
Islamic banks cause systemic crisis.  
 
While in reality, there is stronger evidence to show that Islamic banks do not pose 
systemic crisis risks, however, systemic instability may still occur.  This is because, 
in theory, the banking system is exposed to a domino effect.  Banking regulation is, 
therefore, still needed to prevent future failures.  As Llewellyn states: 
 
“The probability that the failure of a single bank will induce a systemic problem may 
be low, but, if systemic failure were to occur, it could be serious and the costs could 
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be high. Thus, regulation to prevent systemic problems may be viewed as an 
insurance premium against a low –probability occurrence.” 143 
 
His argument is reasonable.  Nevertheless, while regulation can be regarded as an 
‘insurance premium’, the question remains whether more regulation is needed for 
Islamic banks when the market size of Islamic finance in the UK is relatively small.  
This is because systemic crisis only happens to systemically important institutions 
and not to a small market sector.144  On the other hand, such issues are not 
separate from the regulators desire to have level-playing-field regulations for the 
Islamic financial sector.  
 
This section has highlighted the objectives and rationale of banking regulations.  The 
next section focuses on whether simple or additional regulation is more desirable for 
the regulatory framework of Islamic banks and examines the impact of the existing 
regulation for Islamic banks on the level-playing-field objective.   
 
2.3 ARGUMENTS ON BANKING REGULATIONS  
2.3.1 ‘More regulation’ Argument  
(i) Bank’s prudential as justification for more regulation  
Banking regulations are used to mitigate the risk of the macro and micro prudential 
aspects of banking institutions. The objective of macro prudential regulation is ‘to 
limit the risk of episodes of financial distress with significant losses in terms of the 
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real output for the economy as a whole’,145 whereas micro prudential regulation is 
‘to limit the risk of episodes of financial distress at individual institutions, regardless 
of their impact on the overall economy.’146    
 
Due to the unique nature of Islamic banking intermediation, Islamic banks are 
exposed to risks that require appropriate prudential regulations for the survival of 
the Islamic financial sector, for instance, credit risk and operational risk.147 Authors 
have argued that Islamic banks are more vulnerable to credit risk due to the PLS 
business modes.148  This can be inferred from the following examples taken from a 
Mudaraba contract.  Firstly, in Mudaraba contracts, Islamic banks have no legal 
means to control the agent-entrepreneur who has the freedom to manage the 
enterprise according to his best judgment.  Islamic banks are, therefore, vulnerable 
to credit risk if the entrepreneur fails to make profits.149  In addition, in Mudaraba 
contracts, the Islamic bank is only entitled to receive the principal of a loan from the 
entrepreneur at the end of contract if profits are made.  If, however, loss is accrued 
at the end of the contract, the Islamic bank is unable to recover its loan. 150   
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Besides the credit risk mentioned above, Islamic banks are also vulnerable to 
operational risk. When PLS modes adopted by Islamic banks, the latter operate 
internal activities which are not normally performed by conventional banks. For 
instance, there is the determination of profit-loss-sharing ratios on investment 
projects with PLS contract. Due to the fact that Islamic banks have less onsite 
control of the project, this requires more on-going auditing of financed projects and 
greater internal control is required for Islamic banks. Additionally, the non-
standardised nature of Islamic financial products and the lack of efficient Sharia 
litigation system to enforce Islamic financial contracts may expose Islamic banks to 
more operational risk.151   
 
In another example, the original principle of Islamic banking, which is based on the 
PLS model, is seldom practiced.  For instance, in principle, the bulk of assets should 
be made of PLS mode – which essentially means uncollateralised equity financing.  
According to Sundarajan and Errico, however, these assets ‘carry far more risk than 
those made of non-PLS modes, which are collateralised commercial or retail 
financial operations.’152  In principle, therefore, ‘the ratio of riskier assets to total 
assets should typically be higher in an Islamic bank than in a conventional bank.’153  
In practice, however, it is reported that that Islamic banks only implement a small 
percentage of PLS modes.  Based on data reported by the International Associations 
of Islamic banks, Musharaka and Mudaraba assets account for approximately 25 
percent of Islamic banks’ total assets while the rest are made up of non-PLS modes 
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– notably mark-up transactions, leasing and lease purchase transactions typically 
related to trade financing.154  It is argued, therefore, that the actual practice of Islamic 
banks represents more of a hybrid between the paradigm of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks.155  
 
At the international level, the Basel Capital Accords provide a regulatory framework 
for the prudential regulation of banks globally.  In the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision, Principle 16 states:  
“The supervisor sets prudent and appropriate capital adequacy requirements for 
banks that reflect the risks undertaken by, and presented by, a bank in the context 
of the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which it operates. The supervisor 
defines the components of capital, bearing in mind their ability to absorb losses. At 
least for internationally active banks, capital requirements are not less than the 
applicable Basel standards.”156 
 
Although banking supervisors are required to set the appropriate minimum capital 
adequacy requirements, which reflect the risks that banks undertake, the question 
arises whether the supervisors consider the nature and risks of Islamic banks while 
setting the requirements. The Basel Committee is a renowned international standard-
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setting body, which helps to improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide.  
The UK and Malaysia both adopt Basel standards.157  
  
Based on the facts presented earlier, while the types of risks are identical to those 
faced by the conventional banks, nevertheless, Islamic banks address the risks quite 
differently. The application of Basel Accords may, therefore, not necessarily be the 
best option for the prudential regulatory framework for Islamic banks.  Acknowledging 
this fact, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has enacted an international 
regulatory framework for Islamic banks worldwide. The IFSB standards aim to 
complement the work of the Basel Committee to improve the supervisory framework 
for Islamic banks. 158  While the UK’s regulators are aware of the different nature of 
Islamic banks, nevertheless, the IFSB standards seem to be given less attention by 
the UK’s regulators.  There is no emphasis placed on domestic Islamic banks to 
follow the IFSB standards.  As a result, the prudential standards for Islamic banks 
may not be at the optimum level.   
 
(ii) Sector’s development as justification for more regulation 
Regulation can help the Islamic banking sector to develop.159  Without appropriate 
prudential regulation that suits the nature of Islamic banks, the sector could 
potentially be displaced in the financial market. An appropriate regulatory 
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accommodation such as the regulation for the Alternative Finance Bond has indeed 
allowed the Sukuk market to develop in the UK.  Such regulatory accommodation 
that suits the nature of Islamic finance has in fact attracted investors to purchase a 
sovereign Sukuk worth £200 million issued by the UK government worth in the year 
2014; it was oversubscribed.160  This development has indeed proved that the 
rudimentary principle in designing all regulatory or supervisory arrangements is ‘to 
support and enhance market functioning, rather than to displace market.’161  
Additionally, as mentioned in the earlier chapter, the abolition of double taxation for 
Islamic financial products162 could further help the Islamic financial sector to 
develop its market in the UK and help to achieve the objective of a level-playing 
field.  
 
(iii) Transparency as justification for more regulation  
The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority requires all banking institutions to deliver 
transparent dealing with their clients.  In particular, it states that: 
 
“A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of his clients, and communicate 
information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading.”163 
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The notion ‘must’ in the above provision represents the regulator’s expectation that 
institutions behave in a specific way.  In particular, banking institutions in the UK 
are expected to be transparent in their day-to-day dealings with their clients by 
delivering information which is ‘clear, fair and not misleading.’  
 
Owing to the unique nature of Islamic banks, transparency in delivering the 
information to the clients is significant in preventing market abuse that includes 
‘insider dealing, market manipulation, money laundering, terrorism financing and 
corruption.’164  Transparent regulations serve as an important tool to create market 
confidence in the banking and financial sector. 
 
The fundamental principle in Islamic banking operations based on the PLS model 
requires Islamic banks to provide all the necessary information with regard to the 
model.  A notable example which reflects transparent information can be seen in 
the terms and conditions of the former Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) to its depositors.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the former IBB has followed the transparency 
requirement by stating the non-Sharia-compliant aspect of its current account 
product, in particular, the UK’s regulatory policy for the deposit payment guarantee, 
which runs contrary to the PLS mode.165  
 
It is suggested that the lack of clarity in Islamic banking practices require more 
effective regulation with regard to transparency; because not all aspects of Islamic 
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banking operations are based on PLS principles.  Recent research suggests that 
due to the risks and complexities involved in PLS methods, Islamic banks tend to 
apply non-PLS methods in their short-term financing.166  Under PLS financing, 
Islamic banks need to determine the profit or loss ratio for each project.  Islamic 
banks, however, face challenges in quantifying clients’ characteristics and 
proposed business opportunities.  Hence, the PLS method seems not to be viable 
especially for short-term financing.  Moreover, revenue is not guaranteed.  
Additionally, under Mudaraba contracts, ‘Islamic banks have limited means to 
control and intervene in the management of a project.’ 167  
 
Another study shows that Islamic banks mainly use non-PLS instruments to avoid 
the moral hazard problem associated with PLS financing.168  With regards to Islamic 
banking in Malaysia, only 0.5% of finance is based on PLS principles.169  These 
studies reveal the need for further investigation with regards to the transparency of 
information given to customers.  Market confidence could be affected when clients 
are expecting a PLS transaction, but, in reality, a non-PLS model is being used.  
This issue calls for more robust regulation on transparency for Islamic banks so that 
it can deliver information that is clear, fair and not misleading.  Moreover, the 
previous chapter has shown that the lack of transparency in Islamic banking 
contracts has led to the issue of non-Sharia-compliant cases being questioned in a 
court of law, consequently causing reputational risk. 
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It can be concluded that the factors outlined above arguing for more regulation 
amount to one thing – depositors’ protection. While these factors above are 
inarguable, nonetheless, there are several other factors that suggest that simple 
regulation may be more appropriate for the regulatory framework for Islamic banks.  
These factors are considered in the next section.  
 
 
5.4.2  ‘Less is more’ Argument (Simple Regulation) 
 
(i) Cost-benefit of regulation as justification for simple regulation 
“As a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit.”170 
 
Regulation imposes costs both on the regulators and the regulated.171 As Erlich and 
Posner argues, the costs of regulation can be categorised into four main categories: 
(i) the fixed (costs) of designing and implementing legal standards (rule-making 
costs), (ii) the costs of enforcing the standards (enforcement costs), (iii) the costs 
that they impose on the regulated industry (compliance costs), and the social costs 
imposed by regulatory offences (harm costs).172 As such, it can be argued that the 
costs of regulation can be relatively high and this, therefore, raises the issue of a 
cost-benefit analysis of regulation. Following this, the justification for simple 
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172 Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner quoted in Cento Veljanovski, Ibid. 
85 
 
regulation represents that principle that the benefit of regulation should outweigh 
the costs incurred.173  In the OECD Principles of Good Regulation, one of the 
principles of good regulation is that regulation should produce benefits that justify 
costs by taking into consideration the economic, environmental and social effects174 
and it is said that an efficient set of regulations ‘minimises the sum (total) of the 
expected costs (the four categories mentioned earlier) and losses by selecting the 
most appropriate type of rule, and level and type of enforcement.’175 
 
Due to the fact that the making of regulation is connected with economic principles, 
authors have argued that more regulation leads to complexity in financial structures 
and systems.  For instance, it has been agued by Spatt that regulators should resort 
to ‘relatively simple standards and principles so that market participants can 
internalise the consequences of their actions.’176 His argument is supported by 
Aikman et. al where they contend  that ‘financial market participants are always 
likely to seek to game financial regulations, however complex they may be.’177  They 
further argue that more complex regulation makes it difficult to identify regulatory 
arbitrage, whereas simpler regulation may facilitate the identification of regulatory 
arbitrage.178  
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The question of the utility of regulation is an essential factor for considering the 
need to have more regulation. The OECD Review on Better Regulation stated that 
the UK Government gives centrality to regulatory impact assessment (RIA) in its 
regulatory decision making by assessing the cost, benefits, risks and costs of the 
proposed regulation.  For example, evidence from the RIA for Sukuk shows that the 
regulatory decisions were made based on the outcome of the regulatory 
accommodation. This is because the regulators believed that the new regulatory 
accommodation for Sukuk would bring more benefit to the UK market than the 
incurred cost. 179  
 
The justification for simple regulation also lies within the UK’s Better Regulation 
policy through the notion ‘Reducing Regulation Made Simple: Less Regulation, 
Better Regulation and Regulation as a Last Resort.’180  This notion encaptions the 
concept that regulation is considered as a last resort.  The approach taken by the 
UK’s regulators is seen to be in line with arguments made by scholars181 who are 
pessimistic about the need to have more regulation.  Although the UK’s Better 
Regulation framework is primarily aimed at businesses in general (not directly at 
the financial system); nevertheless banking business is considered to be a part of 
the business world. The framework, therefore, reflects the government’s key 
priority, which is for less regulation.  It is said that regulation: 
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“can be ineffective in achieving its intended outcomes if its effects on the system as 
a whole have not been properly considered…If the details of its proposed 
implementation have not been thought through at the outset, including the costs on 
the economy and the potential impact of enforcement, the burden of regulation can 
be much higher than necessary.  In fact, hastily conceived regulation may prove to 
be unenforceable and could, in some cases, be more harmful than doing nothing.”182  
 
It can be argued that, although the key factors above motivate the present policy, 
the point that ‘regulation may prove unenforceable and in some cases, be more 
harmful than doing nothing’ is disputable.  Additionally, can the regulation be made 
simple when financial diversity is encouraged and ultimately the banks can be 
exposed to various types of unknown risks stemming from their financial products?  
The latter issue will not, however, be discussed in this chapter.  
 
In a financial system, therefore, regulation can be said to produce two effects: (i) 
law can help to prevent negative financial shocks from occurring and (ii) law can 
help to mitigate the harm from financial shocks after they occur.183  The question, 
therefore, remains as to how regulation has proved to be more harmful than doing 
nothing?  
 
If it is argued that simple regulation is the most practical approach, the question is 
whether regulatory intervention should be ex-ante or ex-post financial failure?  This 
has led us to the next factor.   
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(ii) Ex-ante and ex-post as justification for simple regulation  
 
The ex-ante approach refers to rules and preventive regulation designed to apply 
before the conduct occurs. Ex-ante operation is resolved in advance of the targeted 
activity.184  On the other hand, ‘ex-post measures tend to be associated with 
standards or litigation.’185  As opposed to rules, standards or litigation do not 
represent how or what constitute permissible conduct.186  Ex-post content is 
determined ‘after the conduct to which it applies has taken place.’187  
 
It has been argued that achieving the right balance of ex ante and ex post regulation 
remains a challenge.  This is because, both ex ante and ex post have their own 
limits.  Anabtawi and Schwarz listed three limits of ex ante financial regulation.  First, 
financial crisis will still happen due to the incomplete information that occurs within 
the financial system.  They describe this as ‘normal accidents’ that often happen in 
the financial world, where despite preventive measures, financial crisis still 
happens.  Complete ex ante regulation could not, therefore, prevent financial crisis.  
Indeed, as argued by Anabtawi and Schwarz; the belief that regulation can prevent 
every failure is an unrealistic goal.   
 
Secondly, the political economy of financial regulation entails the political influence 
of the financial services industry.  The industry ‘plays an important role in explaining 
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the accumulation of risk in an economy’.188  They further argue that public choice 
theories of regulation influence the production of regulation in terms of various 
factors and the regulatory process.  The various factors also include the industries 
being regulated and the public sentiment.189 Indeed, creating a separate regulatory 
framework for Islamic finance in the UK may not be suitable for the secular nature 
of the state, as opposed to Malaysia where Muslims are the majority society of the 
state.  In the latter case creating a state regulatory framework for Islamic finance is 
acceptable.   
 
Thirdly, tight ex ante regulation can also result to circumvention and lead to 
regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, tight ex ante regulation also leads to other 
unintended consequences.  For example, extreme risk aversion would result in 
certain investment opportunities being rejected. 190 
 
As complete ex ante regulation could not be the sole approach to financial 
regulation, it has been argued that ex post regulation would complement the limits 
of ex ante.191  For instance, the fact that financial failure happens in this complex 
financial system, ex post regulation is required to address those inevitable failures 
and it is needed to respond to the consequences of risk taking.192 
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However, complete ex post regulation can give rise to moral hazard.  Moral hazard 
occurs when ‘a decision maker is incentivised to take risks beyond the level that he 
or she would have otherwise taken because some or all of the negative 
consequences of taking those risks are shifted to third parties.’193  The 
establishment of safety nets would encourage market participants to take excessive 
risks because they believe that they are protected.  This encouragement ultimately 
increases the fragility of the financial system.  Additionally, excessive ex post 
regulation could also burden taxpayers.  The failure of firms or markets could 
potentially lead to the use of taxpayers’ funds. 194 
 
While complete ex ante or ex post regulation has its limits, it is suggested that 
aiming for the right balance between these two types of regulation can be regarded 
as an appropriate strategy to protect the financial system.  Although it is difficult to 
determine the right balance, nevertheless, Anabtawi and Schwarz suggests three 
factors that can be taken into consideration in choosing the optimal mix of ex ante 
relative to ex post regulation: (i) the predictability of financial crisis (ii) the feasibility 
of adopting financial regulation and (iii) the ability of regulators to implement their 
programmes without giving rise to substantial market inefficiencies or regulatory 
arbitrage.  
 
With regards to Islamic banks in the UK, as mentioned in the earlier section, the 
lack of liquidity of the biggest Islamic bank in the UK (the former Islamic Bank of 
Britain) proved that financial crisis does not happen.  Secondly, there is not yet a 
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feasibility study on the impact of more regulation on Islamic retail banks.  It is, 
however, likely that more regulation for retail Islamic banks would not have any 
major impact on the performance of Islamic banks - although the existing 
conventional regulatory framework, which governs Islamic retail banking, does 
affect the Sharia-compliant aspect of depositors’ investments.  As argued in the 
previous chapter, the existing regulatory framework does not provide an opportunity 
for the Deposit Guarantee Scheme fund to be invested in a Sharia-compliant way.  
Additionally, so far, there is no case which proves that the existing regulatory 
framework governing Islamic banks both at the retail and wholesale level affect 
market efficiencies substantially or cause regulatory arbitrage.  
 
(iii) Buy what you understand as justification for simple regulation 
 
It has been argued that the main justification for the regulation of financial services 
firms and products is to protect retail consumers.  This fact has been debated by 
George J. Benston.  In his work, Benston referred mainly to Llewellyn’s analysis on 
the rationale of regulation.  Llewellyn argues that market imperfections and failures 
are justifications for regulation and regulation is important so that consumers are 
protected.  The factors that he pointed out for regulation are: 
“Problems of inadequate consumer information, problems of asymmetric information, 
the difficulty of ascertaining the quality of financial contracts at the point of purchase; 
imprecise definitions of products and contracts; under investment in information by 
consumers…agency costs and potential principal-agent problems and issues related 
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to conflict of interest and, because of the technicalities of some financial products, 
consumers are not equally equipped with an ability to assess quality, etc.”195 
 
While Llewellyn’s justification for regulation is regarded as the main rationale for 
regulating financial products and services, Benston contended that retail financial 
products are similar to non-financial products and services.  For instance, the 
purchasers of television sets, automobiles, refrigerators and computers have 
inadequate information about the products they buy, for example, how the product 
was manufactured, the time when specific parts might fail, the cost of repairing the 
unit, etc.  Thus they are experiencing asymmetric information as they know less 
than the manufacturers.  Moreover, Benston added that consumers often equipped 
with the ability to evaluate all the products, would probably rely most on other 
consumers’ reviews.  Therefore, Benston in his cynical remark argues that: 
 
“…neither Llewellyn nor anyone else would want the government to establish the 
Consumer Appliance Authority or Home Maintenance and Repair Authority to deal 
with the economic problems faced by consumers of these financial and non-financial 
products.  Rather, it would or should look to competition among suppliers and other 
market forces to solve the problems.”196 
 
Benston suggests an interesting point – retail consumers should not buy what they 
do not understand; so that their lack of understanding of the product they wish to 
consume will not do harm to their economy.  For consumers who wish to purchase 
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financial instruments that offer great profits, the duty rests with the producer of the 
instrument (bank) to reduce the consumers’ costs by providing what information 
consumers’ want.  He further argues that often the optimal amount of information 
and quality of information will be provided to consumers voluntarily.  
 
Using Benston’s argument with regards to Islamic bank depositors, the latter should 
not deposit their money if they do not understand the nature and risks associated 
with the Islamic banking system (although it can be argued that deposit taking in 
retail banking does not pose many issues to depositors. because they are covered 
by Deposit Protection Scheme).  Similarly, with regards to other investment 
products; investors with Islamic banks should not invest in a product with which they 
are not familiar.  
 
Benston’s argument is also attractive when the duty to provide information rests 
upon the provider of the instrument (the bank). This argument is, however, attractive 
only to a certain extent.  Benston’s reference to the consumption of non-financial 
products cannot be totally equated with financial products.  This is because the 
effect of market failure arising from non-financial products and financial products is 
not the same.  Market failure arising from non-financial product does not cause a 
‘company run’ like a ‘bank run’.  Arguably, what most consumers of non-financial 
product would do is to stop purchasing the same brand the next time around.  The 
situation for consumers of financial products, both depositors and investors, is very 
different.  The non-performance of banks could result in a bank run, which ultimately 
has a potentially contagious effect.  As a consequence, this could cause a financial 
crisis if the bank is a systemically important institution.  
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This is not to say that there should be no regulation at all for financial products 
(unlike Benston’s argument that regulation is neither necessary nor desirable to 
serve other goals); there should be an adequate amount of regulation that is enough 
to serve the objectives of banking regulation.  Moreover, regulation is necessary for 
some banking products, which could expose depositors or consumers to some 
risks.  An appropriate regulation for Islamic banks is essential to protect the need 
of investors who are looking for ethical investment.  
 
(iv) Platforms for dispute resolution as justification for simple 
regulation  
When dispute arises due to the lack of regulation or regulatory loopholes, there are 
several available platforms that the parties can choose to settle their disputes.  
These are: (a) Sharia Supervisory Boards (b) Arbitration and Mediation (c) an 
Ombudsman and Courts of Law. 
 
(a) Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
In the previous chapter, the function of the Sharia Supervisory Board in an Islamic 
bank was mentioned.  As noted earlier, the UK’s level-playing field regulations have 
no specific regulation pertaining to the role of an SSB.  It is mentioned that the 
function of an SSB is merely advisory.  In Malaysia, however, the SAC has power 
over the SSB of an Islamic bank.  Disputes unsolved at the SSB level can be 
brought forward to the SAC.  While an SSB does not have the power to issue a 
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fatwa unlike the Sharia Advisory Council197, nevertheless, any advice sought from 
an SSB pertaining to the Sharia-compliant aspect of the contract in the UK’s Islamic 
banks may resolve disputes encountered between the Islamic bank and the 
customer.  
 
(b) Arbitration and mediation 
Arbitration and mediation is another method for setting disputes among parties 
affected.  Arbitration is defined as: 
“A non-court alternative method of resolving disputes where a neutral, independent 
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, known as a tribunal, is appointed by a third party to 
make a binding decision, known as an award, from which there are very limited 
grounds of challenge.”198 
 
Mediation is another form of dispute resolution, which is ‘a flexible process conducted 
confidentially in which a neutral person (the mediator) actively assists parties in 
working towards a negotiated agreement of a dispute or difference.’199  The process 
of mediation can be before or after the arbitration.  In mediation, the mediator cannot 
issue any binding award or judgement unlike in arbitration.  Med-Arb is another form 
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of dispute resolution which is ‘a hybrid between both mediation and arbitration’ where 
parties can resort to both platforms for dispute settlement.’200   
 
 
Several international arbitration treaties such as United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the New York Convention Arbitration 
Treaties are adopted by hundreds of countries as the basis for their arbitration 
processes.201 Both the UK and Malaysia are member states to both conventions.202  
Other available platforms for arbitration in Islamic finance include the Kuala Lumpur 
Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA), the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Organisation (AALCO), the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), the Abu 
Dhabi Commercial, Conciliation and Arbitration Centre (ADCCAC) and the 
International Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Commercial Arbitration 
(IICRCA).  
 
Opting for arbitration could be a practical approach to resolving Islamic finance 
disputes as compared to choosing litigation for several reasons. First, the decision 
is based on the parties’ choice of law.  This has been affirmed in the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 which states:  
“If the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are agreed 
by them or determined by the tribunal.”203 
                                                 
200 Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, International and 
English Law Practice, (2007), p.24  
201 Ibid., p.39 
202 UNCITRAL, via <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/about/origin_history.html> , New York Arbitration 
Convention via <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/> accessed: 30 May 2014 
203 Section 46 of Arbitration Act 1996 
97 
 
 
Secondly, the choice of arbitration could avoid the lengthy and rigid process in 
litigation. It has been said that arbitration ‘is a cheaper and quicker method of 
dispute resolution’.204 Such perception, however, very much depends on how the 
arbitration is conducted.205  
 
Moreover, arbitration is arguably a better platform for dispute resolution because 
an expert in Sharia and commercial transactions can become the arbitrator for the 
parties. The parties also have the liberty to choose the desired arbitrator or 
arbitrators to handle the dispute resolution process. Whereas in litigation, often that 
courts’ judges have limited knowledge in the Islamic financial industry and may incur 
more time to seek an expert opinion.206  
 
While decision making in arbitration is based on the agreement of the parties, there 
is a possibility that the issue of the Sharia-compliant aspect may differ from one 
arbitrator to another. This may cause uncertainties and lack of standardisation in 
Islamic finance disputes as the decision made by arbitrator is not released publicly 
unlike in litigation.  Since the decision is made on a close case basis, the Sharia-
compliant aspect of a transaction may be regarded as Sharia compliant, while it is 
not by other decision makers.  It can, therefore, be argued that reference to a court 
of law can promote better transparency.  On the other hand, some may also argue 
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that as long as the decision made is agreeable between parties, the concern of the 
above should not be an issue.  
 
(c) Ombudsman and courts of law 
When there is a lack of regulation or issues pertaining to Islamic banking, other 
platforms can be resorted to such as an ombudsman and litigation.  In the UK, the 
Financial Ombudsman Service provides a platform for consumers to report issues 
with regards to their transactions with banks, insurance or financial firms with which 
they are dealing.  The ombudsman service is similar to mediation and in certain 
cases, the ombudsmen has the power to make decisions for the parties.  Since the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) approval of Islamic finance Home Purchase 
Plans, this Islamic mortgage product has been included within the remit of the UK’s 
Ombudsman Service.207 
 
Finally, issues pertaining to Islamic banks can be brought before a court of law.  
The reported cases mentioned in the earlier chapters have shown that Islamic 
banks’ customers have resorted to litigation and it is observed that Islamic banking 
cases were solved by the court like any other contractual cases.  While it is often 
the Sharia-compliant aspect of a contract that was one of the grounds of the dispute, 
nevertheless, it is be observed that the reported cases (mentioned in the previous 
chapters) show no compelling argument to have more regulation for Islamic banks. 
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(v)  Societal background as justification for simple regulation  
(a)    The United Kingdom  
The societal background of a state is an important factor for a particular regulatory 
policy.  With regards to the issue of a regulatory framework for Islamic banks in the 
UK, one of the justifications for simple regulation is to look at it from the societal 
background perspective.  In a secular society, the separation between the state and 
the church dictates that the opinion of the religious leader should not change the very 
nature of the state’s practice. For instance, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan 
Williams, who suggested that the UK government should provide some legal 
accommodation for certain Sharia matters especially for family laws - did not have 
much impact on secular society.208   
 
Secular society represents the neutral aspect or generalisation in the law that 
represents the divorce between religious belief and the state’s law.  As such, the 
religious belief inherent in what is deemed to be Sharia compliant has no impact on 
secular society.  In fact, what is expected by secular society is that Islam and any 
other religion should accept the law as it is.209  In short, the community has to 
subsume its religious culture and belief into secular society – the law of the land is 
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the English law.  Religions may practice their belief freely as long as it does not 
contravene to English law.  Former Lord Chancellor Jack Straw commented: 
 
“…there is nothing whatever in English law that prevents people abiding by Sharia 
principles if they wish to, provided they do not come into conflict with English law.”210 
 
While the Islamic financial system is well accepted by the UK government, secular 
society may not be able to accept fully the legal accommodation especially made for 
the Islamic financial sector. The fact that the sector is considered as an emerging 
sector globally, nevertheless, the regulators are expected to consider the sensitivity 
of the society in making regulatory policies. This is because, the society is the 
consumer in an economy, and their money is used (tax) for regulatory policy making. 
Thus, it can be argued that by simply creating more regulatory accommodation for 
Islamic finance without proper justification may cause an issue. Although on the one 
hand the secular nature of the state per se dictates how much attention is given to 
the regulatory governance of Islamic financial sector, on the other hand, the existing 
antipathy towards Islam itself could be a factor, especially post the 9/11 incident.  It 
can be argued that due to these factors, matters that are associated with Islam could 
be seen as an effort to Islamise the UK.  
 
Nevertheless, the suggested factors are not supported by any empirical evidence.  
There is no research thus far that has proved a lack of acceptance level by secular 
society for greater regulatory accommodation for the Islamic financial sector.  
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Moreover, the differences in Sharia practices in Islam add to the complexity of making 
a separate regulatory accommodation for Islamic financial services.  The various 
Sharia practices derived from the Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi and Shafie schools of 
thoughts within the religion itself lead to the impossibility of accommodating Sharia 
principles.  In fact, looking at the wider picture, the religion of Islam is divided between 
the Sunni and Shia sects, which hold different sets of beliefs and this further 
complicates the application of Sharia principles. The Muslims in the UK, who 
migrated from various countries, have applied different sets of Sharia practices in 
their daily life.  As a result, the daily Sharia practice within the UK’s Muslim community 
could be more restrictive than that which is actually practiced in the country of origin 
whence the Muslim migrant came.  As Ian Edge argues: 
 
“The Sharia rules applied by the different Muslim communities among themselves in 
the unreformed traditional rules of Sharia which are almost nowhere applied in the 
Islamic world because important reforms and amendments (at least in personal status 
matters) have become almost universal.  The Sharia rules applied by Muslim 
communities in the UK therefore may be more conservative and restrictive than those 
currently applied in the Islamic countries from which Muslim immigrants to the UK have 
migrated.”211 
 
Referring to the above argument, it is indeed arguable that the different sets of 
beliefs within the religion itself could lead to a tougher Islamic practice. In this 
regard, if the regulations of Islamic banks are formulated on a more restrictive 
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basis, it would have been more difficult to develop the sector in a secular state such 
as the UK.  
 
It can, therefore, be suggested that the existing legal accommodation is designed 
mainly to generate the economic development of the state. That is, to attract more 
investments from the Gulf region. However, the UK being one of the top financial 
centres in the world, their involvement in Islamic finance is seen as being driven by 
the rapid demand for Islamic finance globally and hence this sparked the interest 
of the government in being the global hub for Islamic financial services.  The 
ambition to be the global hub for Islamic finance arguably represents the 
government’s acceptance of this type of financial service and it is seen as an effort 
to strengthen its identity as the global financial centre. 
 
(b) Malaysia 
While both the UK and Malaysia have the same mission, to be the global hub for 
the Islamic financial sector, nevertheless, it can be argued that having more 
regulatory accommodation for the sector in Malaysia is seen to be more acceptable 
in society.  One possible factor is the fact that Malaysia is an Islamic majority 
country.  Islam is the largest religious group in the country with 60 per cent of the 
population being Muslim and the remaining 40 per cent being non-Muslims.212  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Malaysia adopted a dual regulatory framework 
to treat the Islamic and the conventional financial services on a level-playing field 
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(despite the argument earlier that at some point the Central Bank of Malaysia gives 
greater attention towards the development of the Islamic banks than conventional 
banks). 
 
It can be suggested that the implementation of the dual regulatory framework is due 
to several factors.  Firstly, the government has made the effort to redefine the Malays 
in Malaysia as ‘Melayu-Baru’, which literally means the New Malays.  In this regard, 
Malays, who are all regarded as Muslims, are people who have a personality that is 
suitable to the changing times and at the same time demonstrate the necessary 
attributes of a good Muslim.  For the New Malays, ‘religion would not in any way 
become an obstacle to economic progress.’213  Thus, the Islamic financial sector 
reflects the newly modern Muslim culture for the financial sector and a factor that 
contributes to the economic progress of Malaysian society - although it could be 
inferred that the consumption of Islamic finance is still considerably lower than the 
consumption of conventional financial products. 214 
 
Secondly, the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad introduced a national 
agenda to make Malaysia a fully developed country by the year 2020 through ‘Vision 
2020’. One of the features of Vision 2020 is ‘the challenge of establishing a prosperous 
society, with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic, robust, and resilient’ and 
‘the challenge of ensuring an economically just society... a society in which there is a 
                                                 
213 Abu Bakar Abdul Majeed, ‘Malaysia: Truly Asian and Rightly Islamic’ in Ibrahim Abu Shah (ed), 
Islam Democracy and Good Governance – The Malaysian Experience, (2004), p.75 
214 Ching Wing Lo and Chee Seng Leow, ‘Islamic Banking in Malaysia: A Sustainable Growth of The 
Consumer Market’, (December 2014), p.527 
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fair and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation, in which there is full 
partnership in economic progress.’215    
 
As such, while several matters in Malaysia are not wholly Islamic (especially in regards 
to civil or criminal matters) and where Sharia law is not fully implemented, the greater 
emphasis on promoting the Islamic financial sector is arguably to create a national 
identity for Malaysia.  Vision 2020 and the Malaysian New Economic Policy (NEP)216 
during Mahathirism reflect his ambitious plan to bring Malaysia to the world stage.  His 
aim of making Malaysia the ‘model Islamic state’ could arguably be regarded as one 
of the reasons why Malaysia is focusing on Islamic finance and the concept of a ‘just 
economy’ of Islamic finance seems to blend well with the Vision 2020 agenda.  The 
evidence above also demonstrates that the Malaysian government and society is more 
open to developing an emerging sector that could boost the Islamic nature of the 
country.  
 
(vi) Other international regulatory standards as justification for simple 
regulation  
While the earlier discussions have highlighted the fact that there is a lack of 
regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks in the UK, this issue may possibly be 
resolved, without having more regulatory accommodation, through adopting 
international regulatory standards for Islamic financial institutions.  It can be argued 
                                                 
215 ‘Malaysia as a Fully Developed Country’, via <http://www.wawasan2020.com/vision/p2.html> 
accessed: 15 May 2014 
216 ‘Economic Planning Unit’,  via <http://www.epu.gov.my/en/> accessed: 15 May 2014 
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that the need for more regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks in the UK is 
reduced by implementing international regulatory standards devised by bodies such 
as the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). These establishments 
aim to complement the existing international regulatory standards such as the Basel 
Accords, which focus on the conventional financial sector.    
 
AAOIFI issues standards in accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Sharia 
standards for Islamic financial institutions,217 while the IFSB issues international 
standards that ‘promote and enhance the soundness and stability of the Islamic 
financial services industry’.218  In the UK, Islamic banks are encouraged to follow the 
AAOIFI and IFSB standards; nevertheless, it is not obligatory for Islamic banks to 
comply with these standards.219 The non-obligatory nature of these standards may 
lead to a lack of quality in international standards for Islamic banks.  This may also 
lead to the lack of a level-playing field for Islamic banks as regulators appear to focus 
more on conventional regulatory standards. Simple regulation may, therefore, be the 
desirable option for regulating Islamic banks in the UK, while at the same time 
incorporating the published international standards into the existing regulatory 
framework.  Issues pertaining to the lack of regulation for Islamic banks could be 
minimised without having to resort to more regulatory enactment of the domestic 
legislation.  
 
                                                 
217 Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), via 
<http://www.aaoifi.com/en/about-aaoifi/about-aaoifi.html> accessed: 15 May 2014 
218 Islamic Financial Services Board via <http://www.ifsb.org/> accessed: 15 May 2014 
219 Supra, Note. 676, p.16 
106 
 
   
2.4 IN SEARCH OF ‘LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD’ 
There is no specific definition of ‘level-playing field’ and defining such a notion is rather 
a philosophical problem. However, there have been various illustrations which can 
provide a useful indication of what level-playing field ought to mean. Level-playing field 
has been argued as a metaphor taken from team sports.220 For instance, the ‘levelling’ 
is to make sure that all sports team have equally the same number of players, all 
equally free of drugs intake and all teams compete on the same ground. However, the 
application such metaphor level-playing field that was once used in sports has been 
widely accepted in other domains.  
 
Level-playing field has been interpreted differently by various fields including 
education, employment, business, finance, economy, taxation, and so forth. For 
instance, in air transport, the level-playing field is defined as;  
“an environment in which all competitors, for instance, airlines, in a given market...must 
follow the same rules and are given an equal ability to compete.”221  
 
In the area of taxation, a body which promote policies to improve the economic and 
social well-being of people namely the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) defined the level-playing field as; 
                                                 
220 Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Towards a Level-Playing Field’, (2007), 
p.128. (review essay of Risse, M. (2006) see Risse, M. in bibliography) 
 
221 De Leon, ‘Fair Competition On A Level Playing Field In A Globalising Air Transport Environment’, 
Airneth Paper, (2012) via <http://www.airneth.nl/news/details/article/test-1/> accessed: January 2013> 
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“implementation of high standards of transparency and exchange of information, for 
both civil and criminal taxation matters, within an acceptable timeline with the aim of 
achieving equity and fair competition.”222 
 
From the judicial perspective, what is considered to be a level-playing field in a trial is 
when; 
“neither party enjoying any litigation advantage over the other.”223 
 
The illustrations by various fields above show that there are common elements of what 
can be regarded as representing the expression of level-playing field. Based on the 
illustrations above, the level-playing field denote the rights of parties to receive an 
equal treatment before the law. In other words, neither party should receive more 
treatment than the other in order to have fair competition and a fair outcome. The 
illustrations above can be regarded as the reflection of level-playing field. However, 
the question arises as to whether there are certain elements that can be made as a 
benchmark to regard the level-playing field regulation for Islamic banks? The next 
section discusses the possible elements of level-playing field regulation for Islamic 
banks.   
 
Thus far, there has been little in-depth research on level-playing field and determining 
the common element to it. Evidence suggests that there is an absence of a clear 
definition of what is a level-playing field. An interpretation of level-playing field has 
been made in differing forms according to the subject area. Therefore, it can be 
                                                 
222 OECD Paper, ‘Tax Co-operation: Towards A Level-playing field’, (2007), p.6 
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inferred that discussing the concept of level-playing field and interpreting level-playing 
field is rather open-ended.  
 
Recent research by Morrison and White provides some discussion on the notion of 
level-playing field within the context of international financial regulation. In defining the 
notion of level-playing field, Morrison and White suggested that the notion refers to; 
“an international agreement requiring that banks in different countries be subject to the 
same capital requirements, and also that they charge the same deposit rates, so that 
bank profits are independent of charter location.”224 (emphasis added)  
 
In this aspect, Morrison and White regard ‘international agreement’ and ‘same’ 
charges as keys to the notion of level-playing field. While the idea of providing the 
same capital requirements and charging the same deposit rates are one aspect to 
show fairness in international financial regulation, arguably, such an idea is somewhat 
too narrow to indicate what is considered as the level-playing field.  Although such 
requirement is considered as one of the significant aspects of banking regulations, the 
scope of banking and financial regulation is not only confined to capital requirements 
and deposit rates. Other areas such as authorisation, liquidity requirements, stress 
testing, credit ratings, financial and disclosure requirements and so forth are also 
applicable to banking and financial institutions.  
 
Level-playing field were thought to be successful in the situation where the ‘lowest 
common denominator’ of regulation is established. Morrison and White contend that: 
                                                 
224 Alan Morrison and  Lucy White, ‘Level-Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation’, (2009), 
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“In order for a level-playing field to succeed, regulators must coordinate in adopting 
the lowest common denominator regulations that would be appropriate for the weakest 
regulator in a closed economy…and hence it penalises countries with better 
regulators.”225 (emphasis added) 
 
Questions therefore arise as to how regulation is considered to be in the lowest 
common denominator? And, if the level-playing field in international financial 
regulation is said to be the vision of the international regulators, should there be a 
different set of regulation for the weaker economy? And how does one determine that 
the regulator is the strongest or the weakest?  Be that as it may, their research is 
nevertheless focusing on the level-playing field for multinational banks globally, the 
applicability of level-playing field in different economies and discusses what 
constitutes a level-playing field in international financial regulation. On the other hand, 
the focus of this chapter is to determine the potential basic elements of level-playing 
field regulation for Islamic banks.  
 
Another suggestion on defining level-playing field was made by another author, 
Subedi, where he talks about the level-playing field treatment by the World Trade 
Organisation. In his paper, Subedi suggests that level-playing field represents the 
situation where “all competitors are given an equal opportunity to succeed…”226 It was 
further suggested by Subedi that to ensure the playing field is truly level, “all players 
                                                 
225 Ibid. 
226 Surya P. Subedi, ‘The Notion of Free Trade and the First Ten Years of the World Trade Organization: 
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should equally be well-equipped with the appropriate sports tools, kit and accessories 
for each to stand fair chance of winning the game.”227 Subedi further argues that:  
 
“The creation of a level-playing field would not necessarily result in fairness unless the 
players have equal opportunities to prepare themselves for competition on this 
particular playing field. It is said that equality is possible among equals. Hence, there 
is a need for special and preferential or differential treatment in favour of the developing 
countries in the interim. Only when some parity has been achieved among nations 
would it be possible to speak of a level-playing field. Accordingly, a perfect level-
playing field is a distant objective; the immediate goal should be to providing some 
leeway for those states currently ill-equipped to compete on an equal footing.”228 
 
It is agreeable that his general interpretation of level-playing field is about fairness.  
Indeed, the differences of the subjects require some special and preferential or 
differential treatment in order to reach some parity. Similarly, the position of Islamic 
banks in the existing financial system is somewhat new as opposed to the 
conventional banking sector. Islamic banks have their unique concepts that lead them 
to face some risk in a different dimension than their conventional counterpart. 
Therefore, his argument that equality is possible among equals could not be applied 
in the case of Islamic banks for the fact that they are not equal to the conventional 
banks. Islamic banks may be similar to the conventional banks in certain aspects, but 
they are not the same in totality. In particular, the inherent nature of Islamic banks is 
distinctive from the conventional banks. As has been argued by Subedi that a perfect 
level-playing field is a distant objective, the differences that arise within Islamic banks 
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alone raise the question of the usefulness of the concept of level-playing field 
regulations.  
 
The arguments to level-playing field as a concept is that the playing-field is hardly 
level, therefore, the focus of level-playing field should be concerned with “balancing 
the interests of various groups of states as well as the respective environments…”229 
Thus far, there has been an absence of a standard mechanism to determine what 
level-playing field is – as what is level, equal, fair and just in itself carries a subjective 
interpretation. Therefore, finding the balance will be a challenge since the basic 
concept of level, equal, fair and just is disputable. For example, what is considered 
level or not level to A may not be considered level to B and to C. It has been suggested 
that while fairness is often associated with the image of level-playing field, 'levelling’ 
suggests a requirement of the equalisation of certain conditions.230  An example can 
be observed in the trading environment, where A and B differ in their productive trading 
abilities due to their differences.231 Similarly, in the context of banking and financial 
services, differences exist. The concept and approach that Islamic banks offer, in 
theory, differ due to the values it carries in comparison with the conventional banks 
(setting aside the economic substance of the transaction).  Therefore, nothing can 
really be equated between the two sectors. This has therefore challenged the concept 
of level-playing field.  
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One may also question why there is the need to even think about levelling the playing 
field.232 Indeed, the reality has shown that there are different interests of groups in 
different sets of environments. This raises the notion of diversity, which takes place in 
almost all aspects of our life which leads to the challenge of balancing the interests of 
various groups in their respective environments. It is, therefore, not an easy task to 
find such balance.  
 
Similarly, level-playing field can also be referred to as the idea of balancing the 
diversity that exists in a particular setting or circumstances.  As mentioned in the first 
chapter, the fact that the financial system is complex in nature raises the question of 
the utility of having the notion of a level-playing field.  
 
 
2.5  INTERPRETING LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD 
While there is the challenge of interpreting and building a level-playing field, level-
playing field nevertheless remains a relevant issue to be discussed. This is because, 
as highlighted earlier, ‘level-playing field’ has been a popular notion among the 
government and authorities in various fields. In regards to this research, treating 
Islamic banks on a level-playing field with the conventional banks has frequently been 
announced by governments and regulators in the country where there is the existence 
of Islamic banks - whether Islamic banks’ are governed within the single or dual – 
regulatory framework. Below are some examples of the statements made by 
authorities in various jurisdictions:  
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United Kingdom  
“We will not champion Islamic finance over conventional finance, but will instead strive 
to create a level-playing field between Islamic and conventional finance.”233 (Ian 
Pearson, Economic Secretary to the UK HM Treasury) (emphasis added)  
 
“The Government wishes to see, where relevant and practical, a level-playing field 
established for Islamic finance.”234 (UK HM Treasury) (emphasis added) 
 
“The Government will continue to engage regularly on taxation issues relating to 
Islamic financial products to ensure a level playing field with conventional 
equivalents.”235 (UK HM Treasury) (emphasis added) 
 
“A minimum level of international consistency in measures to address the Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) problem will be essential if a level-playing field is 
to be maintained… and… the UK authorities will continue to participate actively in 
ongoing international work on macro-prudential policy with the aim of achieving 
international consistency and a level-playing field.”236 (HM Treasury) (emphasis added) 
 
Malaysia  
“In a dual financial environment, the prudential regulatory design needs to take into 
account the unique characteristics peculiar to Islamic banking and finance as well as 
provide a level-playing field in relation to conventional banking and finance so as to 
                                                 
233 HM Treasury, ‘The Development of Islamic  Finance in the UK: The Government’s Perspective’, 
(2008), p.3 
234 Ibid, p.13 
235 Ibid., p.17 
236 HM Treasury, ‘A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building A Stronger System’, (2011), p.17 
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ensure that Islamic financial institutions and transactions are not at a comparative 
disadvantage.”237 (Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of Central Bank of Malaysia) (emphasis 
added) 
 
“It is within this context of diversity of systems and players that the regulatory approach 
adopted needs to ensure harmonisation and a level-playing field for a competitive and 
robust financial system.”238 (Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of Central Bank of Malaysia) 
(emphasis added) 
 
Australia  
“It is about creating a level-playing field for the provision of Islamic financial products 
into the Australian market.”239 (Nick Sherry, Assistant Treasurer of Australia) 
(emphasis added) 
 
Hong Kong 
“The Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s supervisory policy for holdings of Sukuk is based 
on the principles of a level-playing field and economic substance.”240 (Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority) (emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
237 BNM, ‘New Opportunities, New Market and New Frontier in Islamic Banking & Finance’, (Governor’s 
speech), (August 2004) via <http://www.bnm.gov.my/> accessed: 5 July 2015 
238 BNM, ‘Approaches to Regulation of Islamic Financial Services Industry’, (Governor’s speech), (May 
2014) via <http://www.bnm.gov.my/> accessed: 5 July 2015 
239 Australia Launches Sharia Compliant Project Initiative via 
<http://www.globalislamicfinancemagazine.com/> accessed 5 July 2015  
240Islamic Finance in Hong Kong: Supervisory Issues, (2008) via 
<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/publication-and-research/quarterly 
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Thus, if the notion ‘level-playing field’ does not carry any weight nor importance, the 
regulators would not have mentioned such notion in their agenda for Islamic banks241 
and subsequently provide some regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks. 
Therefore, the question of level-playing field remains relevant and this leads to the 
next discussion on the approach to determine level-playing field regulation.  
 
For the purpose of this research, an ideal approach to determine the level-playing field 
regulation for Islamic banks is to question: 
(iii) Whether Islamic banks are treated equally before the law; and  
(iv) Whether Islamic banks are given a fair opportunity to compete alongside the 
conventional banks. 
 
The two elements above should exist together. When the law is seen to treat Islamic 
banks equally before the law (for instance, through a specific legal accommodation for 
Islamic banks) the element of fair opportunity to compete is the result of the first 
element. The elaboration on the difference between the two elements is described in 
the next sub-section. Notably, the approach above is rather flexible.  
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Another approach to determine whether there is a level-playing field is by asking when 
level-playing field is said to be distorted. In other words, what is not a level-playing 
field? It can be viewed that the playing-field is not level when the answer to the above 
questions depict an obvious, not a mere, negative outcome - where the subject is not 
entitled to a fair opportunity and not treated equally before the law thus the outcome 
reflects the absolute biasness on the part of the regulator. For example, there is no 
recourse to consultation process on arising issues and there is an absence of fair 
treatment before the court of law. Both approaches can be used concurrently. It can 
be argued that a result is said to be positive when the outcome of the existing law 
provides sufficient space, if not full; for the Islamic financial sector to develop.  
 
A hypothetical position is created for the conventional banks and Islamic banks as 
legal persons in order to position them as the subjects of the research. The legal 
persons are divided according to the transaction type.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the suggested questions above, it is to be borne in mind that legal person A and 
legal person B is the subject in the level-playing field regulation. The aspects included 
are the status between the institutions as well as the type of transaction. Both types of 
level-playing field can be best referred through the following diagram:- 
 
ISLAMIC BANKS 
Legal Person A 
CONVENTIONAL 
BANKS 
Legal Person B 
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[Transaction] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
The following subsection illustrates how the two questions are viewed.  
 
(i) Whether Islamic banks are treated equally before the law  
The nature of law is to maintain order in society, for without law, there is no order.242 
The rule of law is to impose society to do or not to do particular acts hence its role is, 
therefore, significant. The value of law itself is realised when the subjects are obliged 
to obey the rules set to them, because they are law.243 However, the meaning of law 
and order is relative, and even sometimes the desirability of having them can be 
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questionable by different societies.244 The differences in perspectives are commonly 
due to the underlying beliefs - be it social, economic, religious, or political.245 Thus, 
law does not necessarily solve each concrete problem, because each problem 
involves various aspects and perspectives. 
 
The nature of law is that it is often associated with justice in the sense of treating 
different individuals impartially246 - although the desired outcome may not necessarily 
be achieved. It can be said that the element of equality before the law appears to be 
associated with the notion of fairness. For instance, in the judicial proceeding, fairness 
denotes the equal treatment to parties where each party has the right to the disclosure 
of materials in the course of legal proceedings.247 While in the legal context, the notion 
of level, equality, and fairness imply a close association with justice. The notion of 
level, equality, and fairness, however, cannot be simply interpreted as a direct 
meaning to natural justice. This can be inferred from the description of natural justice 
by scholars. In defining what natural justice is; Lord Denning perceives justice as; 
 “the solution that the majority of right-minded people would consider fair.”248  
 
Social contract theorist, John Rawls suggests that natural justice is; 
“...the result of a fair agreement or bargain” to the extent that “the spiritual aims or the 
aims of those of different religions may be opposed.”249    
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In line with Rawls’ argument, Amartya Sen argues that;  
“the public conception of justice should be, so far as possible, independent of 
controversial philosophical and religious doctrines.”250  
 
It is to be noted that the interpretation of social contracts by Rawls and Sen is related 
to the concept of justice and fairness to individuals, while the existing discussion of 
such concept is related to institutions. Therefore, one may argue that Rawls’ and Sen’s 
ideas are not related within the context of fairness at the institutional level. While it is 
agreeable that their arguments are not directly related to the discussion at hand, 
nonetheless, it can be argued that their idea of justice and fairness (on individuals) 
with the existing discussion could be extended to the concept of justice and fairness 
among institutions. This is for the fact that institutions (regulatory bodies) are operated 
by individuals; who essentially makes the regulatory policy based on what they 
perceived as justice and fairness towards the banking sector. Essentially, the banking 
institutions are also led by individuals. Notably, the performance of Islamic banks is, 
to a certain extent, affected by the regulations which are based on the idea of fairness 
by the regulators. Therefore, the perceived justice and fairness by individuals within 
the regulatory in the institutions against other institutions (banking sector) can be 
reflected from the idea of natural justice and fairness as argued by Rawls and Sen. 
Despite this, it is to be noted that their arguments highlighted earlier are limited only 
for the purpose of understanding the basic idea of natural justice and fairness. 
Therefore, this research does not intend to discuss their ideas philosophically at a 
deeper level as it requires a separate discussion and it is also not within the context 
of this research.  
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It can be inferred from the quotations above that although the literal meaning of justice 
implies the notion of fairness and equality, it can also be argued that the concept of 
justice and fairness also represent the neutral treatment to subjects by a group of 
rational individuals with the aim to achieve a fair outcome – to the extent that the aim 
of religion and philosophical doctrines may be neglected.  
 
It can also be argued that from the legal context, there is a thin line between the 
concepts of fairness, level, equality, with justice. The concept of neutrality in law that 
neglects the aim of religion and philosophical doctrine can be associated to the case 
of Islamic banks. For instance, when a law is regarded as neutral, the law may not 
necessary be expected to serve the ideals of Islamic finance which is theoretically 
based on Sharia (religion doctrine). As will be shown in the UK chapter, the regulatory 
accommodation for Islamic banks in the UK is not based on serving the Sharia 
principles. Some of the regulatory accommodation is given because there is no legal 
accommodation for such types of transactions in the conventional regulatory 
framework. For example, in the case of Sukuk. It can also be inferred in the later 
chapter that there is no legal accommodation for Islamic banks where the economic 
outcome is the same as the conventional transaction. It can also be seen that the legal 
accommodation for Islamic banks are basically to promote the sector but not 
necessarily because of the Sharia precepts. Essentially, the objectives of banking 
regulation are free from any religious or philosophical influence. Hence, the neutrality 
in the objectives of banking regulation cannot be expected to serve the Islamic 
financial ideals.   
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One of the features of law is to promote justice and fairness; the law should be able to 
balance the interests of various groups. Thus, a good law should have the ability to 
develop the utmost level-playing field environment. But the important question to be 
asked is whether a complete level-playing field environment can exist? Can the 
regulators enable such a concept?  
 
For it is difficult to obtain a complete level-playing field, the level-playing field 
interpretations by various fields have nevertheless provided some positive indication 
that fairness and equality should prevail - although in reality, there is no absolute 
equality and fairness.   
 
The question as to whether Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia are treated equally 
before the law requires an examination of how Islamic banks are treated in the existing 
regulatory framework. Therefore, attention is directed to the regulatory 
accommodation for Islamic banks to function and develop in the UK alongside the 
conventional banks. This question will help to provide a clearer picture as to how the 
regulators adopt its existing regulation and apply them to Islamic banks. In other 
words, equality before the law represents what exactly Islamic banks are owed; and 
hence this research analyses the extent to which the law serves the need of Islamic 
banks. In other words, if there is an absence of law for Islamic banks, but the law does 
not affect the functions of Islamic banks nor poses any unusual risks to the banks, 
there cannot be inequality before the law as the subject (Islamic banks) is not owed of 
anything. As such, in terms of the context of equality, it has been argued that “nobody 
can complain that her claim is not fully satisfied if all are satisfied equally.”251 
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Equality before the law consists of two types of equality. In equality law, the law 
consists of formal equality and substantive equality. From the legal perspective, the 
famous sayings of Aristotle on “treating like things alike, and unlike things alike” 
represent the notion of formal equality.252 This maxim reflects treating equally the like 
group together and unlike group together. It prohibits direct discrimination. For 
example, it is “unlawful to base a decision about a person on a prohibited classification, 
such as being a woman or being black.”253 Equality before the law is also related to 
the context of status. For example, all people are regarded as equals. All people are 
regarded as equals when they have equal rights “in regards to access to positions and 
facilities.”254 
 
Substantive equality means “treating differently different situated people differently to 
equalise their positions in recognition of those differences.” 255 Substantive equality 
provides the platform for justice to be applied when “it is not sufficient to treat people 
identically at the formal level, since certain groups experience such disadvantage that 
they are unable to compete in the race in the first place.”256 In other words, the law 
attempts to avoid indirect discrimination through the concept of substantive equality.  
 
The types of equality mentioned above mainly referred to the social contract theory 
and indeed it is impossible to equalise it with the current discussion, however, it can 
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be suggested that the principle of equality from the social contract theory could be a 
useful reference to examine the existing question at hand. Note that the issue of 
discrimination is not intended to be discussed for it is irrelevant in the current context.  
 
Formal equality requires the law to treat these legal persons alike. Which means the 
law shall remain in a general form to accommodate both banking sectors. Substantive 
equality requires the law to accommodate the differences of both banking sectors by 
giving recognition to the basic differences of both banking sectors. For example, 
substantive equality should recognise the Sharia-compliant aspect of Islamic finance 
and its transactional nature, the risks exposed, and the contractual relationships 
between the parties. In order to achieve the desired equality, it can be suggested that 
the principle of formal equality and substantive equality must co-exist. Nevertheless, 
question arises as to whether substantive equality must exist all the time? Arguably, 
while it is desirable that substantive equality exists in most instances, nevertheless the 
absence of substantive equality at some point should not necessarily render the 
existing law (formal equality) as an invalid law. This is because, the functions of law 
are not to ensure that there is a substantive equality in every aspect because the 
making of law also involves social and economic aspects of making a law.257 
 
Apart from the above, equality before the law also denotes the kind of legal treatment 
that Islamic banks receive when dispute arises. This can be achieved through formal 
equality whereby disputes are brought before the court in a fair manner. Formal 
equality also allows any particular issues in the Islamic banking sector to be consulted 
through the consultation process in the same manner that the conventional banking 
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sector is entitled to. Hence, it can be argued that any Islamic banking issue which is 
regarded to be similar to the conventional banking should be treated equally, and 
issues which are dissimilar should be treated accordingly. The application of both 
types of equalities is regarded as equality before the law. The summary of this is 
illustrated in the diagram below. 
                                   
 
                      
 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
 
(ii) Whether Islamic banks are given a fair opportunity to compete alongside 
conventional banks. 
The idea behind this second question is to determine whether the existing regulatory 
accommodation provides enough opportunity for Islamic banks to compete fairly with 
the conventional banks. An ideal law should be able to accommodate a fair opportunity 
for the parties to compete. It is a rather difficult question to determine, as what is 
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considered as being ‘fair opportunity’ is debatable. A possible approach to answer this 
question is by examining the existing law; whether the law is an ideal law.  
 
An ideal law, according to legal scholars, such as Lon Fuller, consists of; 
“general rules that are clear, consistent, practicable, prospective, known, stable, and 
consistent.”258  
 
Friedrich A. Hayek viewed that all rule of laws must be;  
“general, known, equal and certain.”259  
 
By the word general, he argues that the law be set out in advance in abstract terms 
not aimed at any particular individual. The application of the law is to everyone whose 
conduct falls within the prescribed conditions of application.260  Whereas for the rule 
of equality, Hayek argues that the law should be applicable equally to everyone without 
making any arbitrary distinctions among people. Hence, when distinctions exist, “the 
law can only be considered legitimate when it is approved by a majority of people 
inside as well as outside the group targeted for differential treatment.”261 Law is 
required to be certain so that “the subject of law able to predict reliably what legal rules 
will be found to govern their conduct and how those rules will be interpreted and 
applied.”262   These thoughts on the natural ideal law are, however, somewhat distinct 
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(2004), p.66 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid. 
126 
 
from the ideal law for banking regulation. The latter can be considered to be more 
specific than the natural ideal law because of its specificity.  
 
The regulation for banks, for instance in the UK, derives from the objective of financial 
services regulation in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The objectives of 
banking regulation are to promote financial stability, market confidence, public 
awareness, the protection of consumers, and the reduction of financial crime.263 It can 
be suggested that an ideal banking regulation is where the general rules of the ideal 
law is combined with the regulatory objectives of the Act. This means that, underneath 
the ideal law there is specific ideal law – which is the law for banking institutions. 
Further discussion on banking regulation can be found in the following chapters. 
Based on the concept of ideal law, Islamic banks should be able to compete fairly with 
its conventional banking counterparts. As mentioned earlier, the first and second 
element should exist concurrently in order to see if the level-playing field has been 
enabled. 
 
The concept of level-playing field has been discussed and it has also been argued that 
the analysis of the concept of level-playing field regulation is relevant. The following 
section discusses the challenges and realities that seem to collide with the concept of 
level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks. The challenges and realities are based 
on four main circumstances: (i) legal pluralism (ii) legal change (iii) level-playing field 
and the risks to Islamic banks (iv) level-playing field and Islamic banks’ stability. In 
turn, these circumstances have revealed the limits of level-playing field regulations 
and have questioned its relevance.  
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2.6 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD: CHALLENGES AND REALITIES  
(i) Legal pluralism 
(ii)  Legal change 
(iii) Level-playing field and the risks to Islamic banks 
(iv) Level-playing field and Islamic banks’ stability 
 
(i) Legal pluralism 
It can be argued that the concept of level-playing field regulation appears to clash with 
the doctrine of legal pluralism that already exists in the existing financial system 
environment. The concept of legal pluralism is used “to characterise the interaction 
between competing and conflicting official legal systems or between an official legal 
system and one or more of the other normative systems.”264 This essentially leads to 
a complex and multisided interplay.265  
 
 
Under the concept of legal pluralism, Tamanaha argued that there are six systems of 
normative ordering in social arenas.266 One of them is the religious normative system. 
With regards to the religious normative system, Tamanaha asserts that: 
 
“Although customary and religious sources of normative ordering are usually seen in 
terms distinct from and broader than official legal systems, they also can contain a 
                                                 
264 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism’, (2007), p.399  
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid., p.397. The six systems are: (i) Official legal systems (ii) customary/cultural normative systems 
(iii) religious/cultural normative systems (iv) economic/capitalist normative systems (v) functional 
normative systems (vi) community/cultural normative systems. 
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subset of norms that have specifically ‘legal’ status, in two different senses (1) through 
recognition by the official legal system; or (2) on their own terms.”267  
Based on the above illustration, the Sharia precepts in Islamic finance are one 
example of the religious normative system that contained some legal status that is 
recognised by the official legal system (common law). The law for banking and 
financial services institutions in the UK and Malaysia which functions on the basis of 
the English common law acknowledged the religious precepts in Islamic finance and 
provide regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks. This has essentially justified that 
Sharia principles, originally derived from the Quran, have obtained some form of ‘legal’ 
status in the UK and Malaysia banking law which is based on the common law system. 
As such, while the law should not be expected to serve the Islamic financial ideals due 
to its neutral factor, the reality has seen some regulatory accommodation being put in 
place to suit the nature of Islamic finance. 
 
Islamic financial transactions can also fall within another type of normative orderings 
within the concept of legal pluralism, that is, the economic/capitalist normative 
systems. This type of normative system “consists of the range of norms and institutions 
that constitute and relate to capitalist production and market transactions with social 
arenas.”268 In this regard, the norms of Islamic finance is seen as having been 
                                                 
267 Tamanaha asserts that “many official legal systems explicitly recognise and incorporate customary 
norms and institutions, and religious norms institutions. Many post-colonial state legal systems, for 
example, acknowledge and enforce customary rules and practices in connection with marriage, divorce, 
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bodies of what the members consider ‘customary law’, entirely apart from whether the norms and 
institutions so identified are recognised as such by  the official legal order. He provides an example of 
‘natural law principles’ in the Catholic tradition. Ibid., p.398 
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incorporated in the official legal system (common law) and the latter recognised 
Islamic finance as having legal status. For instance, the implementation of Sharia 
principles in the Islamic finance commercial contract are recognised and incorporated 
in the economic system. The existing two normative orderings systems (religious 
normative and economic/capitalist) have therefore resulted to a clash. This type of 
clash has been argued to be one of the common types of fundamental orientation 
clashes under legal pluralism.269 In regards to the banking practices, the prohibition of 
usury (Riba) in Islamic finance (religious norms) can be inconsistent with the existing 
economic norms relating to contract, property and credit. The prohibition of Riba in 
Islamic finance which is inconsistent with existing modern banking practices has been 
reconciled through the restructuring of Islamic financial transactions and that has been 
accepted by the UK regulators. For example, the next chapter illustrates that there is 
specific regulatory accommodation for Sharia-compliant liquid assets due to the 
prohibition of interest in Islamic finance. It can therefore be inferred that there is 
already the incorporation of the concept of legal pluralism in the existing financial 
system that is complex and diverse.  
 
However, the concept of legal pluralism has its limitation whereby the incorporation of 
the conflicting normative systems can result in socio-political tension. Legal pluralism 
is also said to be an important aspect that can contribute to the fate of state legal 
systems. As argued by Tamanaha:  
 
                                                 
269Ibid.,p.407-409. The other three clashes are (i) Liberal (Individual) versus Non-Liberal (Non-
Individualist) Cultural Norms (ii) Systems that recognise or draw a sharp separation between public and 
private realms versus those that do not (iii) Rule-based systems with winners and losers versus 
consensual systems oriented towards satisfactory resolution.  
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“People and groups in social arenas with coexisting, conflicting normative systems will, 
in the pursuit of their objectives, play these competing systems against one another. 
Sometimes these clashes can be reconciled. Sometimes they can be ignored. But very 
often they will remain in conflict, with serious social and political ramifications….As in 
the medieval period, today they are coexisting, discrete legal orders that can overlap 
and clash, ranging from various official legal orders to the lex mercatoria and the 
Sharia…When placed in historical context, it is apparent that the texture of legal 
pluralism is intimately to the activities and fate of state legal systems.”270 
 
Based on the illustrations above, it can be inferred that the incorporation of Sharia 
regulation in the conventional regulatory framework is one aspect that arises from the 
doctrine of legal pluralism. Other aspects include the risks posed to Islamic banks and 
the need to develop the Islamic financial sector.  Such incorporation that already exists 
can be said to have contributed to the fate of the existing regulatory framework for the 
banking and financial institutions at the macro level. For instance, the incorporation of 
Sharia in the conventional regulatory framework for banking and financial institutions 
have seen several legislative amendments that somewhat provide an altogether new 
dimension for the banking sector in the UK. Whereas, for Malaysia, the incorporation 
of Sharia for Islamic banks through dual regulatory framework has similarly altered the 
dimension for the regulations governing banking and financial services institutions.  
 
However, the two normative orderings (religious and economic/capitalist system) can 
co-exist only to a certain extent. If Islamic finance is given special attention by the 
regulators over any other form of financial services, some political and social 
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ramifications can be expected in a secular society such as the UK.  For instance, the 
suggestion made in the year 2008 by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan 
Williams, on the need to incorporate some Sharia aspects (in particular, he was 
referring to marital disputes) in Britain has stirred large criticisms by the British public, 
politicians and government officials.271 His suggestion on the incorporation of Sharia 
law in Britain reflects that inclination towards Sharia matters in Britiain could easily 
result to socio-political tension.  
 
Note that in Malaysia, there is no evidence to suggest that the inclination of the 
government towards Islamic banks would result to socio-political tension. In fact, 
recent demographic survey has shown that in Malaysia, Islamic banks are well 
supported by the non-Muslims population.272 In the survey, 41.8% of Christians, 27% 
of Buddhists and 33.1% of Hindus use Islamic banking services.  This demonstrates 
that there is public support for Islamic financial sector in Malaysia because large 
segments of the non-Muslim population choose Islamic banks despite the availability 
of conventional banks. As such, evidence suggests that there is little socio-political 
tension for the government’s support for Islamic banks.  
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The objectives of banking regulation that are generic (neutral law) do not target any 
particular form of financial services (such as Islamic banks or co-operative banks) 
(Note that the discussion on the purpose of banking regulation is contained in Chapter 
5 of this thesis). Notably, the general objectives of banking regulation are mainly for 
depositor protection and to avoid banking failures which arise from externalities. 273   
 
Therefore, it can be suggested that the limits of legal pluralism (particularly in the UK) 
adds to the challenge of incorporating the concept of level-playing field regulation for 
banking and financial services institutions (whereby banking regulations should be free 
from any religious beliefs).  
 
(ii) Legal change 
The law is said to develop by the influence of other factors such as culture and social, 
economic, and political factors.274 Additionally, it can be said that the concept of legal 
pluralism also contributes to legal change. As a consequence, legal change makes 
the law that was enforced and relevant in the past unenforceable and irrelevant in 
today’s world. Similarly, banking and financial services regulation has undergone legal 
change due to the constant changes in the financial system. The law continues to 
develop when there is a development in the banking and financial services sector. 
That makes the law progressive. Thus law is reformed to minimise any potential risks 
that could impinge the health of the financial system. Some examples are the legal 
amendment of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the development of 
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Basel Accords.  As such, the concept of level-playing field regulation can be said to 
have limitations because law will continue to evolve to suit its current nature. Just like 
the legal accommodation for Islamic banks. This, therefore, creates the challenge for 
level-playing regulation for Islamic banks to be relevant within the established 
conventional concept of banking regulation.  
 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the fact that the financial system is complex and 
diverse raises the question of the usefulness of the concept of level-playing field 
regulation and to what extent the regulators can enable such a concept. This is 
because, innovation of the financial products that have always been encouraged by 
the regulators could, in a way, expose financial institutions to risks that differ in its 
dimension and degree. For example, some risks exposed to Islamic banks can be 
more serious than the conventional banks. As a result, the following chapters will show 
that the level-playing field regulation cannot be fully enabled.  
 
 
(iii) Level-playing field and the risks to Islamic banks 
The idea of having level-playing field treatment indicated by governments and 
regulators is seen as showing their support to promote fairness towards all the 
financial institutions operating in their jurisdiction (although the extent of the 
government’s support varies with respect of providing regulation for Islamic banks). 
While the concept of level-playing field represents the idea of fair treatment for Islamic 
banks, the question remains as to what extent level-playing field regulation can be 
connected with Islamic banks?  
134 
 
 
Creating a level-playing field for Islamic banks represents the government’s 
acknowledgment of the unique nature of Islamic finance and to a certain extent, 
understanding some of the risks attached to Islamic banks.275 Additionally, it can be 
suggested that such treatment could promote fair competition for Islamic banks.  
Various works have also supported the treatment of a level-playing field for Islamic 
banks as a means toward helping the sector to continue to develop in the financial 
world.276 This is done through providing legal accommodation for Islamic banks in the 
area that poses risks specific to Islamic banks. (The following chapters discuss the 
extent of regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks and it can be inferred that not 
all risks exposed to Islamic banks are compensated by providing specific legal 
accommodation – hence the usefulness of the concept level-playing field remain 
questionable).  
 
Due to the principles of Sharia in Islamic finance, it has been argued that some of the 
risk profiles attached to Islamic banks are distinct from the risk profiles experienced by 
conventional banks.277 This means that although the risks exposed to Islamic banks 
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are similar with conventional banks, the way Islamic banks are exposed to such risks 
can sometimes be nevertheless more serious or less serious than its conventional 
counterpart. In other words, Islamic banks are exposed to the same type of risks 
similar to the risks faced by conventional banks but by differing degrees and 
dimensions. Therefore, enabling a complete level-playing field regulation is a 
challenging concept.  
 
Note that although the focus of this thesis is on the issue of level-playing field for retail 
Islamic banks, nevertheless, it is important to highlight the risks exposed to Islamic 
banks in totality as banks’ risks affect all types of Islamic banks – whether wholesale 
or retail. The examples below highlight several types of risks that can affect Islamic 
banks in a different context as opposed to the conventional banks. Risks include, but 
are not limited to, general risk management, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, 
profit rate risk, equity investment risk, Sharia non-compliance risk, liquidity risk and 
counter-party risk. 
 
(a) General Risk Management  
With regards to the general aspect of risk management, Islamic banks generally 
require the same approach as the conventional banks. Similar to the conventional 
banks, Islamic banks need appropriate sound risk management that can ensure its 
systems, procedures and governance are well-strucdtured. However, at the specific 
level, several authors have argued that the risk profile of a typical Islamic bank may 
                                                 
‘Diversity in the Regulation of Islamic Financial Institutions’, (2007), V. Sundarajan and Luca Errico, 
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differ from a conventional bank.278 Due to the Sharia-compliance principle, factors 
such as the construction and legal form of the transaction(s), the assets and liabilities 
which arise from the transaction(s), the risks undertaken, and the party absorbing the 
risk need to be taken into account for Islamic banks’ risk management.279 These 
factors arise from the different approach of Islamic financial contracts as opposed to 
the conventional financial contracts. While Basel requirements provide the risk 
management guidelines for banks globally, such requirements may not be fully 
suitable for the inherent nature of Islamic banks. Therefore, guidelines issued by the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (an international standard setting body for Islamic 
financial institutions) which complements Basel standards are highly recommended to 
reduce the risks specifically exposed to Islamic banks.280 This approach can produce 
a better regulatory framework for Islamic banks, although not necessarily ensure a 
complete level-playing field.     
 
(b) Credit Risk  
While the conventional banks are also exposed to credit risk, the overall credit risk 
faced by Islamic banks may differ and could be higher from the risk profile of 
conventional banks.281 In some of the Islamic financial contracts, for instance, in 
Murabaha contracts (cost-plus financing), “Islamic banks are exposed to credit risks 
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when the bank delivers the goods to the client but does not receive prompt payment 
from the client.”282 In this case, Islamic banks are “prohibited from charging any 
accrued interest or imposing any penalty (except if there is a deliberate delay).”283 As 
such, during such delay, the “bank’s capital is stuck in a non-productive activity and 
the bank cannot earn any income.”284 However, in order to solve this issue, it has been 
said that Islamic banks mitigate such risk through better collateralisation.285 In 
Mudaraba contracts (participation or trust financing), when an Islamic bank enters the 
contract as ‘principal’ with an external ‘agent’ (borrower), the bank is exposed to 
enhanced credit risk especially when the bank is unable to monitor the business 
operations accurately, and losses are claimed.286   
 
(c) Market Risk  
Market risk is associated with changes in the market value of held assets. A bank “may 
experience loss due to unfavourable movements in market price, such as the in the 
case of yields or benchmark rates (rate of return risk), foreign exchange rates, as well 
as equity and commodity prices (price risk).”287 Notably, the market risk exposed to 
Islamic banks may differ from the market risk profile of the conventional banks. Islamic 
banks are not allowed to be involved in speculative transactions due to Sharia 
prohibitions; hence market risk can affect Islamic banks differently than towards the 
conventional banks. Islamic banks can be exposed to market risk arising from the 
presence of multiple counterparties that are involved in Islamic banking transactions 
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such as commodity Murabaha (cost-plus financing) transactions.288 Market risk also 
arises from commodity price risk and foreign exchange risk. Additionally, the fact that 
Islamic banks often invest in various types of Sukuk exposes Islamic banks to market 
risk that arise from the volatility of assets they traded.289 
 
(d) Operational Risk 
Operational risk is “the risk of failure of the internal processes related to people and 
systems”.290 It is the type of risk which may expose Islamic banks to a higher extent 
than the conventional banks due to the complexity of their contractual features and 
general legal environment. Several aspects of operational risk that affects Islamic 
banks includes (i) cancellation risk in the Murabaha (cost-plus financing) and Istisna 
(manufacturing) contracts) (ii) failure of the internal control system to detect and 
manage potential problems in the operational processes (iii) the need to maintain and 
manage commodity inventories in illiquid markets and (iv) failure to adhere to Sharia 
requirements.291 
 
(e) Profit rate risk  
Profit rate risk faced by Islamic banks is similar to the conventional interest rate risk. 
However, the degree of this type of risk may differ from the conventional counterpart. 
Profit rate risk is generally associated with “overall balance sheet exposures where 
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mismatches arise between assets and balances from fund providers.”292 Such risk is 
derived from the uncertainty in the returns earned by Islamic banks. The risk arises 
when “an increase in benchmark rates results in expectations of higher rates of return 
on investment accounts.” An increase in benchmark rates will ultimately raise the 
expectations of Islamic bank’s investment account holders’ expectations of higher 
rates of return although the actual rate can only be determined until the end of the 
investment period.293 Islamic banks often minimise this risk, however, through a profit 
equalisation reserve and investment risk reserves.294 
 
(f) Equity investment risk  
Islamic banks’ participation in a partnership agreement such as profit and loss sharing 
investments often exposes the banks to equity investment risk. Some of the examples 
of equity investments of Islamic banks are holding of shares in the stock markets, 
private equity investment, equity participation in specific projects and syndicated 
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investment.295 The equity investment risk is rather unique for Islamic banks due to the 
fact that conventional bank do not invest in equity-based assets.296 This risk can lead 
to “volatility in the financial institutions’ earnings due to the liquidity, credit, and market 
risks associated with equity holdings.”297 Other associated risk in equity-based 
investment is credit risk and financial risk as the capital may be lost due to business 
losses. 298 
 
(g) Sharia non-compliance risk  
As the essential unique selling-point of Islamic banking is that their activities are based 
on Sharia principles, the non-compliance to Sharia principles will impact Islamic banks 
in various aspects.299 For instance, reputational risk, legal risk, transparency risk, risk 
of Sharia governance failure, failure to treat consumers fairly and failure to provide 
consumer protection. This type of risk is viewed differently by different jurisdictions. In 
secular countries, it can be argued that the regulators will view that such risk will affect 
the consumers’ protection and failure to treat consumers fairly. Whereas in Muslim 
jurisdictions, the regulators are seen to give more acknowledgement to this type of risk 
and often detailed regulations is set out to ensure that Islamic banks comply with 
Sharia requirements. This type of risk, however, does not exist for conventional banks. 
This raises the need to ensure an appropriate regulation for Islamic banks.  
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(h) Liquidity risk  
While the conventional banks also faced liquidity risk, this risk is heightened in Islamic 
banks due to several factors: (i) Islamic banks have often had to rely to on short-term 
retail funding due to the fact that the long-term funding takes greater time to reach its 
maturity; (ii) Islamic banks tend to operate in environments with underdeveloped 
Sharia-compliant interbank and money markets and government securities; (iii) there 
is limited ability to hedge certain risks due to prohibitions against the use of 
conventional derivatives; and (iv) there is limited access to lender of last resort facilities 
as opposed to the conventional banks.300 
 
(i) Counter-party risk  
In some of the Islamic financial contracts, Islamic banks may face counter-party risk 
which is present in the case of deferred payment and delivery contracts when 
combined with Murabaha (cost-plus financing).301 For instance, in Bay’ Salam contract 
(deferred delivery) or Istisna contracts (manufacturing contracts), Islamic banks can 
become exposed to counter-party risk when there is a failure to supply on time or at 
all, or, failure to supply the quality of goods as contractually specified.302 This risk can 
also lead to credit risk and commodity risk. Islamic banks could also be exposed to 
counter-party risk in Mudaraba (participation or trust financing) contracts303. For 
instance, as Islamic banks do not have the right to participate in the management of 
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the project, the bank may lose its principal investment and potential share if the 
entrepreneur suffers losses.304    
 
 
(j) Fiduciary risk  
Islamic banks are exposed to this type of risk due to its feature as a profit-loss sharing 
principle. Fiduciary risk is defined as the legal liability arising from a breach of the 
investment contract for mismanagement of depositors and shareholders’ funds.305 For 
example, the relationship between an Islamic bank and its account holders is a 
fiduciary relationship where the bank is allowed to manage the funds of the depositors 
based on trust.306 An Islamic bank is not obliged to return the share of profits for the 
depositors and in the case of heavy losses arising from the mismanagement of funds 
from the current account holders, the latter will lose their confidence and may seek 
legal recourse. In the case of partnership-based investment such as Mudaraba or 
Musharaka, any intentional negligence in evaluating and monitoring the project can 
lead to fiduciary risk.307  
 
The types of risks described above are part of the risks that Islamic banks face in a 
differing degrees and dimensions as compared to conventional banks. There are other 
types of risks faced by the conventional banks that are also applied to Islamic bank 
such as withdrawal risk, solvency risk, asset and liability management risk, and 
                                                 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid., Appendix 
306 Hennie Van Greuning and Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks, (2008),  p.179 
307 Ibid. 
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institutional risk.308  One may argue that since Islamic banks are exposed to the same 
risks as the conventional banks, there is no need to have a specific regulatory 
accommodation for Islamic banks in order to create a level-playing field. However, the 
counter-argument to this is that since Islamic banks are exposed to such risks in a 
different dimension, the degree of risks exposed to Islamic banks may be higher than 
the same risks exposed to the conventional banks. Therefore, to a certain extent, an 
appropriate regulatory accommodation that caters to the inherent risks exposed to 
Islamic banks is still required. However, this does not necessarily mean that a 
complete level-playing field can be achieved. In this regard, the regulatory framework 
set out by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is helpful to minimise 
the risks attached to Islamic banks. The different risks exposures remain a challenge 
to the level-playing field regulation. Further discussion on the IFSB and AAOIFI is 
highlighted in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
(iv) Level-playing field and Islamic banks’ stability 
It has been argued that appropriate banking regulation can help to promote the stability 
of the banking system.309 Banking system stability has been defined as a “steady state 
in which the financial system efficiently performs its key economic functions, such as 
allocating resources and spreading risk as well as settling payments”.310 In other 
words, a sound banking system is where banking institutions meet the solvency 
                                                 
308 Further illustration on these risks is provided in the Appendix section. See, El-Hawary et.al., ‘Diversity 
in the Regulation’, (2007), Appendix.   
309 Supra, Note. 76 
310Nadya Jahn and Thomas Kick, ‘Determinants of Banking Stability’ via 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/bhbibe/jahn.pdf> accessed: 25 June 2015 
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requirements to perform the functions above. On the other hand, banking system 
instability can arise “either through idiosyncratic components related to poor banking 
practices adversely affecting an individual bank’s solvency, from systematic 
components initiated by aggregate shocks entailing financial strains for the banking 
system or a combination of both.”311 Therefore, it has been argued that the “proper 
estimation of distress dependence amongst the banks in a system is of key importance 
for the surveillance of stability of the banking system.”312 In this regard, the banking 
and financial regulators should provide appropriate regulation and recognise the 
importance assessing the risks exposed to the banking system; as well as aiming to 
provide regulation that can minimise risks affecting the banking system’s stability. 
Stability of banks (including Islamic banks) cannot be precisely identified as the 
outcome varies depending on factors such as the size of the banks, the relative size 
of the risks, country by country and by one bank to another.313 While it is often argued 
that appropriate banking and financial regulation can promote the banking system’s 
stability314, question arises as to whether the ‘level-playing field’ regulation can provide 
stability to Islamic banks.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is noteworthy that various researcher have conducted 
studies on Islamic banking stability in comparison with the conventional banks and 
have discovered varied results based on different sets of criteria. Note that the findings 
are not particularly based on the impact of regulation but rather the performance of 
                                                 
311 Ibid. 
312Miguel A. Segoviano and Charles Goodhart, ‘Determinants of Banking System’, (2009) via 
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Islamic banks based on economic variables. However, the reference to the varied 
research outcomes can be reflective of the fact that the performance of Islamic banks 
is dependent on the existing regulatory framework governing Islamic banks (at the 
time the research was undertaken in various countries, and it can also be assumed 
that the targeted jurisdictions provide regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks, 
either in unitary or dual regulatory framework).  Differences in results are also due to 
the different set of regulatory treatment for Islamic banks in each country where the 
research was conducted. Therefore, the outcomes could not be said to be the actual 
result of the existing regulation because as mentioned earlier, the outcome of the 
research findings are based on the economic variables and differences in criteria.  
 
Thus far, there is relatively little empirical analysis on the impact of regulation for 
Islamic banking stability or the role of Islamic banks in financial stability. While there 
is such a limitation, research indicates that Islamic banks stability (within the existing 
regulatory framework of differing countries) under certain criteria can be stronger or 
weaker or similar to the conventional banks.315 For instance, a comparative research 
that was done between Islamic banks and conventional banks conducted in 18 
countries using the economic assessment of Z-scores model have shown that large 
Islamic banks are weaker than large conventional banks. On the other hand, small 
Islamic banks are stronger than small conventional banks, and small Islamic banks 
are stronger than large Islamic banks. 316 The contributing factor for such an outcome 
                                                 
315 Martin Čihák and Heiko Hesse, ‘Islamic Banks and Financial Stability: An Empirical Analysis’, (2008), 
p.20 
316 Ibid. - The authors have argued that such result should be viewed as preliminary given caveats 
related to cross-country data on Islamic banks. Based on the Bankscope data, Islamic banks accounted 
for more than 1 percent of the total assets in at least one year in the period under observation (1993-
2004). Large banks assets are over US$1 billion and smaller banks assets are smaller than US$1billion.  
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is mainly due to the credit risk management of Islamic banks. The result has shown 
that Islamic banks when operating on a small scale can be more relatively stable than 
operating on a large scale. The researchers have suggested that the explanation for 
such findings is due to the fact that “it is significantly more complex for Islamic banks 
to adjust their credit risk monitoring system as they become bigger” as profit and loss 
sharing activities are more difficult to be standardised than loans in the conventional 
banks.317  
 
With regards to credit risk, another comparative research has found that small Islamic 
banks that operate in predominantly Muslim countries (over 90% of the population) 
have lower credit risk than the conventional banks.318 This is based on the assumption 
that the majority Muslims populations express greater concern about their religious 
beliefs and hence are more risk averse than the conventional bank’s clients.319  In 
terms of insolvency risk, the research has found that small Islamic banks are more 
stable than the conventional banks as they are more capitalised.320 However, there is 
no significant difference between large Islamic banks and the conventional banks.321  
 
Other research has also found that during the 2008-2009 global financial crises, 
Islamic banks were affected differently than the conventional banks. The Islamic 
banking model has somewhat helped limit the adverse impact on Islamic banks and 
                                                 
317 Ibid., p.21 
318 Pejman Abedifar, Philip Molyneux and Amine Tarazi, ‘Risk in Islamic Banking’, (2012), p.5.  The 
research was conducted using a sample of 553 banks from 24 countries between the years 1999 and 
2009. Economic variables were used to identify the outcome.  
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has hence shielded their profitability during the early stage of the global financial crisis. 
However, weak risk management affected Islamic banks’ profitability during the later 
stage of the crisis, when the crisis hit the real economy.322 Additionally, another 
research suggests that due to higher capitalisation, better asset quality and liquidity 
holdings, Islamic banks performed better than the conventional banks during the 
global financial crisis.323 
 
While it seems difficult to show whether the level-playing field regulation can contribute 
to the stability of Islamic banks, nevertheless, it can be inferred that some regulatory 
accommodation can contribute to Islamic banks’ stability. For instance, the next 
chapter shows that the regulatory accommodation on Sharia-compliant liquid assets 
regulation could help Islamic banks in the UK to have more options to sufficiently 
manage their liquidity.  More on this point is provided in the next chapter.  
  
The outcome of the research findings above are mainly based on economic variables. 
It does not represent specifically on the impact of the regulation towards Islamic 
banking stability from the legal perspective. Thus far, there is an absence of empirical 
research on determining the impact of level-playing field regulation and the stability of 
Islamic banks. Indeed, it is rather difficult to determine whether level-playing field 
regulation can promote stability of Islamic banks. It can, however, be argued that this 
issue is based on two reasons. Firstly, since the notion of level-playing field is 
metaphorical, there is a difficulty in directly associating the notion ‘level-playing field’ 
                                                 
322 Maher Hasan and Jemma Dridi, ‘The Effects of Global Crisis on Islamic Banks and Conventional 
Banks: A Comparative Study’, (2010), p.33  
323 Alejandro López Mejia, Suliman Aljabrin, Rachid Awad,Mohamed Norat and Inwon Song, 
‘Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks’, (2014),  p. 13 
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regulation and banking stability (including Islamic banks). This is because the notion 
‘level-playing field’ cannot be equated with economic variables. Also, from the legal 
perspective, it is difficult to associate the level-playing field regulation with stability. 
Secondly, as discussed earlier, there is no specific benchmark to determine the 
outcome of the level-playing field, or to question what is level-playing field or  the level-
playing field of what, thus its relation to bank’s stability cannot be specifically 
determined. These reasons have therefore challenged the concept of level-playing 
field regulation. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter concludes that based on the rationale and the justifications for 
more/simple regulations for Islamic banks, it can be said that Islamic banks are better 
regulated in a simpler form of regulations – especially in the UK context. While it is 
important to address the risks exposed to Islamic banks, it is not necessary to have a 
separate regulatory framework to create a level-playing field. What is needed is an 
appropriate regulation for Islamic banks which could help the sector to develop. In 
other words, it is not necessary to have more regulations for Islamic banks (as the 
Malaysian regulatory approach for regulating Islamic banks). This is because, the 
arguments above have shown that there is an absence of connection between the 
idea of level-playing regulations with the rationales and justifications for more/simple 
regulations.  
 
 
Furthermore, what could be regarded as a ‘level-playing field’ regulation remains 
uncertain. The earlier section has shown that there is an absence of a clear definition 
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for the notion of a level-playing field. Interpretations by various fields on what 
constitutes a level-playing field have been made to suit the context of their existing 
issue. The notion of a level-playing field is, therefore, an open ended term. However, 
the common inference of what level-playing field means relates to the idea of fairness 
and the parties’ equal opportunity to compete fairly. In light of this, the existence of a 
level-playing field concept can be inferred by analysing the two suggested elements - 
equality before the law and the fair opportunity to compete.  These elements are 
arguably the guideline to determine the closest connection to what is considered as 
the level-playing field regulation for Islamic banks. Another approach toward finding 
the closest connection to the level-playing field regulation is to determine whether a 
lack of adjustment in the existing regulatory framework ultimately results in an obvious 
negative outcome, and not a mere outcome. In this regard, the relevant approach is 
to question whether the regulatory framework impedes the development of Islamic 
banks and affects the stability of the financial system as a whole.  
 
The concept of level-playing field regulation is seen to encounter several challenges. 
The challenge involves the vagueness in the term itself, firstly, being an open ended 
metaphoric term and secondly, the overlapping concept of level, fairness, equality and 
justice. Thirdly, that the ideal law which was suggested by Fuller and Hayek should be 
made equal, general, practicable, certain, and fair is arguably a mere guideline for the 
regulators when making regulation. This is because, not all area of laws can be made 
general or certain. Likewise, not all area of laws can be made specific. Through time, 
laws change to suit the existing situation hence leading to the legal change. As such, 
there is no certainty that the laws today will be relevant tomorrow. Therefore, in some 
aspect, laws are amended to suit the specific nature of the subject in order to avoid 
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greater risks. Hence, laws may not always be general or equal or certain because law 
is constantly evolving.  If this is the case, it can be suggested that there is nothing that 
can be considered as an ideal law that is relevant for all time.  
 
Additionally, this chapter has also argued that the realities that exist in the legal and 
financial system pose challenges to the level-playing field regulation. Apart from the 
issues above, other realities such as the doctrine of legal pluralism is seen to clash 
with the neutral objective of banking regulation hence challenging the concept of level-
playing field regulations. It was also argued that there is a clash between the level-
playing field regulations and the risks faced by Islamic banks whereby the latter face 
some risks in different degrees and dimension than conventional banks and hence 
require more appropriate regulation. The chapter also pointed out that the vague 
connection of level-playing field regulation with the stability of Islamic banks is seen to 
be a challenge to the usefulness of level-playing field regulations. In sum, the notion 
‘level-playing field’ is argued to be no more than a mere expression and metaphorical 
to fairness. The emphasis of the notion level-playing field made by the regulators 
towards the legal accommodation for Islamic banks (as shown in the later chapters) 
questions the value of the concept of level-playing field regulations. The interpretation 
of level-playing field is rather debatable and subjective, while it remains a relevant 
concept to be examined. 
 
When the rudimentary concept (level-playing field / fairness / equality) is not clear or 
certain, and accompanied with the challenges mentioned earlier, the question is raised 
as to whether the level-playing field regulation is conceptually useful? Especially in the 
existing financial system which is considered to be diverse and complex? Following 
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this, the so called ‘level-playing field’ regulation in the regulatory accommodation for 
Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia is examined in the next chapter. In particular, 
the next chapter analyses the extent of ‘level-playing field’ regulation for Islamic banks 
within the financial system in both jurisdictions. Therefore, the approach is to examine 
the regulatory framework by using the two test questions above (equality before the 
law and fair opportunity to compete) to analyse the level-playing field regulation at the 
transactional level and the institutional level.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the legal background of the UK and Malaysia 
is based on the English common law system and their approach to regulating the 
financial sector is to treat all the financial services institutions on a level-playing field 
basis.  Nevertheless, both countries approach to regulating all financial services 
institutions on a level-playing field basis differs despite the fact that both are 
implementing English common law. For instance, it can be inferred that based on the 
regulatory framework governing Islamic banks in the UK, the idea to treat Islamic 
banks on a level-playing field represents that Islamic banks are treated within the 
conventional banking regulations.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the regulatory accommodation governing 
Islamic banks in the UK by focusing on the issue of a level-playing field in the 
regulatory framework and the legal impediments that have arisen in this context.    This 
chapter analyses whether the UK’s regulators have enabled a level-playing field in the 
regulation of Islamic banks within the conventional banking framework and examine 
whether ‘level-playing field’ regulation is a useful concept. In this regard, this chapter 
questions the regulatory clarity, transparency, standardisation and risks attached to 
Islamic banks in the existing regulatory framework.  
 
Following the analysis made in this chapter, it is inferred that the UK level-playing field 
regulation governing Islamic banks is based on a reactive approach. In particular, 
regulatory accommodations tailored for Islamic banks are based on the real need for 
having a particular regulatory accommodation. This is the case, for instance, with the 
regulatory accommodation on liquid assets regulation, Sukuk, and taxation, which will 
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be explained in detail later in this chapter. Substantive compromises have been made 
by Islamic banks in order to fit into the conventional banking regulatory framework. 
Islamic banks have been exposed to several aspects of risks based on the existing 
level-playing field regulation such as reputational risk, transparency risk, regulatory 
risk, and operational risk. It is found that the level-playing field regulations for Islamic 
banks have not been enabled by the UK regulators.   
 
 
This chapter consists of three main sections. It begins with a brief history of regulatory 
development in the Islamic banking sector in the UK.  The second section highlights 
the regulatory principles adopted by the UK regulators towards Islamic banks.  The 
third section examines and analyses the regulatory accommodation governing Islamic 
banks within the context of a level-playing field. The final section provides the 
conclusion.  
 
3.1.1 THE PAST AND PRESENT REGULATORY SYSTEM GOVERNING 
ISLAMIC BANKS 
Historically, the regulatory system for all financial services in the UK (including Islamic 
banks) was based on ‘tripartite system’ which consists of three authorities – the Bank 
of England (BOE), the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Treasury.324 These 
authorities were collectively responsible for managing financial stability. However, 
following the 2007 global financial crisis, this regulatory model was regarded to be 
inadequate at the institutional level. The BOE was given nominal responsibility to 
                                                 
324HM Treasury, ‘A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Judgement, Focus and Stability’, (2010), 
p.3 
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ensure financial stability, however, it was criticised that there was no tools or levers 
provided to the BOE to carry its role effectively.325 The Treasury which was responsible 
to maintain the overall legal and institutional framework were not given clear 
responsibility to deal with the financial crisis and the FSA was the sole regulatory body 
which is expected to deal with the myriad of issues, from the safety and soundness of 
the global investment banks to the customer practices of the smallest high-street 
financial adviser. It was the authoritative body which authorised and supervised all 
financial institutions including Islamic banks.326  As a result of the financial crisis and 
the institutional failures, the tripartite system was abolished.  
 
Beginning from April 2013, changes have been made in the UK’s financial services 
landscape.  The regulatory architecture in the UK is now transformed to a ‘twin-peaks’ 
model which consists of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) where its primary duty 
is to maintain the financial system’s stability and to consult the BOE on monetary 
policy; and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) which operates as a subsidiary 
of the BOE that is responsible for prudential regulation of all deposit-taking institutions, 
insurers and investment banks. 327 Notably, the PRA derived its objectives under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 which is to promote the safety and 
soundness of the firms it regulates to facilitate effective competition.328 Finally, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is an independent authority, acting as the conduct 
                                                 
325 Ibid., p.4 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid., p.5  
328 Prudential Regulation Authority, via <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/>  accessed 26 July 2015 
156 
 
of business regulator for PRA- authorised firms. 329 The financial services regulation 
in the UK is also subject to European Union (EU) regulations. 330   
 
Prior to the changes in the regulatory architecture, as mentioned in chapter one, the 
latest report has revealed that at least 20 Islamic financial institutions were FSA-
authorised and five of them are fully Sharia-compliant.331  In 2004, the first Sharia-
compliant bank in the UK was the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB),332now rebranded as 
Al Rayan Bank, (hereinafter referred to as Al Rayan333), followed by the Bank of 
London and the Middle East (2007), Gatehouse Bank (2008), Qatar Investment Bank 
(UK) (2008) and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (2013)334.  In 2012, seventeen ‘Islamic 
windows’ were established by the conventional banks.335 The latest report revealed 
that there are now 20 international banks operating on Islamic finance in the UK.336 
 
                                                 
329 Ibid. 
330 The Prudential Regulations Authority’s Approach to Banking Supervision, (June 2014), p.7 
331 The CityUK, ‘The UK: The Leading Western Centre for Islamic Finance’, (November 2015),p.4 See, 
Sharia-compliant technically means the adherence to Islamic principles. More explanation can be found 
in the terminology section.  
332 Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman, and Ali Ravalia.,  ‘Islamic Finance’, 
(2007), p.10, Report: The CityUK, ‘Islamic Finance’ (2012), p.6 
333 The change of name took place in December 2014 following the acquisition by Masraf Al Rayan 
QSC (MAR) via <http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/>accessed 19 April 2015 
334 United Kingdom Trade & Investment, ‘UK Excellence in Islamic Finance’, (2014) via 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/> accessed 6 August 2015 
335 Supra, Note. 9. Islamic windows banks in the UK includes : ABC International Bank Ahli United Bank 
Bank of Ireland Barclays BNP Paribas Bristol & West Citi Group Deutsche Bank Europe Arab Bank 
HSBC Amanah IBJ International London J Aron & Co. Lloyds Banking Group Royal Bank of Scotland 
Standard Chartered UBS United National Bank. See, Report: TheCityUK, ‘Islamic Finance’, (2012), p.4  
336 Supra, Note. 334 
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In terms of products and services, the UK’s Islamic retail bank namely Al Rayan Bank 
(which can be said as the sole fully-fledged Islamic retail bank) offers similar banking 
products as conventional retail banks. For instance, savings accounts, current 
accounts, home financing, debit cards, international money transfer, financial planning 
and other personal investment services.337 Islamic wholesale banks also offer similar 
services to what the conventional wholesale banks offer in the financial market such 
as products and services for real estates, leasing, trade finance, Islamic capital 
markets, treasury, syndications and so forth. 338 However, unlike conventional 
wholesale banks, Islamic wholesale banks are not allowed to get involved in hedging 
activities such as in futures, options and other derivatives due to Sharia restrictions 
(the said activities involve an element of gambling and uncertainties which expose 
Islamic banks to high risk).339 Nonetheless, the Islamic wholesale financial products 
are replaced with other types of contracts similar to hedging such as an Urbun contract 
or Salam contract340 which can mitigate risk.    
 
Thus far, since the regulatory transformation of the UK’s financial services sector takes 
place, there is no evidence that the number of Islamic banks operating in the country 
has increased. However, it has been observed that the number of Islamic banking 
windows in operation has decreased.  For example, in 2012, HSBC terminated its 
‘Islamic window’ operation (HSBC Amanah) in most countries including the UK, except 
for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.  It is reported that the termination was due to their 
                                                 
337 Al Rayan Bank, via <http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/> accessed : 10 July 2015 
338 See, European Islamic Investment Bank via http://www.eiib.co.uk/html/advisory.asp, Bank of London 
and Middle East via https://www.blme.com/, Gatehouse Bank, via <http://www.gatehousebank.com/> 
accessed: 15 July 2015 
339 Natalie Schoon, Islamic Banking and Finance, (2009), p.80 
340 For the definitions of Urbun and Salam, please refer to Glossary.  
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worldwide strategic review, which included a decision to restructure their Islamic 
banking business.341  
 
This subsection has highlighted the UK’s past and present regulatory system which 
governs Islamic banks. We now then turn to the next section that describes the 
government’s regulatory principles for Islamic banks in the UK.  This is important so 
as to understand the method of implementation that has shaped the regulatory 
accommodation of Islamic financial services in the UK.  Note that, in the next section, 
reference to the new regulatory regime which governs the financial services industry 
in the UK is referred to as ‘the regulators’.  
 
3.1.2 THE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH – PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR 
ISLAMIC BANKS 
The UK’s regulatory approaches for the Islamic financial sector are based on three 
principles- fairness, collaboration and commitment.342  Fairness in the regulatory 
accommodation represents the avoidance of giving any special favours to one group 
of financial services over the others and all the regulated financial services should be 
able to provide benefits to UK consumers regardless of faith and beliefs.343  The 
principle of collaboration represents the Government’s objective of working together 
with the financial services industry and the international standards setting bodies to 
ensure that the Islamic financial industry could become competitive in the financial 
                                                 
341 HSBC Amanah via <http://www.hsbcamanah.com/>, and NewHorizon Magazine (Issue : Oct – Dec 
2012), p.6  via < http://www.islamic-banking.com/> accessed: 10 September 2014  
342 HM Treasury, ‘The Development of Islamic Finance in  the UK: The Government’s Perspective’, 
(2008), p.17 
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market.  Through such collaboration, the Government has introduced legislative 
measures in the Finance Act 2003 to remove tax and regulatory barriers to Islamic 
finance in the UK.344  Tax relief was introduced in transactions involving Islamic 
mortgages’ transactions to prevent multiple payment of Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) 
for individual consumers.  The tax relief was given due to the fact that taxation incurred 
for some Islamic financial transactions are more expensive than for conventional 
financial transactions that could potentially reduce the competitiveness aspect of 
Islamic financial products.  Further analysis of the issue of taxation is discussed in the 
later part of this chapter.  Other legislative amendments include other equity sharing 
arrangements (Mudaraba, Murabaha, Diminishing Musharaka and Ijara wa Iqtina 
contracts) in Finance Act 2005 and in Finance Act 2006, the SDLT reliefs were 
extended to companies. Regulatory provisions were also made in Finance Act 2007 
to facilitate the issuance of Sukuk.345 
 
Finally, the commitment by the UK government to the Islamic financial sector is seen 
through the establishment of several working groups to assist the development of the 
sector.  Although the size of the Islamic financial sector in the UK is comparatively 
small, the Government has established the Islamic Finance Experts’ Group, the Tax 
Technical Working Group, an Islamic Finance team in the then FSA346 and the 
formation of the new Islamic Finance Task Force.347  The latter is primarily aimed to 
                                                 
344 HM Treasury, ‘The Development of Islamic Finance in the UK’, (2008), p.16 
345 Ibid., p.16, 20 
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promote the development of the Islamic financial sector, to increase inward investment 
and to strengthen the UK economy.348  Due to the Government’s strong interest and 
support for the industry, the UK is now the leading provider for Islamic financial 
services in the Western world.349  
 
 
Be that as it may, the extent of regulations for Islamic banks in the UK (as well as in 
Malaysia) is also influenced by the government’s public policy and political economy. 
As has been discussed earlier in chapter two, the UK’s government’s aim is to attract 
more investments from the Gulf region. Therefore, the extent of regulatory 
accommodation for Islamic banks is geared towards attracting more liquidity from Arab 
world.  While in Malaysia, the degree of emphasis to provide more regulations for 
Islamic banks are essentially due to the government’s aim to promote and develop the 
Islamic financial market and to become the leading Islamic financial centre in the 
world. Therefore, greater regulatory accommodation is given without necessarily 
based on the economic justification for regulation per se. As such, it can be seen in 
this chapter that Islamic banks in the UK are regulated not more than necessary and 
the regulations are provided to attract more liquidity in the financial market – not 
necessarily considering the substantive equality in the regulations. Moreover, as 
argued in chapter two, the societal sensitivity and perception can be an influential 
factor before a government (in this case, UK and Malaysia) choose to develop a 
particular sector.  For the fact that the UK is a secular country, providing a greater 
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emphasis on developing a sector i.e: Islamic financial sector; could trigger the 
sensitivity of other religions or the secular society as a whole. Ultimately, it could 
somewhat cause political tension in the government. Whereas in Malaysia, such an 
issue would not arise for it is a Muslim majority country. Additionally, the focus of the 
UK’s government is towards attracting more liquidity in its country rather than 
regulating more for the ‘faith’ in the Islamic financial sector. In other words, the extent 
of regulation is also driven by political-economy factor. As such, the regulators prefer 
to be a neutral regulator rather than giving a special favour to a particular financial 
service350 – in this regard, Islamic finance.  
 
With regards to the UK’s regulators approach to treat Islamic banks on a level-playing 
field, the idea of ‘level-playing field’ is rather ambiguous. There is no clear or specific 
indication of what ‘level-playing field’ actually means in the regulatory environment. It 
can be argued, therefore, that a general interpretation of ‘level-playing field’ is the idea 
of providing neutral treatment for all banking and financial services institutions – in 
terms of their products and conduct of business.  Notably, Islamic financial products 
are decided either on a case-by-case basis, categorised differently or not regulated at 
all.351  Also, the regulatory principle for regulation and taxation of Islamic finance is 
based on the economic substance of the products over their legal form.352   
 
 
                                                 
350 Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman, and Ali Ravalia.,  ‘Islamic 
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Therefore, what is assumed to be ‘level’ by one party may not necessarily be 
considered as ‘level’ by another party.  Similarly, in the context of banking and financial 
services regulation, the existing regulatory accommodation, which is assumed as the 
level-playing field regulation for all banking and financial services institutions, may not 
be the most appropriate approach.  This is because Islamic banks face risks that can 
harm the banks in different dimension than the conventional banks, as well as the 
challenges and realities that have been mentioned in the previous chapter. In fact, 
Chapter 2 has shown that the rationales and justifications for banking regulations have 
made the level-playing field regulations unworkable. Additionally, the regulators have 
also acknowledged that Islamic financial products contain different ‘legal, economic or 
risk structures’.353  
 
Following this, the next section examines whether the regulators have enabled a ‘level-
playing field’ in the regulatory environment and whether level-playing field is a useful 
concept by analysing the regulatory framework governing Islamic banks in the UK.   
 
3.2 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD AND THE REGULATORY ACCOMMODATION 
FOR ISLAMIC BANKS  
This section examines and analyses the regulatory issues governing Islamic banks in 
the UK and the underlying problems faced by the banks within the context of a level-
playing field.  It consists of eight sections that include the regulatory aspects on 
authorisation, Collective Investment Scheme (CIS), Home Purchase Plan (HPP), 
Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), Islamic finance cases before the English courts, the 
regulatory decision making process, Sharia-compliant liquid assets and taxation.  
                                                 
353 Ibid.  
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As argued in the previous chapter, the term level-playing field could include two main 
factors: (i) equality before the law and (ii) fair opportunity to compete.  The following 
regulatory aspects are discussed in relation to these two factors.  
 
 
(a)  AUTHORISATION  
Banking and financial services regulation requires that all banking and financial 
institutions in the UK be authorised in order to conduct their business and financial 
activities, formerly known as regulated activities.354  For Islamic banks, fulfilling the 
authorisation requirements in the existing regulatory framework was a challenge.  For 
instance, this was highlighted during the authorisation process for Al Rayan Bank by 
the then FSA.355  The process required in the conventional regulatory framework 
poses difficulties for Islamic banks to get authorisation for their banking business in 
the UK as the fundamental requirement enumerated in the Regulated Activities Order 
requires financial institutions accepting deposits to have ‘capital certainty’.356  
 
‘Deposit’ as defined by the Regulated Activities Order (RAO) is, 
The “sum of money paid on terms under which it will be repaid, with or without interest 
of premium, and either on demand or at a time or in circumstances agreed by or on 
behalf of the person making the payment and the person receiving it, and which are 
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referable to the provision of property (other than currency) or services or the giving of 
security.”357 
 
The obligation for an Islamic bank to meet the ‘capital certainty’ requirement did not 
align with the concept of an Islamic banking business358 (the fundamental principle of 
Islamic finance is based on a profit and loss sharing (PLS) account (usually under 
Mudaraba contract). Under the Mudaraba contract, the account holders (Rabb al-mal) 
and the Islamic bank as the manager (Mudarib) share the profits on a pre-agreed basis 
and the loss is borne by the Rabb al-mal.  The Mudarib accepts the risk of any loss 
only as a result of their misconduct, negligence or breach of any conditions under 
Mudaraba.359  Thus, in principle, due to the PLS model the depositors owned the risk 
of not being able to obtain their deposits.360  However, for an authorisation to be 
granted an assurance has to be made by an Islamic bank to the regulator whereby 
depositors are entitled to full repayment in order to fulfil the requirement of ‘banking 
business.’361  
 
Such practice, nevertheless, contradicts the principles of PLS in Islamic finance.  The 
capital certainty requirement is a challenge in an Islamic financial environment due to 
the PLS model, because the rate of return in Islamic financial assets is not known and 
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not fixed as opposed to the conventional system where the rate of return is 
predetermined or fixed.362  
 
This raises the question of a level-playing field in the regulations, in particular; 
conventional banking and financial services regulation does not fully enable Islamic 
banks to operate based on the PLS model.  Arguably, this has caused some inequality 
at the substantive level in the regulation.  (As argued in the previous chapter, equality 
before the law comprises of two other elements, (i) formal equality (ii) substantive 
equality).  This is because Islamic banks have to compromise their principles to fit into 
the conventional banking and financial services regulatory requirements.  Ultimately, 
the outcome of this regulation highlights the fact that conventional regulatory practice 
and Islamic banking principles do not always fit.  
 
As argued earlier, when the regulation does not fully enable Islamic banks to practice 
PLS in their banking business, Islamic banks have to compromise their principles to fit 
into conventional regulatory practice because an inequality at the substantive level 
exists.  To solve the said issue, therefore, Al Rayan established a profit-stabilisation 
reserve (PSR) to fulfil the deposit repayment guarantee. The PSR is aimed ‘to smooth 
the volatility in the profit payments that are provided by the bank’363 and the fund of 
this reserve means ‘a deduction made by the bank from the gross profit after deducting 
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the bank’s share.’364  The fund of the PSR is also used by the bank when the 
investment does not generate profit or makes losses365.  
 
Another example where the regulation does not enable Islamic banks to practice its 
original business model is in the case of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme.  In the UK, 
consumers of authorised financial firms are protected through the Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme Directive (DGSD) by virtue of the FSMA 2000.  The purpose of DGSD is to 
reimburse the depositors up to a certain ‘ceiling’ in the event that the bank is facing 
lack of liquidity has stopped trading or is in default.  The DGS ceiling amount is £85,000 
for deposits and £50,000 each for investments and home finance.366 Therefore, in the 
UK, Islamic banks can only pass on losses to its account holders only after the bank 
has announced the loss and there is an express agreement by the account holder of 
his desire to bear the losses for religious reasons.367 
 
Al Rayan Bank is legally bound to offer a deposit repayment guarantee to the 
depositors.368  However, DGS funds are invested in interest-bearing accounts369  
which ultimately oblige Islamic banks to invest in the conventional pooled fund.  Islamic 
banks are therefore exposed to non-Sharia-compliant activities and the DGS 
requirements also mean that Al Rayan and any other Islamic banks are not allowed to 
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practice their PLS model. For instance, Al Rayan Bank needs to opt for Qard principle 
(loan) equivalent to conventional current account concept which means that the 
current account is regarded as a loan to the bank, which is used by the bank for 
investment and the deposit is returned to the depositor on demand. 370  
 
Notably, the type of Islamic banking accounts which offer a PLS model is on current 
accounts, Mudaraba (partnership agreement) or Wakala (agency agreement) 
structure (where it implies that profits are share between the bank and the depositors 
on the basis of a contractually agreed profit ratio, and losses are distributed in 
accordance with the proportion of capital provided).371 For Al Rayan Bank in the UK, 
Wakala structure is used for the savings accounts. Al Rayan Bank uses the term called 
‘Fixed Term and not ‘Fixed Return’ where the bank provides “an expected profit rate 
over a set period of time as a set period of time as a ‘target’ based on the investment 
activity it will undertake with the deposits.”372 For example, two years of the Two Years 
Fixed Term Deposit Account. Under this arrangement, Islamic banks cannot 
guarantee a fixed return like the conventional banks do (because in investment there 
is always an element of risk).  
 
This sort of compromise has prevented Islamic banks from implementing their Islamic 
financial model.  In this regard, the question of a level-playing field arises concerning 
the substantive equality in the law itself.  Although there is formal equality in the law 
(where all the banks should obey the requirements of offering deposit repayment 
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guarantees), nevertheless, at the substantive level of the law there is a lack of fairness 
for Islamic banks, because the fundamental theory of Islamic finance could not be fully 
implemented in practice.  This could ultimately impede Islamic banks from developing. 
 
While such regulatory obligation is in conflict with the salient feature of Islamic finance, 
which is based on the PLS principle, Islamic banks have the option of notifying 
depositors, who are adhering strictly to Sharia rules, of turning down deposit protection 
on religious grounds and opting for the risk-sharing formula in order to comply with 
Sharia principles.  For Al Rayan, the refusal to turn down deposit protection is regarded 
as a non-Sharia-compliant act.373  In other words, should the depositor accept Al 
Rayan’s offer of the deposit repayment guarantee, the act is considered as non-Sharia 
compliant, because it goes against the Sharia-based PLS principle that  the depositor 
should accept some risk of loss.374  This practice would not have happened if Islamic 
banks in the UK were they able to channel the DGS fund to a separate entity that 
invests only in Sharia-compliant activities - similar to the Malaysian approach.  In 
Malaysia, DGS funds for Islamic banking depositors are channelled separately under 
the Malaysian Deposit Insurance Scheme (MDIC) establishment.  This establishment 
is mentioned further in the next chapter.  
 
With regards to the authorisation of Islamic banks, the categorisation of an Islamic 
bank as a deposit-taking business also conflicts with the inherent nature of Islamic 
banking business.  In the regulatory framework, an Islamic bank is regarded as a 
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depository institution - whereas the salient feature of Islamic financial transactions is 
based on profit sharing.375  The fact that Islamic banks are operating on equity-based 
transactions in their deposit-taking business raises an issue of whether Islamic banks 
should be authorised as investment banks (i.e non-depository institutions) rather than 
depository institutions.376  Nevertheless, to define deposit-taking Islamic banks as 
investment banks is also problematic since investment banks do not conduct deposit-
taking at the retail level. The task of appropriately defining an Islamic financial 
institution, which undertakes deposit taking business is, therefore, rather tricky and 
this ultimately raises concerns when Islamic banks are regulated in the existing 
framework.  It is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the issue of 
categorising Islamic banks. 
 
While the capital certainty requirement obliges Islamic banks in the UK to invest in 
conventional pooled funds like DGS, which is non-Sharia compliant, the remaining 
issue is whether or not a capital certainty requirement should be imposed on Islamic 
banks.  Simon Archer and Rifaat Abdul Karim argue that, in order to promote the 
development of Islamic finance, an Islamic bank should not be obliged to offer ‘capital 
certainty’.377  Instead of imposing the capital certainty requirements for Islamic banks, 
the scholars have suggested that a fund management entity should be established as 
a subsidiary of the retail bank or a fellow subsidiary of a holding company.  This entity 
will be acting as Mudarib that manages the investment account holder (IAH) funds.  
The IAH funds are divided into two types: restricted and unrestricted.  For the 
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unrestricted IAH, ‘the funds are invested at the bank's discretion, normally in the same 
asset pool as that in which the bank's own funds and those from current accounts are 
placed.’378  On the other hand, for the restricted IAH, ‘the funds of the restricted IAH 
are invested in asset pools that are separately designated and distinct from the bank's 
own funds and thus do not appear in the bank's balance sheet.’379   
 
Should the UK’s financial regulator, however, choose not to impose a capital certainty 
requirement for Islamic banks; an issue with regard to the fair opportunity for Islamic 
banks to compete alongside conventional banks would arise.  This is because such a 
policy could expose investors to the risk of loss in regards to their investment.  The 
consequence of the insecurity that this would create may be contrary to the objective 
of the UK’s financial regulator – which is to create investor confidence in the financial 
market.380  On top of that, the present suggestion by Archer and Karim contradicts 
their earlier paper where they admitted that: 
“in so far as IAH have deposited their funds in the bank rather than investing them in 
a collective investment scheme, the expectation would be that if IAH are paid no 
returns on their investments or low returns compared to the market return of similar 
instruments and are made to bear the risk of loss, they may start a run on the bank to 
withdraw their funds.”381 
 
It is, indeed, inarguable that, as stated in their earlier work, a bank-run could happen 
should the IAH’s returns be lower than the conventional market or they are made to 
                                                 
378 Supra, Note. 374 
379 Ibid. 
380 Article 3, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
381 Supra, Note. 374, p.13 
171 
 
bear the risk of loss.  As a result, a bank’s solvency may be threatened and systemic 
risk may be triggered, which can lead to a financial crisis.  While the  fund management 
entity  suggested by Archer and Karim can be regarded as an innovative approach to 
help Islamic banks to practice their PLS model,  the proposed establishment of a 
subsidiary of the retail bank or a fellow subsidiary of a holding company could not 
ensure that the IAH funds would be well managed.  
 
Although PSR was established to overcome the issue of capital certainty 
requirements, the market discipline of an Islamic bank is not necessarily ensured.  
For instance, the ‘profit share’ paid to the unrestricted IAH is ‘the outcome of a 
process of earnings management and accounting manipulation that seeks to shadow 
the rates of return paid by conventional banks on their retail deposits.’382 Hence, 
shareholders have to agree to the risk that part or all of their profits will be displaced 
to accommodate the returns for the IAH.  This risk management system is devised to 
avoid attracting the attention of the banking regulators and to reduce the danger of a 
bank run.383 
 
In sum, the existing conventional regulatory framework (which is seen as representing 
formal equality) has led Islamic banks to make certain compromises in order to fulfil 
the regulatory requirements.  This could expose Islamic banks to operational risk as 
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well as reputational risk as they are unable to implement the Islamic financial model.384 
Therefore, due to the existing regulatory requirement for Islamic banks it can be 
argued that there is a lack of equality at the substantive level in the existing regulatory 
framework.  The positive aspect of the existing regulation, however, is that Islamic 
banks have a fair opportunity to compete with their conventional counterparts when 
they are required to have capital certainty like all other banks as it promotes financial 
stability and depositor protection. Nonetheless, it has also been argued that the issue 
of reputational risk should be given due attention by the regulators for the sector’s 
survival and growth. 385 
 
Perhaps, the Malaysian approach of having a separate Islamic deposit insurance 
scheme could be considered by the UK’s regulators, but one may also argue that the 
latter suggestion could not be implemented at present as the number of Islamic banks 
in the UK is comparatively small.  This argument may also lead to the question of what 
is considered as an adequate number of UK Islamic banks in order to establish a 
separate deposit insurance scheme for them. The latter issue, however, is not going 
to be discussed further in this thesis.  We now turn to the next section, which discusses 
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the issues in the Collective Investment Scheme regulation within the context of a level-
playing field.  
(b) COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEME (CIS)  
As the Islamic banks in the UK are governed within the conventional regulatory 
framework, the issue of regulatory definition in the CIS represents another challenge 
for Islamic banks, in particular in relation to Islamic financial contracts.  The broad 
regulatory definition of CIS in relation to the most widely used Islamic financial 
contracts shows the uncertainty in the regulation which ultimately questions the 
usefulness of the level-playing field regulations. Three examples of widely used 
Islamic financial contracts are provided below to highlight the issue.  They are 
Mudaraba, Musharaka and Sukuk.   
 
Firstly, the characteristics of a Mudaraba contract could fall within the broad definition 
of the Collective Investment Scheme (CIS).  CIS is defined as;  
“any arrangements with respect to property of any description (including money), the 
purpose or effect of which is to let investors participate in the profits or income arising 
from that property (whether by becoming owners of that property or otherwise).”386 
 
In the CIS regulation, the participants in the scheme must not have any ‘day-to-day’ 
control over the management of the property, whether or not they have the right to be 
consulted or to give directions.387  Such arrangements must also have either or both 
of the following characteristics:- 
                                                 
386 Michael Blair and Andrew Henderson (eds), Blackstone’s Guide to the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, (2009), p.200 
387 Section 235 (2) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
174 
 
(a) The contributions of the participants and the profits or income out of which 
payments are to be made to them are pooled; 
(b) The property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the scheme. 388   
 
In Mudaraba, it can be argued that its mode of transaction could fall within the 
arrangement under the CIS.  Therefore, the classification of an arrangement as a CIS 
means that those establishing and operating the arrangement would need to be PRA 
authorised.389  
 
While Mudaraba could fall under the CIS arrangement, Mudaraba could also fall within 
the provision of ‘accepting deposits’ under the Regulated Activities Order (RAO)390.  
Thus, classifying Mudaraba within the provision of the RAO would exclude Mudaraba 
from the definition of a CIS on the basis that ‘they are pure deposit-based schemes 
within the meaning of paragraph 3 of the Schedule to the Treasury CIS Order.’ 391  
 
The practice is that the regulator and an Islamic bank conduct discussions to decide 
the most accurate category for a specified investment that suits the commercial nature 
of the product or service that an Islamic bank wishes to offer.  In practice, the approach 
often taken by an Islamic bank is to apply for both categories in seeking authorisation 
from the regulator.392  From such practice, it can be deduced that regulatory 
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uncertainties have been caused when treating Islamic banks in the conventional 
regulatory framework.    
 
The issue of regulatory uncertainties in CIS arrangements also arises in the case of 
Musharaka contracts.  The characteristics of Musharaka could also fall within the CIS 
arrangement depending on the nature of the arrangement.  Generally, Musharaka 
satisfies the ‘arrangements’, ‘property’ and ‘purpose of effect’ conditions and the 
‘pooling’ or ‘management as a whole’ condition in the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000. Arrangements such as trade financing and the element of ‘day-to-day’ 
control are, however, a question of fact in a Musharaka contract.  For instance, the 
management of a Musharaka contract or diminishing Musharaka may be undertaken 
jointly by an Islamic bank and the client.  The parties to the contract may argue, 
therefore, that ‘day-to-day’ control remains with both parties.  As such, the 
arrangement is not a CIS.393  In certain arrangements, a Musharaka contract could fall 
within the CIS exclusion order such as ‘schemes entered for commercial investment 
purposes related to existing business.’394 
 
Sukuk395 arrangements are another Islamic financial instrument which could fall within 
the wide definition of CIS.  Sukuk is often treated in a similar way to the conventional 
bond, however it is in fact a participation certificate that entails an undivided ownership 
interest in the underlying asset such as ‘tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in 
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the ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special investment activity.’396  
Sukuk must involve the transfer of assets to Sukuk holders which entitle them to earn 
a return from those assets.397  It is a form of security, which involves the sale-re-
purchase of tangible assets via a special purpose vehicle (SPV).398 On the other hand, 
conventional bonds are a simple debt instruments that entail a debt owed by the issuer 
to the bondholders.   
 
Bondholders have ‘no direct interest in any underlying assets of the issuer and they 
are merely creditors of the issuer earning interest on the debt owed to them by the 
issuer.’399  Sukuk is otherwise termed by the regulator as the ‘Alternative Finance 
Investment Bond’ (AFIB) and ‘alternative debentures’ in the FCA/PRA Handbook – in 
order to reflect the neutrality of its treatment.  Notably, the UK Government has issued 
its first sovereign Sukuk worth £200 million, which is set to mature in the year 2019. 
400 
 
Regulatory uncertainties also arise when Sukuk are regarded as a CIS.  According to 
the regulator, due to the broad regulatory definition of CIS, some Sukuk were treated 
as CIS while some were excluded from CIS.401  There are no examples given by the 
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regulator, however, on the type of Sukuk that could be treated as CIS or otherwise.  
Nevertheless, the regulatory accommodation has meant that the Sukuk issuers were 
subject to a wider range of controls and authorisation was needed; whereas the parties 
to conventional securities were not.  As a result of that, there could be marketing and 
promotion of Sukuk that ultimately placed the Sukuk issuers at a competitive 
disadvantage.402 The arrangement was also considered as inappropriate, because 
Sukuk instruments comprise similar economic characteristics and risk profiles to 
conventional bonds or asset backed securities.403  Additionally, the regulators believed 
that the regulatory accommodation for Sukuk as a CIS or RAO (‘instruments creating’ 
or ‘acknowledging indebtedness’) may be overlapping as Sukuk arrangements can fit 
into either the CIS or RAO categories.  
 
To overcome the issue above, the regulator introduced legislative amendments.  The 
aim of the legislative amendment was to ensure that Sukuk are treated in a similar 
way to existing financial products with similar economic characteristics and subject to 
proportionate regulatory treatment with conventional bonds.404  The objective of the 
legislative changes was to provide clarity in the regulatory treatment and compliance 
costs for Sukuk so as to facilitate Sukuk issuance in the UK.  Furthermore, it can be 
argued that the legislative amendment could also be regarded as a representation of 
the regulator’s effort to provide a level-playing field for the Islamic financial sector.  The 
legislative amendments are incorporated in FSMA 2000 (Collective Investment 
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Schemes) Order 2001 and a new specified investment provision is created in Article 
77A (1) and Article 78 (2) of the RAO.405  
 
Treating Sukuk within the RAO rendered Sukuk as ‘instruments acknowledging 
indebtedness’ and subject to the ‘Debt Issues’ exclusion in the Treasury CIS Order.406  
This led to the creation of a category of specified investment in the Finance Act 2005 
for tax purposes (Section 48A – where Sukuk are named as Alternative Finance 
Investment Bonds [AFIBs]).  The content of Section 48A is the same as Article 77A (1) 
of the RAO.407  Sukuk are, therefore, viewed as fitting better under FSMA 2000 and 
Sukuk are now, consequently, excluded from the definition of a CIS.408  The 
consequence of excluding Sukuk within the Treasury CIS Order meant Sukuk would 
be treated as ‘specified investments’ for RAO purposes and anyone carrying on a 
regulated activity with respect to Sukuk would require the regulator’s authorisation with 
respect to ‘debentures’ (‘alternative debentures’) to avoid breaching the General 
Prohibition under FSMA 2000.’ 409 
 
One positive aspect of a level-playing field in the existing regulation can be inferred 
when the UK government stipulated that Sukuk, if they are a public debt, should also 
be subjected to listing requirements.410.  In the UK, Sukuk are listed by the United 
Kingdom Listing Authority (UKLA) and any entity that wishes to list a Sukuk must 
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acquire the UKLA’s approval.411  The rationale for the listing requirement is that if the 
CIS is exploited by the instrument, which is supposed to be classified as a CIS (‘i.e. 
the risk that the exclusion from being classified as a collective investment scheme is 
exploited by instruments not intended to be excluded’), the instruments will still be 
listed in an official list or traded on a regulated market or recognised investment 
exchange.  The intention was to avoid regulatory arbitrage and to enhance the level 
of transparency and consumer protection.412 
 
In the current regulatory framework, however, not all Sukuk are accommodated in the 
new legislative changes – only those that are structured to have similar economic 
characteristics to conventional debt instruments.413 In other words, only those 
arrangements that grant; in substance, debt-like returns are captured.  The regulatory 
accommodation for Sukuk in the UK is therefore decided on a case-by-case basis.414  
In this regard, the approach taken by the regulator is to focus on the substance of the 
transaction of Sukuk rather than its form.  For example, the regulatory accommodation 
of Sukuk is based on the context of a Sukuk transaction and whether it fits with the 
definition in the provision.  The definition of AFIB in Section 48A of the Finance Act 
2005 and the RAO would cover Sukuk, if the arrangement replicated the 
circumstances for a conventional debt security.  If the arrangement does not replicate 
the circumstances for a conventional debt security, the definition does not include 
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Sukuk, because the risks and rewards under Sukuk were not equivalent to a 
conventional bond.415 
 
Although the regulator’s effort could somehow be seen as an attempt to create a more 
level-playing field for the Islamic financial sector through the legislative amendment, 
nevertheless, inequality at the substantive level still exists.  Since Sukuk are decided 
on an individual basis, the current regulatory accommodation may pose regulatory 
uncertainties as the same type of Sukuk issued by different Islamic financial 
institutions could possibly be treated differently by the regulator.  Moreover, not all 
Sukuk transactions could be treated in a similar manner as the conventional bond due 
to the fact that some Sukuk contain distinctive underlying legal structures from the 
conventional bond.416  For instance, the mode of transaction in Sukuk-al Ijara is distinct 
from a conventional bond.417  Arguably, this issue should not create problems, if the 
regulator has a full understanding of how every type of Sukuk operates.  It is therefore 
crucial for the regulators to give more attention to particular risks attached to Sukuk, 
although it is not necessary to have different regulatory treatment.  
 
In sum, it can be inferred that based on the legislative amendment for Sukuk, the 
regulator has made an attempt to provide a more level-playing field for the Islamic 
financial sector in the UK.  On the one hand there is a positive implication for the 
regulatory treatment of Sukuk, which represents the element of equality before the law 
(formal equality – through the legislative amendment).  On the other hand, there is still 
                                                 
415 Supra, Note. 406, p.1017 
416 Supra, Note.401, p.19 
417 Jonathan Ercanbrack, (PhD Thesis): The Law of Islamic Finance in the UK: Legal Pluralism and 
Financial Competition, (2011), p. 286 
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a lack of regulatory certainty at the substantive level (when not all Sukuk are regulated 
based on its nature).  It can also be argued, however, that while the legal uncertainty 
exists, the level-playing field regulation does not necessary need to have separate 
regulation when the economic substance is the same, for the reason that extra cost 
would be incurred.  
 
The next section discusses the lack of regulatory clarity involving the HPP regulation 
and the model of Islamic financial contracts.  It highlights the regulatory problems with 
regards to a level-playing field within the conventional regulatory framework.  
 
(c)  HOME PURCHASE PLAN (HPP) 
This section questions the clarity in the regulatory definition provided in the HPP 
regulation.  This issue involves three Islamic financial contracts commonly used for 
Islamic mortgage arrangements.  These are - the Ijara contract, Diminishing  
Musharaka contract and Murabaha contract.  The diagrams below represent Islamic 
mortgages. 
 
Ijara      
 
 
  
 
Figure 1:         Source: Author’s own 
 
The diagram above shows the Ijara transaction.  
Islamic 
Bank 
(Lessor) 
Seller 
(property 
developer) 
Buyer 
(Lessee) 
(iii) 
(ii) 
(i) 
(iv) 
100% price 
100%  
Lease  
15 years 
Rent 15 years   
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(i) The Islamic bank purchases the house from the Seller with full payment.  
(ii) The house is transferred to the Islamic bank together with the ownership.  
(iii) The Islamic bank leases the house to the buyer for a fixed rent over a fixed period 
(e.g 15 years).  
(iv) The buyer pays the monthly rent to the Islamic bank. Note that simple Ijara does 
not transfer the ownership to the buyer.418  
 
Diminishing Musharaka                                                                                                          
         
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 2          Source: Amin419  
 
                                                 
418 Ken Eglinton, Nash Jaffer, Armughan Kausar, and Alkis Michael, ‘Accounting and Taxation 
Implications of Islamic Finance Products’ in Craig R. Nethercott and David M.Eisenberg, Islamic 
Finance: Law and  Practice, (2012), p.95 
419 Mohammed Amin, via <http://www.mohammedamin.com/> accessed: 10 October 2013 
Payments for slices of property 
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25% price (Deposit) 
25%   
 
(i)  
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The diagram above showed the Diminishing Musharaka transaction.  
(i) The buyer identifies the house and paid 25% deposit to the property developer.  
(ii) The Islamic bank purchases the house for the remaining price (75%) and shares 
ownership with the customer.  
(iii)  The property is transferred to the Islamic bank with the bank’s share.  
(iv) The buyer pays rent a for slices of the property and the buyer’s share increases 
every time the rent is paid and concurrently the Islamic bank’s share declined.  
(v) Upon the full payment of rent (which includes the principal + profit), the buyer has 
full ownership of the house. Note that the Diminishing Musharaka transaction is 
identical to the conventional loan arrangement.  
 
Murabaha       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3         Source: Amin 
The diagram above shows the Murabaha contract.  
(i) The Islamic bank pays the seller the cost-price (e.g: £500,000) on a spot basis.  
(ii) The Islamic bank gets the ownership of the house. 
£625,000 paid in equal 
instalment over agreed 
years 
 
 
Price £500,000 
100%  
100% 
£125,000 
Islamic 
Bank 
Seller  
(property 
developer) 
Buyer 
(iv) 
(ii) 
(i) 
(iii) 
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(iii)The Islamic bank immediately sells the same asset to the buyer at cost + profit. 
(e.g: £ 500,000 + £125,000= £625,000).  
(iv) Title of the house is passed to the buyer. 
 
Islamic mortgage arrangements were accommodated in the Home Purchase Plans 
(HPPs) under the Finance Act 2007.420  The legal accommodation is to give the 
customers of an Islamic finance mortgage the same level of protection as the 
customers of conventional mortgages.421   
 
The level-playing field in the regulation causes lack of regulatory certainty where the 
characteristics contained in two different Islamic financial contracts could fall within the 
HPP RAO broad regulatory definition.  For example, the Ijara contract and the 
Diminishing-Musharaka contract should fall within the definition of HPP.  
RAO defined HPP422 as:  
An arrangement comprised in one or more instruments or agreements which meets 
the following conditions at the time it is entered into:  
(a) the arrangement is one under which a person (the 'home purchase provider') buys 
a qualifying interest in land or an undivided share of a qualifying interest in land;  
(b) where an undivided share of a qualifying interest in land is bought, the interest is 
held on trust for the home purchase provider and the individual or trustees in (c) as 
beneficial tenants in common; 
                                                 
420 ‘Home Purchase Plans’ via <http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/> accessed: 1 September 2015 
421 Ibid. 
422 Article 63 (F) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No.2) 
Order 2006 
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(c) the arrangement provides for the obligation of an individual or trustees (the home 
purchaser) to buy the interest bought by the home purchase provider during the course 
of or at the end of a specified period; and 
(d) the home purchaser (if he is an individual) or an individual who is a beneficiary of 
the trust (if the home purchaser is a trustee), or a related person, is entitled under the 
arrangement to occupy at least 40% of the land in question as or in connection with a 
dwelling during that period and intends to do so. 
 
Following this, an Islamic bank has to determine the exact type of home financing 
product they wish to enter into with the customer in order to apply for the appropriate 
role; either as a home purchase provider or administering an HPP. 423 
 
Moreover, for an Ijara contract, it can also be argued that the arrangements did not fall 
within the definition of ‘regulated mortgage contract’ – as the Ijara arrangement 
entailed the ownership of the property remaining with the Islamic bank for a specified 
term Ijara until the customer made the full payment.424  
 
As for the Murabaha contract, which is also often used in home mortgage financing, 
the arrangement does not fall within the scope of HPP as it does not involve the 
homeowner buying the property from the Islamic bank on deferred payment terms.  
Thus, Murabaha contracts should fall within the scope of a ‘regulated mortgage 
contract’. Based on the existing regulatory accommodation, an Islamic bank needs to 
                                                 
423 Ibid. Also see, Andrew Henderson, ‘Islamic Financial Institutions’ in Craig R. Nethercott and David 
M.Eisenberg, Islamic Finance: Law and  Practice (2012), p.73 
424 Andrew Henderson, Ibid., p.72 
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apply for permission in respect to HPPs and ‘regulated mortgage contracts’ under 
FSMA 2000 Part XV,425 which provides:- 
(a) a ‘regulated mortgage contract’ means a contract under which— 
(i) a person (‘the lender’) provides credit to an individual or to trustees (‘the borrower’); 
and 
(ii) the obligation of the borrower to repay is secured by a first legal mortgage on land 
(other than timeshare accommodation) in the United Kingdom, at least 40% of which 
is used, or is intended to be used, as or in connection with a dwelling by the borrower 
or (in the case of credit provided to trustees) by an individual who is a beneficiary of 
the trust, or by a related person. 
 
There is also a lack of regulatory clarity in the existing regulation with regards to Ijara 
and Diminishing Musharaka contracts. These contracts are accommodated separately 
in the FCA/PRA Handbook although the actual practice differs.426   For example, Al 
Rayan Bank uses a Diminishing Musharaka contract as a first transaction and an Ijara 
contract as the second transaction.  
 
The steps are illustrated as follows:- 
(i) Al Rayan Bank will agree to sell its share of the property to the customer at an 
agreed monthly amount over a fixed period (known as the term).  The customer’s 
share in the property increases with every monthly payment made towards 
acquiring Al-Rayan Bank’s share in the property.  
                                                 
425Ibid., p.73. See, Article 61 (3) (a) Financial Services Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 
2001 
426 Islamic Bank of Britain Product Information Booklet via <http://www.islamic-bank.com/> accessed 
10 September 2013 
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(ii) Second, the shares of the mortgage are leased through an Ijara contract.  Al Rayan 
Bank will then agree to lease its share in the property to the customer for which the 
customer will pay a monthly rent.  The customer’s HPP payment is therefore made 
up of two elements, an acquisition payment and a rental payment.  As the 
customer’s make monthly payments, the customer’s share in the property 
increases as Al Rayan Bank’s share gets smaller and although the customer’s 
monthly payments remain constant (subject to quarterly reviews) the rental 
payment element will decrease whilst the customer’s acquisition payment element 
increases.  These two steps are used concurrently.  In other words, Al Rayan used 
Ijara and Diminishing Musharaka as two contractual elements of a single 
transaction427 whereby the customer and Al Rayan Bank contribute towards the 
purchase or refinance of the house as partners.  
 
On the other hand, the regulator’s illustration in its Handbook reflects two different 
products offered by an Islamic bank. 
 
Below is the diagram provided by the regulator on Ijara and Diminishing Musharaka 
arrangements.  The regulator states that two types of home purchase plan are 
currently available – the Ijara and the Diminishing Musharaka.428 
 
 
 
                                                 
427 Home Purchase Plan via <http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/home-finance/home-purchase-plan/> 
accessed: 11 April 2015 
428 Note that while the diagrams are based on the website of the former FSA, however, the usage of 
the diagrams is used as an example to show the Islamic finance mortgage arrangement in the UK. 
These diagrams are not shown in the current FCA Handbook, however, the mortgage remains the same 
at present.   
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Deposit Year 0  Year 5             Year 10                  Year 15 
Figure 4: Ijara Home HPP (15 year term)    Source: former FSA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposit Year 0  Year 5             Year 10                  Year 15 
Figure 5 : Diminishing Musharaka HPP (15 year term)  Source: former FSA  
 
 
 
The terms used to describe the Home Purchase Plan are different to those used in the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook which leads to the lack of clarity in the 
regulation.429  For instance, the illustration provided in the Handbook describes a 
different type Ijara which is called as Ijara Muntahiya Bitamlik (leasing leads to 
ownership) whereas, the term used in the Handbook to describe such arrangement is 
                                                 
429 PERG14: ‘Guidance on Home Reversion and Home Purchase Activities’ via 
<https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/> accessed; 1 September 2015 
Firm’s share – Purple 
Customer’s share: Green  
Level of payment made: Orange 
Firm’s share – Purple 
Customer’s share: Green  
Level of payment made: Orange 
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simple Ijara (simple leasing arrangement). Arguably, while these structures represent 
different practices; it is assumed that such practices may not differ in economic terms.  
It can, therefore, be deduced that the level-playing field in the regulation may give 
effect only in the legal context, although it may not necessarily affect the economic 
justification.   
 
The following section highlights the fourth aspect in the existing regulation.  It 
describes the features of Sharia supervision of an Islamic bank and analyses the 
regulator’s treatment in respect of the level-playing field in the regulation.   
 
(d) SHARIA SUPERVISORY BOARD (SSB)  
 
‘Who guards the guardians?’430 
 
One of the distinctive features with regards to the governance of an Islamic bank and 
a conventional bank, is the establishment of a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB). Sharia 
supervision is required for an Islamic bank to ensure that the activities conducted by 
an Islamic bank are in accordance with Sharia principles.  
 
The table below shows the additional governance unit in an Islamic bank in 
comparison with a conventional bank.  In practice, the additional governance unit 
varies from one jurisdiction to another.  In the UK, there is no specific requirement for 
                                                 
430 The terms are derived from the famous political theory inquiry: ‘Quis custodiet custodies’. Richard 
A. Epstein in Patricia D.White, Tax Law, (1995), p.4 
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this additional unit.  A typical Islamic bank, however, shall at least comprise of a Sharia 
board for governance and supervision.  
Source: Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)  
 
An SSB, comprises a group of professionals and Sharia scholars in the area of Fiqh-
al-Muamalat (Islamic commercial laws) that is able to provide expert opinions on 
Islamic financial services.431  The Accounting and Auditing for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) define an SSB as:- 
 
An independent body of specialised jurists in fiqh-al-muamalat (Islamic commercial 
jurisprudence).  However, the Sharia supervisory board may include a member other 
than those specialised in fiqh-al-muamalat, but who should be an expert in the field of 
Islamic financial institutions and with knowledge of fiqh-al-muamalat.  The Sharia 
Supervisory Board is entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising 
the activities of the Islamic financial institution in order to ensure that they are in 
                                                 
431 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) ‘Guiding Principles -10 on Sharia Governance Systems on 
Financial Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services’, (2009), p.22 
FUNCTIONS TYPICAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
ADDITIONS in ISLAMIC 
BANKS 
Governance  Board of Directors  Sharia Board  
Control  Internal Auditors  
External Auditors  
Internal Sharia Review Unit  
External Sharia Review Unit  
Compliance  Regulatory and financial 
compliance officers, unit or 
department  
Internal Sharia Compliance 
Unit  
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compliance with Islamic Sharia Rules and Principles.  The fatwas, and rulings of the 
Sharia Supervisory Board shall be binding on the Islamic financial institution.432 
 
The SSB is part of the corporate governance structure of an Islamic bank and the 
operation of the SSB is either within the Islamic bank itself or through an external 
institution such as a central bank (often called the National Sharia Advisory Council) 
or a firm may appoint an independent Sharia consultant.433  The SSB is responsible 
for issuing its verification and/or resolutions (often called a fatwa) on matters pertaining 
to issues in Islamic finance and matters relating to the Sharia-compliant financial 
products (including the design and development of the legal instruments).434  It also 
includes the calculation of Zakah (alms giving), disposal of non-Sharia-compliant 
earnings and advice on the distribution of income or expenses among the bank’s 
shareholders and investment account holders.  These are the internal tasks of an SSB 
and the monitoring of an Islamic bank is often done on an ex-ante basis.435  Facts 
have, however, shown that there is still lack of practice by Islamic banks in conducting 
ex-post Sharia compliance reviews.  As stated by the Islamic Finance Services Board 
(IFSB), 
 
“A particular aspect of Sharia compliance, which still appears to be generally lacking 
amongst IIFS is the conduct of external ex-post Sharia compliance reviews.  In its 
survey, the IFSB found that only a small minority of the IIFS have external ex-post 
                                                 
432 Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) Governance 
Standard for Islamic financial Institutions No.1 
433 Hennie Van Greuning and Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks, (2008), p.188 
434 Ibid.,p.187 
435 Ibid.,p.189 
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Sharia compliance reviews, even then mostly carried out by their governing central 
banks.”436 
 
The range of Islamic financial services could also be a factor in determining the need 
to have an SSB in an Islamic bank.  An approach to determining the need to have an 
SSB is to establish the limits of Islamic financial offerings in a financial institution.  If 
the range of Islamic financial products is very limited, the IFSB standards do not expect 
a conventional bank to have an in-house Sharia governance framework.437  The IFSB 
made a clear differentiation between such organisations and fully-fledged Islamic 
banks or conventional banks that offer a broad range of Islamic finance products 
through ‘Islamic window’ operations, which requires a proper Sharia governance 
framework.438  ‘Islamic window’ operations are given the flexibility to appoint an 
external Sharia advisory firm in their governance framework. 439 
 
As has been noted, the level-playing field in the UK’s financial services regulations 
represent the regulator’s neutrality towards all banking and financial services 
institutions.  This means that the UK regulator did not intend to regulate the substance 
of an SSB’s activities.  Therefore, the element of equality before the law (formal 
equality) does not show any preferential treatment by the UK regulator with regards to 
how the corporate governance and supervision of an Islamic bank should take place.  
                                                 
436 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), ‘Guiding Principles on Corporate  Governance For 
Institutions Offering  Only Islamic Financial Services’, (December 2006) via 
<http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb3.pdf> accessed: 11 April 2015 
437 Ibid. 
438 Supra, Note. 431, p.8 
439 Ibid. 
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This has, therefore, raised certain regulatory conflicts with regards to the SSB in the 
conventional banking and financial services framework.   
 
Before proceeding further, the following highlights the relation of a level-playing field 
in the regulation with regards to the corporate governance structure and supervision 
of Islamic banks.  
 
With regards to the SSB functions, the regulator acknowledged the importance of the 
SSB’s role in supervising the Islamic bank’s products and transactions - particularly to 
ensure that the Sharia-compliant requirement has been met.440  It encouraged the 
adoption of international regulatory standards by an Islamic bank – as this would 
convince them that Islamic banks adhere to the standards.441  A level-playing field in 
the regulation, however, does not include any specific standard or requirement on the 
manner which an SSB should carry out its functions in an Islamic bank.442   
 
 
It is expected, therefore, that no requirements were imposed on the composition of an 
SSB in the UK.443  The establishment of an SSB depends on whether the bank is a 
fully fledged Islamic bank or a conventional bank that operates ‘Islamic windows’ or a 
financial institution handling Islamic finance transactions on an ad-hoc basis.444  
Notably, with regards to the composition of an SSB, the number of the board members 
                                                 
440 Ibid. 
441 Supra, Note. 411, p.16 
442 Ibid., p.13 
443Ibid., p.16 
444 Ibid., p.8 
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varies from one regulatory authority to another.  According to AAOIFI standards, the 
composition of an SSB should consist of at least three members.445  However, some 
countries like Malaysia446 and Iran447 require an Islamic bank to have a minimum of 
five members sitting in an SSB. 
 
In the level-playing field regulations, the regulator has to be informed of the exact role 
of the SSB’s members in an Islamic bank - whether the member is playing an executive 
role or an advisory role; and how the SSB’s function would affect the operation of the 
firm.448  This is thought to be sufficient guidance for the regulator to impose suitable 
requirements that must be fulfilled by the SSB members.  
 
For instance, if the SSB member is to play an executive role, each of the Islamic banks 
is required to apply for each member to be an ‘approved person’ under the FCA/PRA 
High Level Standards - called as the ‘Fit and Proper Test for Approved Persons.’449  
One of the essential criteria in the ‘approved person’ rule is to prove the person’s 
competency and capability to carry out his or her function.  In order to prove that 
criterion, the relevant training and competency requirements (or as termed by the 
regulator ‘relevant experience’) must be fulfilled by the SSB member.450  
 
                                                 
445 Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) Governance 
Standard for Islamic financial Institutions No.1 
446 Global Islamic Finance Report 2012 
447 Strategic Plan for an Islamic Banking Industry in Pakistan via 
<http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/pdf/StrategicPlanPDF/> accessed: September 2013  
448 Supra, Note. 411, p.16 
449 Ibid. 
450 FCA and PRA Handbook, FIT 2.2.1  
195 
 
The regulator regards an executive role as being an active role for the SSB member 
in the Islamic bank’s operations, thus resembling the role of an executive director 
rather than a non-executive director.451  An executive director is a person who has the 
capacity to exercise significant influence by way of his involvement in taking decisions 
for that firm.452 Thus, this scope of duty requires an SSB member to be actively 
involved in the decision making of an Islamic bank. 
 
In this respect, applying for the authorisation as an executive role could be a challenge 
for an Islamic bank.  This is because, an Islamic bank needs to fulfil the requirement 
of ‘whether the person has adequate time to perform the controlled function and meet 
the responsibilities associated with that function.’453  In reality, a Sharia scholar often 
performs his duties on multiple Sharia boards.454  For instance, a report has shown 
that the top 100 Sharia scholars are sitting on 953 boards and represent 83.52% of 
the global total board positions.  This has, therefore, raised some concern relating to 
the potential for conflicts of interest among Sharia scholars.455 
 
In the existing conventional regulatory framework, the issue remains as to whether the 
position of a Sharia member is as an employee of an Islamic bank.  For instance, if 
the position of an SSB member is as an employee of the firm, the provisions of the 
Companies Act 2006 governing the directorship role would apply - as a bank is 
                                                 
451 Supra, Note. 411, p. 13 
452 FCA and PRA Handbook, SUP 10.6.5 
453 FCA and PRA Handbook, FIT 2.2.1 (3) 
454 Murat Ünal, ‘The Small World of Islamic Finance: Sharia Scholars and Governance- A Network 
Analyctic Perspective v.6.0’, Report: Funds@Work (2011) via <http://www.funds-at-work.com/> 
accessed: 1 September 2012 
455 Ibid. 
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typically a company.  As such, the directors’ duties requirement is applicable to the 
SSB member.  For example, based on the Companies Act 2006 regulation, one of the 
duties is to avoid conflict of interest.  Hence, an SSB member who is sitting on multiple 
boards is constrained by such regulation.456  
 
The regulatory accommodation for an SSB member to apply for an executive director 
role raises an issue when such a role is given through a service contract.  If the Sharia 
board member is appointed by virtue of a service contract, he is then regarded as an 
employee of the firm.457  However, an essential condition stipulated by AAOIFI on the 
governance of an Islamic bank is that a Sharia scholar cannot be an employee of the 
firm.458  
 
With respect to the advisory role, an Islamic bank need not apply for each member to 
be an approved person.459  What is required by the regulator is that the Islamic bank 
should be able to show that that the role and responsibilities of their SSB member is 
merely advisory and does not interfere with the management of the firm.460  Thus far, 
the regulator has reported that most Islamic banks apply for their SSB members to be 
appointed in an advisory role and they have successfully fulfilled those requirements. 
461 
                                                 
456 Section 175 of the Companies Act 2006  
457 ‘Directors as Employees’ via <http://www.companylawclub.co.uk/> accessed: 11 April 2015 
458 Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions Governance Standard for 
Islamic Financial Institutions No.5 
459 Andrew Henderson, ‘Islamic Financial Institutions’ in Craig R. Nethercott and David M.Eisenberg, 
Islamic Finance: Law and  Practice (2012), p.63 
460 Supra, Note. 411, p. 13 
461 Ibid. 
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The question of conflict of interest by a Sharia scholar, however, is difficult to prove.  
In fact, there is no empirical evidence to show that conflict of interest has happened 
apart from the general assumption provided in the report mentioned earlier.  
Nevertheless, the possibility of conflict of interest from an SSB should not be ignored 
by the regulator.  Apart from the report above stating that a Sharia scholar sits on 
multiple boards of Islamic banks worldwide, the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) indicates that there could be a potential conflict of interest within the SSB 
members. The provision of the Governance states that an Islamic bank should ensure 
that, 
“the Sharia board is more focused, with more time spent on each assignment and 
conflicts of interest adequately managed,” (emphasis added) 462 
 
The SSB, which is regarded as the backbone of an Islamic bank is the group of people 
that decides the path an Islamic bank should take.  Their approval is significant for an 
Islamic bank and could determine the future of the bank, especially on the Sharia-
compliant aspect of a particular transaction.  The fact that conventional regulation 
treats all banks and financial services institutions on a level-playing field, the absence 
of SSB regulation makes them the ‘unofficial’ governors of an Islamic bank.  
 
The next section examines and analyses some challenges that arguably have created 
regulatory uncertainties from the ‘Fit and Proper Test for Approved Persons’ rule 
arising from the conventional regulatory framework. 
 
                                                 
462 Supra, Note. 431, p.9  
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(i) ‘Competent’ requirement 
The IFSB requires the Board of Directors and senior management of an Islamic bank 
to comply with certain minimum criteria primarily to create public’s confidence – that 
the Islamic bank they are dealing with is competent, honest, financially sound and will 
treat them fairly. 463 
 
By referring to the IFSB standards, the competency requirement of an SSB member 
is massive.  In addition to the requirement of being an expert in Fiqh-al-Muamalat, the 
IFSB imposed a minimum standard for an SSB member - the understanding of finance 
in general, strong skills in the principles of Islamic law (Usul al-Fiqh), good knowledge 
of written Arabic is expected and it is highly recommended for an SSB member to be 
able to converse in English.464  Thus, in principle, apart from having an expertise in 
Fiqh-al-Muamalat, the competency requirement for an SSB member requires an 
understanding of Islamic finance and law, language and conventional banking 
practices.465  In Malaysia, the standard imposed by the country is that a Sharia advisor 
is required to have at least a Bachelors Degree in Sharia or Islamic Transactions or 
Islamic Commercial Law (Fiqh-al-Muamalat).466   
 
The UK’s regulator did not impose any specific requirements in regard to the 
competency of an SSB member; neither is there a defined term for the competency 
requirement for an ‘approved person’ in the FCA/PRA Handbook.  The word 
                                                 
463 Ibid., p.11 
464 Ibid., APPENDIX 4 
465 Ibid. 
466 Ibid. 
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‘competent’ as defined in the Oxford Dictionary is, however, ‘having the necessary 
ability, knowledge, or skill to do something successfully.’467 
 
The distinctive features of an Islamic bank’s corporate governance are acknowledged 
by the regulator, however, they did not wish to provide a set of criteria as a benchmark 
for the competency requirement of a Sharia scholar - mainly for the reason that they 
are not a religious regulator.468  This essentially means that in the level-playing field 
regulation, the UK’s regulator permits anyone to regard themselves as a Sharia 
scholar.  Hence their role is assessed based on the conventional corporate 
governance criteria.  As such, a person who is appointed as a Sharia scholar is 
assessed by the ‘approved person’ rules.  It was, however, admitted by the then FSA 
that most of the Sharia scholars would not meet the criteria for an ‘approved person’. 
469 
 
It can, therefore be argued that the absence of competency requirements for a Sharia 
scholar in the conventional regulatory framework ultimately lead to regulatory 
uncertainties at the substantive level (institutional aspect).  Additionally, it can be 
argued that the absence of the requirement could possibly create a lack of confidence 
in an Islamic bank’s corporate governance.  (Note that in the previous chapter, it is 
asserted that a level-playing field is comprised of the element of substantive equality.  
The substantive equality is divided into two– transactional level and institutional level.)  
                                                 
467 ‘Competent’ meaning via <http://oxforddictionaries.com/> accessed: November 2013 
468 Supra, Note. 273, p. 13  
469 Ibid. 
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It is therefore suggested that the competency requirements for a Sharia scholar in an 
Islamic bank should be based on the IFSB standards.  
 
We now turn to the next criteria of the ‘approved person’ rule based on the existing 
regulatory framework.  
 
 (ii) ‘Relevant experience’ 
The term relevant experience is not defined anywhere in the legislation, therefore, 
what constitutes an ‘experienced’ person is a matter of interpretation.  In the existing 
regulation, there is no express indication on the number of years in the profession that 
one needs to have in order to regard that the condition of ‘relevant experience’ as 
being met.  Thus, the question of the number of years in the industry is not a factor in 
considering whether or not a candidate is an ‘experienced’ person.  In practice, the 
burden of proof is upon the Islamic bank to show to the regulator that the SSB’s 
member possesses the relevant experience.470  Based on Al Rayan Bank’s SSB 
member’s profile, it is indicated that the SSB members generally acquire ‘relevant 
experience’ based on their participation in other SSBs or have had a strong 
educational background that relates to the field of Islamic finance. 471  
 
The open-ended interpretation for ‘relevant experience’, arguably, creates regulatory 
uncertainty at the substantive level (institutional).  The UK’s regulator leaves the matter 
to Islamic banks to decide what constitutes ‘relevant experience’ for an SSB member.  
                                                 
470 Ibid. 
471 Al Rayan Bank, The Sharia Supervisory Committee via <http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/useful-info-
tools/islamic-finance/> accessed: 11 April 2015  
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Although one may argue that ‘relevant experience’ is a generic term that every 
institution should be able to decide based on their preferences,  nevertheless, this may 
not be the case for an SSB.  This is because the position of an SSB is regarded as 
crucial in an Islamic banking institution due to its function as the ‘governor’ of the bank.  
 
The case of Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors472 
proved that Islamic banks can be exposed to regulatory risk when the Sharia 
compliance of a product is questioned.  In this case, one of the defendants’ arguments 
was that the agreement entered into comprised an element of Riba, which essentially 
has violated the principles of Sharia.  The reported case has therefore raised questions 
on the ability of the regulator to monitor firms and the products they are selling.  While 
the aforementioned case also comprised other issues, in particular the governing law 
of the contract; nevertheless, the issue of the Sharia-compliant aspect of the contract 
should not be taken lightly.  The impact of the issue raised could lead to the argument 
that an Islamic bank has failed to act in a prudent manner and misrepresented the 
products they are selling to the consumer.  This essentially causes a lack of confidence 
in the market and reduces the equal opportunity of Islamic banks to compete as the 
quality of the products approved by the SSB is questionable when disputes arise.  
Essentially, the competency of the SSB is also disputable.  
 
Arising from the absence of an SSB competency requirement, it can be argued that 
the level-playing field in the regulatory framework is in conflict with the FCA’s approach 
to regulation such as: to protect consumers; analyse risks and the impact on the 
                                                 
472 (2004) 4 All ER 1072 
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market; ensure that firms uphold market integrity; the firms it regulates are financially 
sound and urging all the firms to act in a prudent manner to avoid misrepresentation.473   
 
As stated earlier, the difference between the corporate governance of Islamic banks 
and conventional banks is the existence of an SSB.  Thus, having a ‘Fit and Proper’ 
SSB is crucial, because an Islamic bank’s operation and reputation relies much on the 
strength and competencies of the SSB.  Leaving an Islamic bank to freely decide 
without a general guideline by the regulator could create a degree of weakness in the 
regulation.  Additionally, it could also suggest that the regulator does not fully 
acknowledge the difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks.  
Arguably, having a benchmark could raise the SSB of an Islamic bank in the UK to a 
better standard.  It could also help the Islamic bank to have a ‘Fit and Proper’ SSB.  
Moreover, having a certain benchmark for an SSB will not cause the UK’s regulator to 
be regarded as a ‘religious regulator’.  
 
The possible solution to a lack of regulation is to consider creating a ‘competency’ 
requirement for an SSB in the conventional regulatory framework. In principle, an SSB 
should comprise various experts on one board.  As stated in the IFSB Guidelines, 
there must be a combination of experts in the areas of commerce or finance in retail 
banking, Takaful (Islamic insurance) undertaking or capital market products in an SSB.  
The benchmark for a ‘competency’ requirement for the SSB would not only strengthen 
the quality of the corporate governance framework of an Islamic bank, but could also 
minimise the governance risk. 
                                                 
473 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Our approach to regulation’ via  
<http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/regulating> accessed: 11 April 2015 
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We now turn to the next section which analyses the extent to which the English courts 
are willing to consider the Sharia compliance issues in disputed Islamic financial 
contracts and to what extent the judgment reflects the level-playing field in the 
regulation.   
 
(e) ISLAMIC FINANCE CASES BEFORE THE ENGLISH COURTS  
Thus far, only a few Islamic finance cases have been heard before the English courts.  
To date, it can be argued that Islamic financial disputes have been treated equally 
before the law and the doctrine of formal equality has been well implemented by the 
English courts.  Islamic finance cases were given equal opportunity to be heard in the 
UK’s judicial proceedings.  In spite of this, it is argued that the element of substantive 
equality is limited to a certain extent.  Two cases are provided to highlight this point.  
 
 
The case of The Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v. Symphony 
Gems N.V. and others,474 was the first Islamic finance case heard and decided by the 
English courts.  In this case, the claimant (The Islamic Investment Company of the 
Gulf (Bahamas) (Ltd) (hereinafter IICG) entered into a Murabaha financing agreement 
with the first defendant (Symphony Gems N.V) (hereinafter Symphony Gems).  The 
first defendant requested IICG to purchase a large quantity of precious gems and 
stones from the Hong Kong-based supplier, Precious (HK) Ltd. for USD 15,000,000 
and then to sell it to Symphony Gems by way of instalments (as mutually agreed in 
the agreement) for USD 15,834,900.00.  The Murahaba financing agreement 
                                                 
474 [2002] All ER (D) 171 
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contained an English law of choice and jurisdiction clause.  As the supplier of the 
diamonds was not able to supply the requested gems, no delivery of diamonds was 
made to Symphony Gems.  As such, Symphony Gems refused to pay the instalments.  
As such, IICG applied for summary judgment before the English Queen’s Bench 
Division against Symphony Gems for the recovery of the sums owed to them.  
 
The question of the Sharia-compliant aspect of the agreement was raised by the first 
defendant in this case.  Before proceeding further, in principle, Murabaha consists of 
two promises: (i) a promise by the customer to purchase the goods and (ii) a promise 
by the bank to sell the goods. The transaction is concluded when the goods are placed 
in the possession of the customer.  Moreover, before the goods are placed in the 
possession of the customer, risks associated with the goods are with the bank.475  It 
was argued that the Murabaha agreement was in reality a purchase and sale 
agreement and that IICG’s claim to recover the sale price should fail because IICG 
delivered no goods to Symphony Gems.  IICG, however, has its safety clause by 
provisions in the Murabaha agreement which state that:  
 
“The relevant instalments of the Sale Price in respect of each Purchase Agreement 
shall be payable by the Purchaser to the Seller on the due dates thereof, whether or 
not: (a) any property in the Supplies has passed to the Purchaser under the relevant 
Purchase Agreement and/or to the Seller under the relevant Supply contract…”476   
 
                                                 
475 Hakimah Yaacob, ‘A Critical Appraisal of International Islamic Finance Cases, and the Way 
Forward’, (2011), p.5 
476 Clause 4.4. of the Murabaha Agreement in The Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf 
(Bahamas) Ltd v. Symphony Gems N.V. and others [2002] All ER (D) 171 
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And, 
 
“In particular, the seller shall have no liability in respect of loss, damage or deterioration 
of the supplies in transit…”477 
 
The provision above is, however, against the principle of a Murabaha transaction as 
the risks should be borne by the seller (in this case it is upon IICG) and the risks in 
relation to the goods should be borne upon the seller before the goods were 
transferred to the buyer (Symphony Gems).  The court in this case called two expert 
witnesses to clarify the Sharia-compliant aspect of the agreement and it was confirmed 
that the agreement was not Sharia compliant.  Nevertheless, the Court rejected all the 
defences by the defendant and held that the defendant was liable to pay the debt owed 
amounting to USD 10,060,354.28.  The ratio decidendi478 by the Court was that 
delivery is not a prerequisite for payment and the risks borne by the bank were properly 
insured.  
 
This case has shown that while the court has testified that the Murabaha agreement 
was not Sharia compliant, nevertheless, the Court was reluctant to adopt those views. 
The Court has applied the English rules interpretation in deciding the case and the 
question of the Sharia-compliant aspect of the case was disregarded.  It can be argued 
that in this aspect, the application of substantive equality at the transactional level was 
ignored. The case would have been viewed differently should the Court have taken 
into account the opinions of the expert witnesses.  However, since the provision of the 
                                                 
477 Clause 5.7 of the Murabaha Agreement in The Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) 
Ltd v. Symphony Gems N.V. and others [2002] All ER (D) 171 
478 Ratio Decidendi (Latin) = reason for the decision 
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Murabaha agreement expressly stated the liability of both parties and IICG was 
protected by the governing clause, the Court has rightly applied the English law of 
contract.   
 
The case of Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors, Shamil 
Bank (‘the Bank’)479 is another example where the issue of substantive equality can 
be examined.  
 
In this case, the Bank acted as a claimant/respondent and Beximco Pharmaceuticals 
(‘Beximco’) acted as a defendant/appellant.  This case was brought by the claimant 
on the ground that the defendant had failed to settle the remaining sum of the loan 
entered into in a Murabaha and Ijara financing agreement with the Bank.  On appeal, 
the main issue was related to the governing law of the agreement.  That clause stated 
that:- 
 
“Subject to the principles of the Glorious Sharia, this Agreement shall be governed by 
and construed in accordance with the laws of England.”480 
 
The disputed issue was whether the contract should be governed by English law and 
Sharia law or English law alone.  The defendants’ principal argument was that the 
agreement entered into comprised an element of Riba, which essentially violated the 
principles of Sharia.  It was further argued by the defendants’ counsel that the ‘doctrine 
of incorporation’ should be applied in this case when interpreting the governing law of 
                                                 
479 (2004) 4 All ER 1072 
480 Ibid. 
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the agreement whereby ‘the rights of the parties to choose foreign law as the choice 
of law to govern their contract and at the same time they are free to incorporate into 
their contract terms of some of the provisions of the foreign law.’  Hence, it was argued 
by the defendants that the parties had chosen English law as their governing law and 
the parties had incorporated the terms of Sharia law into their contract, which should 
have a binding effect.  The agreement should, therefore, be held null and void. 
 
The defendant’s counsel suggested that the way of viewing the ambit of Sharia and 
English law in a contract is that ‘the clause should be read as incorporating simply 
those specific rules of Sharia which relate to interest and to the nature of the Murabaha 
and Ijara contracts, thus qualifying the choice of English law as the governing law only 
to that extent.’  While the argument seems to be a valid argument that represents the 
application of substantive equality, the judge in this case viewed that the relevance of 
Sharia principles could not be relied upon substantively.  The judge therefore upheld 
the decision of the High Court, which gave favour to the claimant.  The judge, Potter 
LJ, noted that:- 
“The general reference to principles of Sharia in this case affords no reference to, or 
identification of, those aspects of Sharia law which are intended to be incorporated into 
the contract, let alone the terms in which they are framed...Thus the reference to the 
“principles of … Sharia” stand unqualified as a reference to the body of Sharia law 
generally. As such, they are inevitably repugnant to the choice of English law as the 
law of the contract and render the clause self-contradictory and therefore 
meaningless.” 
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The ratio decidendi481 of the case was based on Article 3 (1) of the Rome Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (Rome Convention 1980), 
which has the force of law in the UK.  The provision stated that the law ‘shall be 
governed by the law chosen by the parties’ and Article 1 of the Rome Convention 1980 
states that: 
“The rules of this Convention shall apply to contractual obligations in any situation 
involving a choice between the laws of different countries.”482 
 
Therefore, it was argued that Sharia law is not a law of a country and there is an 
absence of provision for the choice or application of a non-national system of law such 
as Sharia law.  Furthermore, the judge cited an example of The Hague Rules or the 
French Civil Code where, 
“the doctrine of incorporation can only sensibly operate where the parties have by the 
terms of their contract sufficiently identified specific ‘black letter’ provisions of a foreign 
law or an international code as terms of the contract.”483  
 
By the principle above, the judge argued that ‘English law is applied as the governing 
law to a contract into which the foreign rules have been incorporated.’484  In this regard, 
while the court is ready to adopt foreign rules, the basis of judgment was based on the 
principles of the law of contract.  
 
                                                 
481 Supra, Note. 478 
482 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 
483 (2004) 4 All ER 1072 
484 Ibid.  
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It was held that the matter of the Sharia compliance of the agreement was not a matter 
of concern by the defendants upon the conclusion of the agreement or before the 
proceedings.  Morrison J argued that:- 
“So far as the bank was concerned, that is likely to have been sufficient for its own 
regulatory purposes and there is no suggestion that the defendants were in any way 
concerned about the principles Sharia law either at the time the agreement was made 
or at any time before the proceedings were started.” 
 
Additionally, the Court was also not prepared to judge on the Sharia aspect of the 
contract as the Sharia rules were un-codified.  Hence, the matter should be left to the 
bank’s religious board to monitor the Sharia compliance of the contract in the 
international banking context.  
 
Based on the above ratio decidendi, the judgment was made in favour of the Bank.  
While the fact that the contract is referred to as purely a contract law, arguably, the 
English courts should provide more accommodation on the issue of the Sharia 
compliance of a contract.  Authors485 have argued that the English courts were quite 
reluctant to discuss the Sharia-compliant aspect of Islamic financial transactions for 
several reasons including the secular nature of the English courts, as well as the 
limitation stated in the Rome Convention 1980.  Moreover, the court’s reluctance was 
also due to the fact that Islamic financial contracts are viewed simply as the law of 
contract. 
                                                 
485 Jonathan Ercanbrack, “The Regulation of Islamic Finance in the United Kingdom”, (2011),  Ecc. 
L.J. 2011, 13(1), 69-77, Abdul Karim Aldhoni, The Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking, 
(2010),  Adnan Trakic and Hanifah Haydar Ali Tajudin (eds), Islamic Banking & Finance: Principles, 
Instruments and Operations, (2012)  
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It can, however, be argued that in almost all of the reported cases486 thus far; the 
question of the Sharia compliance of a contract arises when the defendants were in 
default payment for the sole interest of the debtors for the purpose of loan financing 
rather than having the bona fide intention of having a Sharia-compliant transaction.  
The English courts, therefore, treated Islamic financing agreements in a similar way to 
conventional financing agreements.  Thus, the argument on the Sharia-compliant 
aspect of a contract could not be the strongest point in a trial, but just a mere reference 
for the English courts.  For example, in the case of Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. 
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors, Potter LJ stated: 
 
“the factual assertions of the defendants themselves, which demonstrate that their sole 
interest was to obtain advances of funds to be used as working capital and that they 
were indifferent to the form of the agreements required by the Bank or the impact of 
Sharia law upon their validity.” 
 
 
In spite of the above argument, it can further be argued that the willingness of the 
English court to call two expert witnesses in Beximco’s case and the Symphony Gems’ 
case to clarify Sharia principles shows that the English court has made the attempt to 
apply the substantive equality when the court was ready to hear what Sharia entails in 
order to assist the judges to deliver their judgment.  
                                                 
486  The Investment Dar Company KSCC v. Blom Developments Bank SAL (2009) EWHC 3545 (Ch.), 
Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf v. Symphony Gems NV & Others [2001] Folio 1226 , Shamil 
Bank of Bahrain v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors (2004) 4 All ER 1072.  
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As argued earlier, in the case where the question of the Sharia-compliant aspect is 
regarded as a crucial issue to be tried – resorting to a mini-trial attended by Islamic 
financial experts could be a better approach to promote greater substantial equality 
for Islamic financial contracts in dispute  It can also be suggested that when the issue 
of Sharia compliance is a serious issue to be tried, the alternative of having a mini trial 
comprised of selected Islamic finance experts is indeed a good resort for discussing 
the Sharia-compliant aspect of a transaction - especially when the Bank’s SSB could 
not solve a dispute.  For example, in some countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan 
where substantive Sharia issues have failed to be solved at the institutional level, the 
government has established a National Sharia Advisory Council that can overrule the 
decision made at the subordinate level.  In Malaysia, for example; the High Court of 
Kuala Lumpur has established a specific court to hear Islamic finance cases known as 
the Muamalat (Islamic Transactions) Bench within the Commercial Division.  The 
judge of this court is required to have expertise in the area of Islamic commercial 
contracts as well as common law.  
 
 
The level-playing field in the UK judicial system clearly shows the neutral and secular 
nature of the English courts.  The evidence above demonstrates that the secular 
nature of the courts means that the Sharia-compliant issues in an Islamic financial 
contract did not influence the court’s judgement; instead, common law contract 
principles were implemented.  Nevertheless, it can be argued that the English judicial 
system does not fully disregard the Sharia-compliant issue.  With regards to the 
question of a level-playing field, the lack of interest by the English courts does not 
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mean that there is no fairness in the regulatory treatment of Islamic finance.  Other 
factors in the cases were considered to be more important than the issue of Sharia 
compliance although the Sharia-compliance aspects of the contracts were considered 
and expert witnesses were called to clarify the question of Sharia.  An improved level-
playing field can be achieved, however, if the UK’s regulators were to establish a 
national Sharia advisory council to assist with Islamic finance issues.  Nevertheless, 
one may argue that this suggestion may not be fully realised if there is a lack of 
lobbying efforts by the Islamic financial market players.  
 
 (f)  THE REGULATORY DECISION MAKING PROCESS  
The consultation process is not defined anywhere in the Financial Services Markets 
Act 2000, neither is it defined in any legislation. Nevertheless, the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority’s Approach to Consultation is helpful to describe how a 
consultation process is carried out.  The blueprint describes the consultation process 
as a stage where the regulator engages with the practitioners (authorised persons 
from the regulated firms [bankers]), consumers (if needed) and other interested parties 
(if needed) to gather and discuss the arising issues.  The regulator will seek the views 
of participants as to how the proposed means of achieving the regulator’s objectives 
will affect their particular business.  The regulator, according to circumstances, will 
need to publish its conclusions in light of the consultation and publish the draft of the 
proposed rules for the firms to make representations on the proposal.  The feedback 
from the regulatory proposal will then be analysed before any decision is taken to 
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make it an enforceable regulation.487  The above description of the process can be 
simplified in the following diagram:  
 
Now that the general picture of consultation and regulatory decision-making processes 
have been explained, it is worth looking at how the concept of a level-playing field may 
be interpreted in the process as part of the regulatory decision making.  Thus far, there 
is no published work that describes exactly how the consultation process is carried out 
and to what extent; the concept of a level-playing field can be assumed to exist during 
the process.  Based on the interviews held between among practitioners in the banking 
industry who typically get involved in the regulatory decision-making process, the 
general picture of the process can be demonstrated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
487 The Prudential Regulations Authorities’ Approach to Consultation (27 December 2012) via 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/> accessed: 20 March 2015  
Regulator 
•Invite views (Consultation process) 
Regulator
•Publish response in light of conclusion and draft of proposed rules 
Partipants 
•Representation by firms on the proposed rules 
Regulator
•Analyse feedback and enforce rules 
•Publish report (includes its effect, purpose and how the proposed rules are 
compatible with PRA's objectives)
• Enforce regulation
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          Level-playing field   
     
       
 
(i. information exchange ii. feedback iii. outcome iv. regulatory proposal) 
Diagram 1        Source: Author’s own  
 
The diagram above represents the general picture of the consultation process 
between the regulator and the bankers. Most of the time, a regulatory proposal is 
directed to all banking services, both the conventional and Islamic banks.  This 
process implies the application of formal equality.  It can be argued, however, that a 
regulatory proposal, which is often designed to serve the issues faced by the banking 
institutions as a whole, may not necessarily serve the minority.  In this regard, Islamic 
banks are a minority.  The outcome of the formal equality in the first stage of regulatory 
decision making, therefore, may not necessarily be substantially equal.  As such, once 
the regulation is imposed on all the banking institutions, it is left to the Islamic bankers 
to raise those issues that affect the functioning of the Islamic banking sector arising 
from the regulatory accommodation.  The illustration can be interpreted in the following 
diagram: 
 
 
    
 
(i. information exchange ii. feedback iii. outcome iv. regulatory proposal) 
Diagram 2         Source: Author’s own  
Bankers (conventional and 
Islamic banks) and/or 
consumers, other interested 
parties (if needed) 
 
Regulators 
 
 
 
Regulator Islamic 
bankers 
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The above diagram shows the circumstances where Islamic bankers pose their 
regulatory concerns based on the existing regulation to the regulators.  It is to be noted 
that this process only happens if the Islamic bankers wish to forward their concerns.  
Nevertheless, from this process, it can be inferred that substantive equality exists 
when the regulator attends to the issues raised by the Islamic banks and consider 
making regulatory amendments.  
 
Relying on both the regulatory decision-making processes (diagram 1 and 2) above, 
the positioning of the subjects (conventional and Islamic banks) is reflected as follows: 
 
 
 
Diagram 3        Source: Author’s own 
*The above diagram shows that the positioning of the conventional and Islamic banks 
is separated. 488 
 
In general, the regulatory proposal made by the regulator is to be imposed on all 
banking institutions.489  Based on the regulator’s practice during the regulatory 
                                                 
488 The process was discussed on individual interviews as well as informal conversations held 
between Islamic banking practitioners who hold different posts, consisting of bankers and consultants. 
489 Ibid. 
Regulator
Conventional 
banks 
Islamic banks 
 Both subjects are regulated 
in the same financial sector  
 Generally, the regulator 
makes regulation for all 
 Both subjects do not 
necessarily having the same 
regulatory concern   
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decision-making process at the first stage, the practice implies that it is not necessary 
for the regulator to consider the effect of the proposed regulation on Islamic banks.  
For instance, this can be seen in the existing regulatory framework where Islamic 
banks are required to follow the conventional regulatory framework.  Hence, a 
separate regulatory decision-making process will be conducted, only if the Islamic 
banks are affected by the existing, conventional regulatory framework.   
 
In light of achieving the PRA’s objective, it can be argued that the standard practice 
by the regulator raises a level-playing field concern where the regulator makes 
regulatory decisions based on the majority of banking institutions without necessarily 
considering Islamic banks at the initial stage.  In other words, the standard practice 
appears to be somewhat contradictory to the original purpose of making regulations, 
which are supposedly targeting banking institutions as a whole.  There are, however, 
two possible rationales arising from the standard practice.  Firstly, there are only a few 
Islamic banks in the UK as opposed to their conventional counterparts.  It is, therefore 
not unusual that regulatory decision making is often made for the majority of the market 
players as they largely influence the stability of the financial system.  Arguably, it is 
also unfair to assume that the lack of regulatory accommodation for the Islamic 
banking sector would not affect the health of the financial system in the UK.  Secondly, 
it has been argued that understanding the inherent risks faced by Islamic banks is 
something of a challenge for the regulator to take into account unless they are raised 
by the Islamic bankers themselves. 490 
                                                 
490 Ibid. See, the regulatory process before the making of a new regulation in HM Treasury, ‘2010-2015 
Government Policy: Bank Regulation’, (May 2015) via <https://www.gov.uk/government/> accessed: 28 
August 2015. The background of the making of a new regulation was carried out through consultation 
process and the responses to the consultation are used to develop the Banking Reform Bill.  
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Following from the above discussion, the next issue is to what extent the regulatory 
decision-making process affects the element of fair opportunity to compete?  In 
addition, how does the process impact the concept of a level-playing field?  Based on 
Diagrams 1 and 2, it can be suggested that there are two perspectives on interpreting 
the element of fair opportunity to compete.  Firstly, Diagram 1 shows that the element 
exists when a regulatory proposal is made to all banking institutions at one time - 
regardless of whether a regulatory proposal affects the performance of Islamic banks.  
This means that all banking institutions are competing fairly based on the same 
regulation.  Nevertheless, one may also argue that the effect of some regulatory 
accommodations could affect the performance of Islamic banks; therefore, the element 
of fair opportunity to compete does not exist.  One may also agree, however, that there 
is the element of fair opportunity to compete when Islamic banks are given the 
appropriate platform to raise their regulatory concerns (Diagram 2).   
 
In sum, the notion of a level-playing field in the regulatory decision-making process, at 
the first instance, is not really obvious in the case of Islamic banks.  By looking at both 
perspectives, however, a level-playing field can be said to exist when the regulatory 
decision-making process involves all banking institutions in the UK.  Moreover, the 
existing practice does deliver substantive equality when a separate consultation 
process is conducted to help Islamic banks address their regulatory concern.  
Ultimately, the element of fair opportunity to compete could also be assumed to be 
present.  The existing practice affirms the view that a level-playing field does exist in 
the UK’s regulatory decision-making process for Islamic banks.    
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(g) SHARIA-COMPLIANT LIQUID ASSETS  
This section examines the current regulatory proposal for Sharia-compliant liquid 
assets regulations for Islamic banks by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and 
investigates whether there are problems relating to a level-playing field in the 
regulation and whether the regulators are able to create a level-playing field in the 
regulation. 
 
An appropriate regulatory framework to support liquidity management is crucial to 
maintain a sustainable and healthy financial system.  The global financial crises have 
shown that the banking system came under severe liquidity stress hence prudential 
regulators have been focusing on providing an appropriate regulatory framework for 
liquidity management of banks.491  In March 2014, The Prudential Regulation Authority 
set out regulatory proposals on Sharia-compliant liquid assets regulations for Islamic 
banks in the UK.  This is because there have been calls for change since the existing 
regulations do not give Islamic banks enough options to sufficiently manage their 
liquidity. 
 
Liquidity refers to ‘a measure of the ability and ease with which assets can be 
converted to cash.’492  Liquid assets are those that can be converted to cash quickly if 
needed to meet financial obligations; examples of liquid assets generally include cash, 
central bank reserves, and government debt.  To remain viable, a financial institution 
must have enough liquid assets to meet its near-term obligations, such as withdrawals 
                                                 
491 BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision via 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf> accessed: 10 March 2015 
492 Liquidity and Capital via http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/cat_21427.htm accessed: 10 March 
2015 
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by depositors.’493 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) defined 
liquidity as ‘the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as 
they become due, without incurring unacceptable losses.’494  Liquidity is an essential 
element in the macro economy and this element exposes banks to liquidity risk, 
therefore, establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework to minimise the 
exposure to liquidity risk in banking is crucial.  
 
The existing regulation in the UK’s regulatory framework shows that there are three 
problems which are inter-related when implementing a level-playing field in the 
regulation. These are: (i) eligibility of the asset (ii) concentration risk and (iii) available 
options for liquid assets.  The first problem is where the existing regulation shows that 
there is currently only one asset that meets the eligibility criteria for inclusion in an 
Islamic bank’s liquid assets buffer.495  In the existing regulation, the eligibility criteria 
for inclusion in a firm’s liquid assets buffer means that all financial institutions’ assets 
are limited to only: 
(i) high quality debt securities issued by a government or central bank; 
(ii) securities issued by a designated multilateral development bank; 
(iii) reserves in the form of sight deposits with a central bank of the kind specified 
in BIPRU 12.7.5R and BIPRU 12.7.6R; and 
                                                 
493 Ibid. 
494BCBS, via <http://www.bis.org/index.htm> accessed: 10 March 2015 
495 Prudential Regulation  Authority, ‘Sharia –compliant liquid assets’, Occasional Consultation Paper 
(March 2014)   
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(iv) in the case of a simplified ILAS BIPRU firm only, investments in a designated 
money market fund.496 
 
The second problem is concentration risk.  Islamic banks are exposed to this type of 
risk due to the fact that there is only one asset that meets the eligibility criteria for their 
liquid asset buffer.  It is reported that the concentration risk has created two further 
issues.497  First, ‘Sharia-compliant firms will optimise liquidity mismatch to a greater 
extent than similar non-Islamic firms would do, thus limiting balance sheet growth and 
the entry of Sharia-compliant firms.’498  Second, ‘the liquid assets buffer of Sharia-
compliant firms is more concentrated than that of similar non-Islamic firms resulting in 
comparatively higher risks to the safety and soundness of Sharia-compliant firms.’499  
As a result, Islamic banks can be more fragile in the event of a financial crisis as 
opposed to their conventional counterparts. 
 
Islamic banks and the conventional banks are vulnerable to liquidity risk; and both 
types of banking institutions are exposed to this risk in a similar way.  As a result, the 
third problem is when the options for liquid assets available for both types of banking 
institutions are not the same.  While the liquid assets instruments such as cash, 
Treasury Bills, Certificate of Deposits, Call Money Market, Commercial Paper, 
Bankers’ Acceptance and government loans are available for conventional banks; this 
is not, however, the case for Islamic banks.   
                                                 
496 Prudential Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms (BIPRU) Clause 12.7    
Liquid Assets Buffer via <https://fshandbook.info/FS/print/FCA/BIPRU/12/7>  accessed : 10 March 
2015 
497 Supra, Note. 357 
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In the money market, the liquid asset instruments available to maintain the liquidity of 
Islamic banks are limited. Islamic banks are not in the same position as the 
conventional banks, because the former cannot borrow at interest to meet unexpected 
withdrawals from their depositors. Since Islamic banks operate on Sharia principles, 
only Sharia-compliant liquidity instruments from a Sharia-compliant institution are 
allowed to be traded.500 While cash is used as a liquid asset instrument in conventional 
finance, trading money with money is not allowed in Islamic finance (money does not 
have any value in the Islamic economy).501  Sukuk is the most common liquidity 
instrument for Islamic banks.  In the UK, the lack of sufficient quality sterling Sukuk 
recognised by the Bank of England poses liquidity challenges for Islamic banks despite 
it being argued that that those banks are naturally ‘over liquid’.502  Thus far, the only 
eligible assets are Sukuk issued by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)503.  Other 
instruments are trade finance letters of credit or government-issued Sukuk.504  
Additionally, Islamic banks are said to rely on retail deposits as their liquidity source 
more than the conventional banks.505 Notably, with regards to the liquid assets options, 
                                                 
500 European Banking Authority, Report on Impact Assessment for liquidity measures under Article 
509 (1) of the CRR (December 2013), Appendix 11, p.246 
501 Abdul Karim Aldohni, The Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking: A comparative look at 
the United Kingdom and Malaysia, (2011),  p.27 
502 Richard Thomas, ‘Liquidity Risk’ in Rifaat Abdel Karim and Simon Archer, Islamic Finance: The 
New Regulatory Challenge, (2013) (ebrary), p.328 
503 Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Sharia–compliant liquid assets’, Occasional Consultation Paper 
(March 2014)   
504 Ola Al-Sayed, ‘Money Market Instruments in Conventional and Islamic banks’, (2015), EIJSH 
(Vol1:3) 
505 Supra, Note. 502, p.331   
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the international Islamic finance regulator such as IFSB in its 2005 IFSB Guiding 
Principles were silent on the types of liquid asset to be held. 506  
 
 
The lack of ability to invest their surplus assets in the secondary market exposes 
Islamic banks to liquidity problems.  It has been asserted that one of the reasons for 
the shortcomings is ‘the lack of markets in which to sell, trade and negotiate financial 
assets of the banks.’507  Moreover, the lack of an Islamic inter-bank money market on 
the scale of similar-sized conventional markets aggravates the existing liquidity issue. 
508  
 
Additionally, it is worth noting that, while Islamic banks may be facing failures due to 
their illiquidity; they may not be able to opt for Lender of the Last Resort from the Bank 
of England for liquid injection.509  This is because, the funds of the Lender of Last 
Resort scheme may be invested in an interest-based transaction, and Islamic banks 
may be charged an interest rate by the Bank of England for the liquidity injection.510  
This problem is a challenge for Islamic banks, because they are not able to take part 
in interest-based transactions.511  The issue of the ability of Islamic banks to borrow 
                                                 
506 Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance, (2012), p.127 
507 Zamir Iqbal, ‘Challenges Facing Islamic Financial Industry’, (2007), p.3 
508 Thomson Reuters, ‘Issues in Islamic liquidity’, (2007), IFR, via <http://www.ifre.com/> accessed 13 
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funds with the Bank of England remains unsolved.512  It is not, however, the aim of this 
section to discuss this issue further.  
 
In light of the fact that the liquid asset requirements in the existing regulation have 
been identified as limiting the growth of the Islamic banks in the UK,513 the PRA’s 
regulatory proposal states that Islamic banks should be allowed to have a wider set of 
assets in their liquid assets buffers.  It is intended to ‘help reduce the risks of 
concentration in Sharia-compliant firms’ liquidity buffers and they are intended to help 
remove potential barriers to growth and entry.’514  Following this, the regulators 
proposed to recognise Sukuk issued by sovereigns with lower credit ratings and other 
Sukuk that are not issued by a member of the financial sector.  Additionally, Sukuk 
issued by the highest-rated sovereigns may be included in a firm’s liquid assets buffer 
without a haircut.  The lower quality assets, however, would be subject to haircuts and 
caps.515  The proposal is said to be in-line with Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
requirements.  In certain circumstances, however, the PRA mentioned that it may 
increase the haircut to account for a less developed secondary market.516  
 
Now that the issues arising from liquid assets in the existing regulation have been 
discussed, the questions are - to what extent does the liquid asset regulation for 
Islamic banks represent a level-playing field and have there been regulatory problems 
in creating a  level-playing field for Islamic banks in the regulatory framework  
                                                 
512 Ibid. 
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As mentioned in the earlier chapter, a level-playing field consists of two elements, 
which are equality before the law and the fair opportunity to compete.  The difference 
between the two elements is in their contexts.  For equality before the law, this element 
represents how the law treats the subjects - in particular, the legal accommodation.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, equality before the law consists of formal and 
substantive equality.  Whereas, fair opportunity to compete is the possibility of the 
subject being able to compete fairly based on the legal accommodation.  
 
It can be asserted that the PRA’s regulatory proposal delivers the element of formal 
equality.  The practice is an indication that special regulatory accommodation would 
be given to Islamic banks on those issues that are regarded as critical for the survival 
of the institutions.  It can be inferred that formal equality derives from the consultation 
process which has been mentioned in the previous section. 
 
While formal equality appears to exist in the regulatory proposal, the issue is whether 
the approach by the regulators delivers the element of substantive equality?  This 
question arises from the fact that Islamic banks are allowed to purchase lower-quality 
liquid assets (as opposed to the conventional banks, which will not be entitled to this 
flexibility).  It can, therefore be said that there is leniency in the proposed regulation. 
This raises the question of substantive equality in the regulatory framework.  
 
Substantive equality can be interpreted from two perspectives.  Firstly, substantive 
equality arises on the part of Islamic banks. Secondly, substantive equality may not 
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exist on the part of the conventional banks.  This statement is illustrated in the following 
diagram:  
 
 
 
            
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
With regards to the first perspective, the facts outlined earlier have shown that there 
is substantive equality for Islamic banks when special regulatory accommodation is 
given to them due to the existing concentration risk.  It is asserted that the 
concentration risk for Islamic banks is due to two main factors: (i) the regulators 
requirement of high liquid assets and (ii) the constraint faced by Islamic banks due to 
the first factor.517  The flexibility of the regulatory proposal is, however, not applicable 
for conventional banks.  
 
Generally, the UK’s regulatory standard for high quality liquid assets (HQLA) means 
that the assets should contain high quality, unencumbered assets and maintain a 
prudent funding profile.518  According to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), 
the value of the ratio of liquid assets should not be lower than 100% in the absence of 
financial stress.519  
                                                 
517 Ibid. 
518 FCA and PRA Handbook, Rule 12.2.8R BIPRU 
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As it is difficult for Islamic banks to hold Sharia-compliant liquid assets, an exception 
is given to them.  It can be inferred that the exception has led to the creation of  
substantive equality by allowing Islamic banks to (i) purchase Sukuk with lower credit 
ratings and (ii) to purchase other Sukuk that are not issued by a member of the 
financial sector.  In other words, the liquid asset quality for Islamic banks may have 
lesser quality in comparison with their conventional counterparts. 
 
Following this, it can be argued that substantive equality only exists to a certain extent. 
This raises the issue of whether treating Islamic banks differently to conventional 
regulation will distort the level-playing field between the two types of institutions. This 
concern was highlighted by the UK regulators in the same consultation paper.  Note 
that the question of a level-playing field was mentioned by the regulators in the 
following statement: 
“Developing a definition of liquid assets specific to Sharia compliant firms which is 
different from the general definition may give rise to level playing field concerns.  
However, unlike Sharia compliant firms, conventional firms can hold non-Sharia assets 
to meet their liquidity requirements and therefore the proposals would allow Sharia 
compliant firms to hold a similarly diverse liquidity buffer.”520 (emphasis added) 
 
Furthermore, the problem of a level-playing field was also mentioned by the European 
Banking Commission (EBA): 
“The EBA suggests the possibility of waiving certain requirements for the holding of 
such assets under conditions clearly defined in the delegated act.  However, the 
                                                 
520 Supra, Note. 503 
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resulting regime should not constitute a competitive advantage for such banks vis-à-
vis non-Sharia compliant banks.  Alternatively, a provision could be included in the 
delegated act to provide discretion for competent authorities to waive the liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) and/or requirements for HQLA on a case-by-case basis for 
Sharia-compliant banks. However, these alternatives are less favourable due to level 
playing field issues and comparability of banks’ LCR positions.”521 (emphasis added) 
 
Both statements above indicate that treating Islamic banks and the conventional banks 
on a level-playing field is regarded as problematic by all parties – the regulators and 
the banking institutions, in the UK and internationally.  From the statement above, it 
can be deduced that substantive equality as one of the elements in equality before the 
law does not exist.  In particular, the conventional banks can be judged to have a 
disadvantage based on the proposed regulatory accommodation. 
  
One may, however, argue that it is more important to look at the whole context of the 
regulatory accommodation itself.  For example, the fact that the regulatory proposal 
allows Islamic banks to have lesser quality liquid assets; conceptually, the law does 
not disadvantage conventional banks.  As mentioned earlier, the conventional banks 
are provided with bigger options on liquid assets as opposed to Islamic banks.  
 
One of the principal objectives of banking regulation in the UK is to promote a fair 
opportunity for all banking institutions to compete.  It can be asserted that the ‘fair 
                                                 
521 European Banking Authority, Report: ‘Impact Assessment for Liquidity Measures under Article 509 
(1) of the CRR’, (December 2013), Appendix 11. At the European level, the European Banking 
Commission proposed the insertion of the ‘definition of the Sharia-compliant financial products as an 
alternative to assets that would qualify as liquid assets’ in the Capital Requirements Regulations. 
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opportunity to compete’ in the regulatory framework for the banking institutions in the 
UK comprises two dimensions.  On the one hand, the earlier regulation which provides 
the same regulation to all banking institutions in the UK is considered as providing a 
‘fair’ opportunity for all banking institutions to compete.  On the other hand, the recent 
regulatory proposal can also be considered as providing a ‘fair’ opportunity for Islamic 
banks to compete as it is aimed at resolving the liquidity management issue that is 
seen to impede the development of Islamic banks.  
 
The regulatory proposal by the UK regulators, however, shows that the opportunity for 
all banking institutions to compete is fair only to a certain extent.  On the one hand, it 
could be said that fairness does not exist due to the fact that the regulatory proposal 
does not provide the same regulation for all banking institutions in the UK.  Arguably, 
if the ‘fair’ opportunity to compete can be a contributing factor to the objective of 
creating a level-playing field, ideally, the same regulations should be imposed on all 
banking institutions.  For instance, in the current regulatory proposal; the regulators 
have proposed a dedicated regulatory accommodation on liquid assets for Islamic 
banks.  Such an accommodation is viewed to be more flexible than what is imposed 
on the conventional banks thus raising the question of fairness in the regulation.  
 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the regulatory proposal is intended to 
promote a fair opportunity for Islamic banks to compete with conventional banks.  This 
is because the flexibility given to Islamic banks reflects the fact that the regulators are 
working to provide a better solution to the issues faced by Islamic banks.  The 
regulatory amendment should, therefore, be perceived in a wider context rather than 
a straightforward comparison of the regulatory treatment.  For instance, the whole 
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contextual approach by the regulators is to promote Islamic banks in the UK.  Hence, 
it can be argued that the regulatory accommodation does not necessarily provide a 
fair opportunity for all banking institutions to compete, but it helps to provide a better 
playing field for Islamic banks to continue to grow. 
  
At the international level, in the past, the acceptance by the regulators that they should 
provide a legal accommodation to reflect the element of ‘fair opportunity to compete’ 
is somewhat different from the existing situation.  The element of ‘fair opportunity to 
compete’ in the regulation for Islamic banks is not as clear in the international financial 
regulation.  It was rather difficult to see that international financial regulators at the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) have the willingness to provide some attention 
to the issues faced by Islamic banks.  Most of the regulatory decisions were made to 
focus on the dominant conventional banking industry, in particular, to internationally-
active banks.  As stated in the BCBS Charter, the Committee is given the mandate ‘to 
monitor the implementation of BCBS standards in member countries and beyond with 
the purpose of ensuring their timely, consistent and effective implementation and 
contributing to a level-playing field among internationally-active banks’522.  This 
mandate, however, does not seem to fit with the overall objective of the Basel Accords, 
which is ‘to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality 
of banking supervision worldwide. It is also to promote monetary and financial stability 
in the banking sector worldwide.’523  While these are the overall objective of the Basel 
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Accords, neither the regulatory frameworks of Basel II nor Basel III were written with 
their application to the Islamic banking sector in mind.524 
 
Recent evidence, however, has shown that international regulators such as the Basel 
Committee and the European Banking Commission have begun efforts to resolve the 
liquidity management issue for Islamic banks.  Section 68 of the Basel III Framework 
on the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools (‘Treatment for 
Shariah-compliant banks’), which came into force in January 2013, as well as Section 
509(1) of the Capital Requirements Regulation Directive illustrate this point.  
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the regulatory accommodation for the liquid assets 
of Islamic banks represents positive development, other regulatory concerns, which 
involve the liquidity issue in Islamic finance, remain unsolved.  For instance, there is 
the issue of Sharia-compliant assets, which are not denominated in the currency of 
the third country that issues them (because the majority of sovereign Sukuk issuance 
is in US dollars).  In addition the secondary market in Sukuk is comparatively less 
active and Sharia-compliant assets are not eligible collateral for the standard liquidity 
operations of a central bank in a member State.525  
 
Notably, the lack of regulation, which suits the nature of Islamic banks in the 
international regulatory framework such as in the Basel Accords, is solved by the 
establishment of the international regulatory body, namely the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB).  The IFSB aims to complement the lack of regulatory 
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accommodation to suit the nature of Islamic banks in the Basel frameworks – hence 
the IFSB-12 Guiding Principles on Liquidity Risk Management for Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services were established and took effect in 2012.  The International 
Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation was also established by the IFSB in the 
year 2010 with the primary objective of issuing Sharia-compliant financial instruments 
to facilitate more efficient and effective liquidity management solutions for the Islamic 
financial sector.526  
 
While international regulatory standards mainly to accommodate the nature of Islamic 
banks have been established by the IFSB for some considerable time, arguably, the 
regulators in the UK and the Basel committee seem reluctant to adopt the IFSB 
approach.  It is however difficult to identify the reasoning behind this issue.  It can be 
argued that one possible approach to fill the gap in the banking regulation is to have 
the conventional and Islamic banking regulatory bodies work together.  For instance, 
the International Accounting Standards Board has taken steps towards working with 
the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
on developing accounting standards that are appropriate for the needs of Islamic 
financial institutions.527  This approach could be taken by the Basel committee and the 
IFSB, working jointly to develop regulatory standards for Islamic banks. 
 
In sum, despite the fact that the Islamic banking sector is comparatively small in 
comparison with the conventional banking sector, the relevance of the Islamic banking 
                                                 
526Via <http://www.ifsb.org/> accessed: 9 January 2015 
527 Mohammed Amin, ‘Accounting and Tax Development’, via 
<http://mohammedamin.com/Islamic_finance/Accounting-and-Tax-Developments-2014.html> 
accessed:10 March 2015 
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sector in the UK and in Europe has become increasingly significant.  This has led the 
regulators to pay more attention to the issue of liquidity management for Islamic banks.  
Treating Islamic banks on a level-playing field within the conventional regulatory 
framework, however, certainly causes regulatory concerns.  As posited by the 
regulators, since Islamic banks are unlikely to qualify for the liquidity coverage 
requirement, the absence of specific provisions, which accommodate the liquidity 
management issues, creates inconsistency in the regulation for the conventional and 
Islamic banking sectors.  Furthermore, there is no similar-sized inter-bank money 
market for Islamic banks in comparison with the inter-bank money market of 
conventional banks – thus making it more difficult for Islamic banks to grow.  As such, 
the regulators have taken the view that the issues faced by Islamic banks with regards 
to the liquid assets options could be a barrier to growth and entry to the financial sector.  
Based on the analysis above, it can be deduced that there are issues surrounding a 
level-playing field in existing regulation as well as in regulatory proposals.  This 
therefore leads to the conclusion that the regulators are not able to create an absolute 
level-playing field in the regulation. 
 
We now move on to the taxation treatment in Islamic financial transactions.  It can be 
argued that taxation is not directly related to the subject of regulation.  The fact is, 
however, that some legislative changes for taxation have been made by the regulator 
and so the question of a level-playing field, as enumerated in the legislation, leads to 
the discussion in the next section. Moreover, Islamic banks are affected by the 
regulatory accommodation on taxation for their retail mortgage products. The next 
section, therefore, analyses the taxation principles and practice within the context of a 
level-playing field in the regulation.  
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(h) TAXATION  
There is no precise definition of tax,528 however, tax has been illustrated through its 
purpose, principles and policies.  Tax is used ‘to raise revenue for government 
expenditure’, for the ‘redistribution of wealth and income’, to exercise ‘control of the 
economy’, for ‘social control’ and for making sure that the subjects ‘pay the full price 
of something.’529  The taxation policy of a country is often shaped through political, 
economic, social, and administrative pressures.530  
The principles of taxation, as argued by Adam Smith, are mainly based on four basic 
principles:  
(i) The subjects must contribute taxes to the state in proportion to their revenue; 
(ii) Tax should be certain and not arbitrary; 
(iii) Every tax should be levied in a convenient way; 
(iv) The cost of imposing and collecting taxes is to be kept to a minimum531 
 
In addition to the above principles it is asserted by Williams and Morse that taxes 
should be competitive internationally.532  The latter’s view is indeed significant for the 
UK to remain a competitive financial hub.  UK taxation is also subject to European 
Union regulations,533 hence the regulatory accommodation for taxation in Islamic 
finance is subject to EU directives.  
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PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES   
At a macro-level, the taxation policies adopted by the UK government in its 2012 
Budget should be ‘simple, predictable, support work and they should be fair’534.  In 
early June 2010, the Coalition Programme for Government set out the new approach 
to taxation policy making whereby; 
“the tax system needs to be reformed to make it more competitive, simpler, greener and 
fairer.  The Government wants to ensure that the tax system better reflects its values and 
priorities...and aimed to reform tax policy ‘to restore the UK tax system’s reputation for 
predictability, stability and simplicity’ underpinned by ‘greater transparency.”535 
 
The approach to creating a level-playing field for the Islamic financial sector in the UK 
can be inferred when the Tax Technical Working Group (the ‘Working Group’) was 
established by the UK government in the year 2003.  Its role is mainly to solve the 
taxation issues in Islamic finance536 and the idea is to remove tax barriers in the Islamic 
financial sector that could potentially impede the sector’s development. 537  
 
Notably, the UK policy for the taxation framework for Islamic finance is based on these 
principles:- 
(i) treatment should follow the economic substance of the transaction; 
                                                 
534 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech: Budget 2012 (March 2012) via 
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535 HM Treasury& HMRC, ‘Tax Policy Making: A New Approach’, (2010), p.5 
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(ii) treatment should be on the same basis as equivalent financial products that bear 
interest; 
(iii) ordinary tax rules should be applied where possible; and rules that give 
undesirable or unpredictable results should be amended.538 
 
Some Islamic financial transactions can produce complexities in taxation.  In particular, 
the double taxation incurred through the multiple stages of an Islamic financial 
transaction often led to Islamic financial products being more expensive than their 
conventional counterparts. This has ultimately exposed the Islamic financial sector to 
a lack of opportunity to compete with its conventional counterpart.  (Although, based 
on this fact, a conventional banker may argue that multiple taxations do not necessarily 
produce a lack of fair opportunity to compete, because, if the Islamic financial contracts 
are genuinely expensive, then it should be fair enough for them to charge according 
to the multiple transactions.  This would then produce a fair opportunity to compete 
between all financial services institutions).  
 
Be that as it may, the level-playing field in the existing regulatory framework for Islamic 
finance taxation in the UK is based on three main options. Through the consultation 
process, three options are available to the regulator when deciding upon a regulatory 
proposal.  The options are either to make legislative amendments, issue legal opinions 
or ‘do-nothing’.  The ‘legal opinion option’ was not chosen as it was considered that it 
would only lead to minimal competitive effect and the long-term uncertainty would not 
be removed. The ‘do-nothing’ option was not chosen as it was considered that it would 
not produce positive competitive consequences and would restrict the profitability of 
                                                 
538 Ibid., p.15 
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products offerings.539  The government chose to make legislative amendments over 
the other two options as it is believed that legislative amendments would produce 
certainty in the taxation treatment for Islamic finance.540  
 
Following this, in 2003, there were two legislative changes made to the Finance Act 
2003 (FA 2003) under ‘Alternative Property Finance’.  Firstly, the FA 2003 introduced 
‘relief to prevent multiple payment of Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) on Islamic 
mortgages’541 and the relief from SDLT on a ‘series of chargeable land transactions 
that are not necessary under conventional mortgage structures.’542  Further legislative 
amendments were made in the Finance Act 2005 (FA 2005) and the Finance Act 2006 
(FA 2006) for borrowing arrangement products (Murabaha and Diminishing 
Musharaka, Ijara); deposit arrangement products (Mudaraba and Wakala); asset 
finance products (Tawarruq, Istisna’); investment certificates (Sukuk) and derivatives 
(Option, Profit Swap, ‘Urbun).  Notably, in the year 2009 SDLT relief was granted on 
issuance, transfers or redemption of Sukuk subject to the conditions set out in the 
Finance Act 2009.543 
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The next section highlights the taxation treatment of some Islamic financial contracts 
in the area of Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT), Corporation Tax and Value Added Tax 
(VAT) on Islamic finance arrangements.  
 
(i) STAMP DUTY LAND TAX (SDLT) 
SDLT is ‘levied on all transactions involving the sale and purchase of land and 
buildings.’ 544 Before 2003, in Islamic financial transactions involving property finance, 
SDLT was charged twice – upon a bank purchasing the property and secondly upon 
the property being resold to the customer.545 Consequently, this double-taxation made 
Islamic finance more expensive than the conventional equivalent product where the 
customer is only charged once when the customer buys the property from a third party 
(whether using his own money or a bank mortgage).546 Ultimately, the original 
treatment in Islamic finance real estate acquisition made the Islamic financial product 
less competitive than the conventional equivalent, hence leading to the lack of a level-
playing field. 
 
Facts have shown that the lack of a level-playing field issue in Islamic financial 
contracts was then solved by the UK government. Legislative amendments were made 
in the Finance Act 2003 to abolish the double-taxation treatment so that Islamic 
finance transaction bears the same SDLT cost as with a conventional property finance 
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acquisition.547 The relief on double-taxation is now granted to Murabaha and 
Diminishing Musharaka arrangements in real estate transfer provided that specified 
qualifying conditions are met:548   
 
The situation with Ijara contracts is similar. Legislative amendments in 2003 provide 
taxation relief as the SDLT is not chargeable as long as the lessee is given the right 
to acquire the asset. Whereas, prior to the legislative amendments, SDLT was 
chargeable on (i) the purchase of the asset by the lessor (ii) on the lease to the lessee 
and (iii) at the disposal stage to the lessee. Notably, the fact that the regulatory 
approach for Islamic financial product is based on the economic substance of the 
contract, the Ijara contract is treated the same as the conventional lease agreement.  
 
The legislative amendments which abolished the double SDLT treatment are seen as 
a positive step by the regulators to promote a level-playing field and promote a fairer 
opportunity for the Islamic financial sector to compete alongside conventional financial 
products.  It may, however, be argued that treating one financial product as equivalent 
to another product leads to a lack of clarity.  Nevertheless, such an issue may not arise 
if the regulation provides clear guideline.  A positive aspect of the existing SDLT 
treatment is the fact that the regulator is referring to the economic substance of the 
Islamic financial transaction rather than its form thus reducing the need to have more 
regulation.  
 
                                                 
547 Section 73 Finance Act 2003 and Mohamed Amin, ‘Islamic Financial Products and their challenge 
to taxation systems’ via <www.mohammedamin.com> accessed:12 March 2015 
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(ii)   CORPORATION TAX  
Corporation tax is charged on the profits returned by companies for any financial 
year.549  For the Islamic financial transaction, the return is called the ‘alternative 
finance return’ - generally treated as interest in a conventional loan.550  Changes were 
made to the Finance Act 2005 and Finance Act 2006 for the corporate taxation on the 
profits from Islamic financial transactions.551  The return from Islamic financial 
transactions is tax deductible subject to specific conditions in the legislation.  For 
example, the alternative finance return payable under Diminishing Musharaka as well 
as the return from the unrestricted investment account of a Mudaraba contract is taxed 
in a similar way to the interest payable on a conventional loan – hence tax 
deductible.552  
 
In the existing regulatory framework, the legislative amendments on the corporate tax 
treatment for certain Islamic financial contracts are treated as equivalent to another 
Islamic financial contract.553  This is done where the regulator deems that there are 
structural similarities between one Islamic financial contract and another.  For 
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example, contracts such as Istisna’, Parallel Istisna’ and Wakala – these contracts are 
treated similar to Murabaha contracts.   In these contracts, subject to specified 
conditions, the banks’ profit return is tax deductible.  Similarly Islamic financial 
contracts such as Tawarruq are also viewed as having structural similarities to 
Murabaha transactions, therefore, subject to fulfilling conditions prescribed in the 
legislation, - the corporate taxation is treated in the same way. 
 
The element of formal equality can be inferred in the existing regulatory treatment for 
some Islamic financial contracts where the tax treatment for the latter is treated in a 
similar manner to conventional financial contracts.  In Islamic financial contracts such 
as Constant Musharaka, this contract is treated as a partnership contracts.  Following 
the corporate tax treatment of a conventional partnership, the underlying profits will be 
taxed onto the partners individually rather than the partnership itself.  Accordingly, if 
trading activities are undertaken in the UK, the partners will be taxed based on their 
share of trading profits.554  For contracts such as Ijara, they are treated in a similar 
manner to conventional leases and for Sukuk, they are taxed in the same way as the 
return from a conventional bond.555  For Tawarruq, Murabaha and the other Islamic 
financial contracts above, which are treated the same as Murabaha – these contracts 
are treated in the same way as conventional loans.556  
 
The level-playing field in the regulation reflects the simplistic approach taken by the 
regulator, where the existing corporate tax treatment of conventional products is also 
                                                 
554 Ibid.,p.109 
555 Ibid. p.96, 114 
556 Ibid.,p.87-94 
241 
 
implemented for Islamic financial products.  It can be argued that such an approach is 
a fairer way to accommodate tax treatment hence aligned with the principle of taxation 
policy for Islamic financial transactions.  As of now, it is unforeseeable that the 
regulatory accommodation for corporation tax will produce any issues for the Islamic 
financial sector.  It is also unforeseeable that the effect of the existing regulatory 
accommodation could result to an unfair advantage for Islamic finance to compete 
against conventional finance.  
 
(iii) VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) 
VAT is ‘a tax that is charged on most goods and services that VAT-registered 
businesses provide in the UK’ as well as to ‘goods and some services that are imported 
from countries outside the European Union (EU) and brought into the UK from other 
EU countries.’557  Standard VAT rates are imposed differently by EU Member States.  
Usually the rates are charged between 15% and 25%.  
 
In the year 2006, the UK issued VAT Information Sheet 11/06 which provides for the 
VAT treatment of Islamic financial products.  The information sheet is intended to 
supplement the HMRC558 guidance.  In other words, the specific rulings provided in 
the VAT information sheet are to be applied concurrently with VAT rulings provided by 
the HMRC guidance notes. 
 
                                                 
557 Value-Added Tax via <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/> accessed: 10 October 2011, See also Section 
1, VAT Act 1994 
558 Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs  
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The level-playing field in the regulatory framework representing the VAT treatment for 
Islamic financial products in the UK are based on the nature and type of the 
transaction.559  It can be argued that following this treatment, the formal equality 
principle is applied by the regulators whereby the application of VAT rulings for Islamic 
financial contracts is that they are to be treated no differently than conventional 
financial products.  For example, the VAT Information Sheet 11/06 treats Murabaha 
transactions involving goods and property in a similar manner to conventional credit 
sales, the Ijara transaction as a basic leasing product, Wakala as an investment 
product (treated similar to Mudaraba) and Sukuk is treated similar to the conventional 
bond. 560 
 
In some circumstances, however, the VAT treatment for certain Islamic financial 
products could lead to the lack of level-playing field for the Islamic financial sector to 
compete against its conventional counterpart.  For example, under the Diminishing 
Musharaka transaction, the customer has to pay VAT for the lease and the sale of the 
beneficial interest.  In contrast the conventional repayment mortgage is VAT exempt.  
This makes the Diminishing Musharaka contract more expensive and less competitive 
than the conventional repayment mortgage.561 
 
In another example, facts have shown that there is a lack of regulatory standardisation 
in the VAT treatment pertaining to the capacity of the Islamic financial contract.  This 
                                                 
559 VAT Information Sheet 11/06 
560 VAT Information Sheet 11/06. The specific Vat treatment for Sukuk was not provided in the VAT 
Information Sheet. Sukuk follows the VAT rulings on conventional bonds. See, Ken Englinton‚ Nash 
Jaffer, Armughan Kausar, Alkis Michae in Craig R. Nethercott and David M. Eisenberg (eds), ‘Islamic 
Finance: Law and Practice‘, (2012), p.116 
561 Practice Note: Sharia-Compliant Transactions via <www.practicallaw.com> accessed May 2014 
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can be inferred in Wakala and Mudaraba contracts 562 where the VAT treatment 
depends on whether the Islamic bank is acting in a restricted or unrestricted capacity.   
 
Should the Islamic bank be acting in a restricted capacity (where the Islamic bank 
follows the customer’s decision on their investment), the ‘additional revenue made by 
the bank on the investment of the capital will be taxable at the standard-rate.’563  This 
is because the HMRC regard such transactions by the Islamic bank as a form of 
portfolio or investment management.  On the other hand, should the Islamic bank act 
in an unrestricted capacity (where the Islamic bank is making its own investment 
decisions), the ‘additional profit made by the bank will be outside the scope of VAT.’564  
The VAT treatment represents the application of the existing conventional taxation 
rulings; however, the outcome of this treatment leads to the conclusion that the 
unrestricted position of the Islamic bank would be more cost-efficient for the customer.  
Therefore, should the Islamic bank be in a restricted position - the VAT charge levied 
upon the Islamic bank may make this investment option unattractive.565 
 
To conclude, the existing taxation treatment for Islamic financial products is designed 
to suit the taxation framework as laid down by HMRC.  In the context of a level-playing 
field, the regulator has made several legislative amendments to allow a more level-
                                                 
562 Wakala contract is an investment product which functions similar to the Mudaraba contract. However 
the difference between these two is that all of the profit in the Mudaraba contract is divided between the 
parties. Whereas in Wakala contract, the investor receives only the agreed ratio against investment.  
Thus, returns made above the agreed ratio is kept by the Islamic bank and not given to the investor. 
Notably, Mudaraba savings account is treated as conventional savings account. See, VAT Information 
Sheet 11/06 
563 VAT Information Sheet 11/06 
564 Ibid. 
565 Ibid. 
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playing field for Islamic financial products.  Nonetheless, the legislative amendments 
were made with reference to the taxation principles and based on the practicality of 
having amendments.  Based on the existing treatment, the level-playing field 
regulation shows that the economic justification is considered to be more significant 
than the legal justification.  Hence, while the structure in form is different from one 
contract to another, nevertheless, what is looked at is the substantial structure of a 
contract.  
 
3.3 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has analysed the regulatory accommodation governing Islamic banks in 
the UK from the context of a level-playing field. Arguably, there is no clear indication 
by the UK’s regulators as to what exactly level-playing field means in the context of 
regulation. The findings of the analysis suggest that the regulatory accommodation 
governing Islamic banks in the UK does not fully represent the idea of level-playing 
field regulations. As discussed in the previous chapter, a level-playing field comprises 
the element equality before the law. Equality before the law is represented through the 
regulators’ effort to apply the element of formal and substantive equality through 
legislative amendments. The principle of formal equality applied by the UK’s regulators 
has led to two conclusions - first, where substantive equality is met in some cases and 
second, inequality at the substantive level exists.  The inequality at the substantive 
level arises due to the fact that the regulators chose not to amend the law after 
considering the economic benefits of such a change.  
 
The results of the investigations show that the UK’s regulators were selective when 
making regulatory amendments for specific Islamic financial products and, 
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consequently, all the issues within the Islamic financial sector at the substantive level 
were not considered.  In fact, in most instances, Islamic financial services have had to 
make substantive compromises in order to serve the formal equality.  Hence the 
principle of substantive equality is hardly achieved.  As substantive equality is 
compromised, the law cannot be considered as an ideal law.  Nevertheless, it can also 
be argued that the absence of an ideal law does not necessarily mean it is an invalid 
law.   
 
The general findings above have led to the second major observation whereby the 
impact of the existing level-playing field regulations have exposed Islamic banks to 
several types of risks; such as reputational risk, operational risk, transparency risk and 
regulatory risk. In terms of the authorisation process, substantive compromises have 
to be made by Islamic banks wishing to operate in the UK. For instance, despite the 
fact that the nature of Islamic banks is based on the profit-loss sharing model, Islamic 
banks have had to compromise the PLS model in order to fulfil the level-playing field 
regulations. Under these regulations, Islamic banks have to resort to using the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme in which funds are pooled and mixed with the conventional funds. 
This has led Islamic banks to become exposed to operational risk and reputational 
risk.  
 
The capital certainty requirements have also led Islamic banks to compromise the PLS 
model in order to fulfil the formal equality requirement because they are regarded as 
depository institutions (It has been argued earlier that the capital certainty 
requirements bring more benefit for Islamic banks. However, although it can be said 
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that the capital certainty requirement would not cause any serious risk to Islamic 
banks, one can also argue that it affects the operational aspect of Islamic banks 
(operational risk) because of the actual nature of Islamic banks which is based on PLS 
model, and this may lead Islamic banks to face reputational risk). Additionally, where 
the kind of regulations applicable to Islamic banks are based on the type of banking 
business which an Islamic bank wishes to offer (depository or investment institution) 
the level-playing field regulations may not be able to accommodate the specific type 
of Islamic banking business due to the vague status (depository or investment 
institution) arising from its inherent nature of banking business. Therefore, regulatory 
uncertainties can arise if the regulators and/or Islamic banks cannot determine the 
most appropriate category of service / investment they wish to offer under the 
conventional regulatory framework. 
 
It was also shown that the level-playing field regulations causes some regulatory 
uncertainties and suffers from a lack of regulatory clarity. For instance, in the case of 
Sukuk, it was highlighted that not all type of Sukuk are given specific regulatory 
accommodation based on its nature. The level-playing field regulations under the 
conventional regulatory framework only provide specific regulatory accommodations 
for Sukuk which produces similar economic substance than the conventional bonds. 
In other words, the UK’s regulators refer to the substance of Sukuk transaction rather 
than its form. However, as mentioned earlier, this should not be a problem if the 
regulators understand the product fully.  Lack of regulatory uncertainties can only 
occur if there is a lack of understanding with regards to the type of Sukuk that matches 
the conventional regulation. Notwithstanding these limitations, a positive aspect of the 
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level-playing field regulations within the UK regulatory framework is where Sukuk that 
is a public debt is subjected to listing requirements, which is similar to the treatment of 
conventional bonds, and this enhances transparency and minimises regulatory 
arbitrage.  
 
In another aspect, the level-playing field regulations on Home Purchase Plan has led 
to a lack of regulatory certainty and clarity due to the terminology used by Islamic 
banks and the definition of Home Purchase Plan provided by the regulators. The 
practice indicated by the Islamic bank suggests a different arrangement than that 
suggested in the context of the regulations.  
 
The level-playing field regulations within the conventional regulatory framework have 
also shown that there is no preference on the part of the UK’s regulators as to how 
Islamic banks’ wish to operate. The element of equality before the law (formal equality 
and substantive equality) shows that no regulatory accommodation is imposed to 
Islamic banks pertaining to a Sharia Supervisory Board (which is regarded as crucial 
for Islamic banks) and how the supervision of Islamic banks should take place as part 
of their corporate governance. In this regard, the absence of regulation may expose 
Islamic banks to operational risk for the fact that they can operate according to how 
they wish.  
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With regards to Islamic financial disputes before the English courts, the practice has 
suggested that formal equality exists where Islamic finance cases are treated under 
common law principles. Nonetheless, it has been argued earlier that the English courts 
have not fully disregarded the Sharia-compliant aspect of the contract where expert 
witnesses have been called to testify. However, it can be suggested that there should 
be an establishment which consists of Sharia experts in the UK at the national level 
(similar to the National Sharia Advisory Council established by the Malaysian 
regulators) to decide on cases involving the substantive question on the legitimacy of 
the transaction in an Islamic finance contract.  
 
Other positive findings under the level-playing field regulation for Islamic banks in the 
UK are pertaining to the regulatory decision making process, the regulation on 
taxation, as well as the Sharia-complaint liquid assets regulation. However, for the 
latter, it was found that while there is equality at the substantive level for Islamic banks, 
substantive equality may not exist on the part of the conventional banks as Islamic 
banks are allowed to have lower quality of assets. This causes a lack of opportunity 
for conventional banks to compete with Islamic banks and a lack of regulatory 
standardisation.  
 
The overall findings of this chapter’s analysis suggest that the regulators have not 
enabled the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks in the UK. This is because, 
while in some cases there is the positive impact of the level-playing field regulations, 
the majority of the cases show that the level-playing field regulations have not been 
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effective hence poses risks to Islamic banks. Ultimately, the level-playing field 
regulations can be said as not a useful concept. However, there is yet to be a grievous 
issue pertaining to the existing regulatory accommodation which totally hinders Islamic 
banks from developing. Taken together, Islamic banks in the UK still have the 
opportunity to resort to a consultation process with the regulators for any arising 
issues. Nevertheless, the absence of appropriate regulations could adversely affect 
Islamic banks’ ability to compete fairly with the conventional banks and ultimately to 
develop to its fullest extent. This then leads to the question of whether Islamic banks 
should be given more regulation which will be discussed in Chapter five. Before 
proceeding to this issue, it is necessary to examine the level-playing field regulations 
for Islamic banks in Malaysia. This is the focus of the next chapter.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The preceding chapter analysed level-playing field within the regulatory framework of 
Islamic banks in the UK. The UK regulators have set a benchmark that all banks are 
subject to the conventional regulatory system thereby achieving uniformity within the 
diversity of the financial system. Hence the expression of level-playing field is 
demonstrated by regulators’ treatment for all types of banks operating in the UK, in 
which the uniformed regulation caters for the diversity of the financial system. The 
diversity that exists in the UK financial system has allowed some regulatory 
development for Islamic banks to a certain extent. It has been argued that while the 
UK regulators encouraged the development of Islamic banks in its financial system, 
there are still some areas of the law which exposes Islamic banks to potential risks 
that ultimately impede the development of Islamic banks. It has been observed that 
the UK regulators’ approach towards Islamic banks is reactive. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the level-playing field regulation in the UK is not a meaningful concept.  
 
It has been mentioned in the introductory chapter that a similarity between the UK and 
Malaysia is that these two countries practice the common law system, but the 
approach to regulating all financial services institutions on a level-playing field differs. 
In treating the Islamic financial sector on a level-playing field, Malaysia has established 
a dual regulatory framework to separate the Islamic and conventional financial sectors. 
As opposed to the UK’s reactive approach, the Malaysian regulatory framework for 
Islamic banks is considered to be proactive. Detailed regulations were set out by the 
regulators, ranging from institutional aspects to the specificity of each Islamic financial 
contract.  
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The outcome of the dual regulatory framework is that it provides a better platform for 
Islamic banks to develop its Sharia-compliant branding as well as a fairer system for 
Islamic banks to compete with the conventional banks. The dual regulatory system 
has also promoted transparency at the institutional and transactional level. 
Additionally, it can be seen that the dual regulatory framework, in theory, could 
minimise certain types of risks such as liquidity risk, reputational risk and legal risk. 
However, in practice, there are still areas of the law within the dual regulatory 
framework that do not align with the notion of level-playing field and still exposes 
Islamic banks to risks. The unique nature of the existing dual regulatory framework 
which is made to treat Islamic banks and conventional banks on a level-playing field 
therefore raises the same question as those raised in the UK chapter - to what extent 
do the Malaysian regulators enabled a level-playing field for Islamic banks? 
 
Following this, the current chapter analyses the regulatory accommodation governing 
Islamic banks in Malaysia by focusing on the issue of level-playing field in the dual 
regulatory framework and examining the impact of the level-playing field regulations 
in the existing dual regulatory framework. The same approach as the previous chapter 
is used. This chapter therefore questions the regulatory clarity, transparency, 
standardisation and risks attached to Islamic banks.  
 
Note that the discussion in this chapter is rather limited and lesser arguments can be 
found in this chapter as opposed to the discussion in the UK chapter (chapter three). 
This is because, the fact that the Malaysian government has established a dual 
regulatory framework for the Islamic banking and financial sector, lesser substantive 
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issues for the sector are involved as opposed to the UK’s regulatory framework. In 
particular, this research does not contain certain section of which contained in chapter 
three. For instance, it is not intended to discuss the regulatory decision making 
process in this chapter due to the fact that there is no arising issue within the context 
of level-playing field.566 Therefore, it can be seen that the discussion in this chapter is 
rather limited in comparison with chapter three.  
 
This chapter consists of three main sections. It begins with a brief history of regulatory 
policies and the Islamic banking sector’s development in Malaysia. The second section 
examines the regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks in the context of a level-
playing field and analyses whether the Malaysian regulators have in fact enabled level-
playing field treatment for Islamic banks. The third section provides some conclusions.  
 
4.1.1 THE PAST AND PRESENT REGULATORY SYSTEM GOVERNING ISLAMIC 
BANKS 
 
As stated in the first chapter, the first Islamic financial institution in Malaysia was 
formed in 1963 with the establishment of Tabung Haji (the Pilgrimage Fund).  The real 
drive towards developing the Islamic financial services sector did not, however, begin 
until 20 years later, when the first Islamic bank called Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB) was established in 1983.  Later, in 1999, the second fully-fledged Islamic bank 
was established; namely Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad.567  Since then, the Islamic 
                                                 
566 Moreover, the limited discussion in this chapter has proven the argument in chapter one (on the 
limits of comparative law research) whereby in comparative law research, no comparison on a 
particular research can be of the same.  
567 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011, p.164 
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financial services industry in Malaysia has continued to flourish and now numbers 16 
fully-fledged Islamic banking and financial institutions (IFIs), 11 Islamic windows, four 
international IFIs, and 16 Takaful (Insurance) companies.568   
 
 
Today, the Islamic finance sector in Malaysia is governed within the purview of: 
 the Ministry of Finance,  
 the Central Bank of Malaysia (CBM) - responsible for the monetary and 
financial stability in the Malaysia,  
 the Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) - regulates and authorise the 
enforcement of the Malaysian capital market,  
 the Labuan Financial Services Authority (Labuan FSA) - acts as an 
authoritative body for international business and financial services institutions 
in Labuan,  
 the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) - administers stamp duty and taxes,  
 Bursa Malaysia (Bursa-Mal) - exchange company for listing, trading, clearing, 
settlement and depository services, and  
 the Labuan Financial Exchange (LFX) - a similar exchange company as Bursa-
Mal which does listing and trading of financial instruments for financial services 
sector in Labuan. 569  
 
 
                                                 
568 ‘Malaysia’s Islamic Finance Marketplace’, (2013) via  <http://www.mifc.com/index> accessed: 10 
October 2013 and EY Global Takaful Insights, (2013), p.62 
569 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011, p.163 
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In 1983, the first Islamic finance legislation was enacted – the Islamic Banking Act 
1983 (IBA1983).570  It is considered to be the first legal instrument in the world to 
comprise provisions governing fully-fledged Islamic banking and financial institutions 
(excluding Takaful companies).571 Takaful companies were governed in separate 
legislation – the Takaful Act 1984.  IBA 1983 did not govern Islamic banking windows, 
instead, the latter were governed by the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 
(BAFIA) – the legislation governing conventional banks. Notably, the Islamic windows 
system did not begin until 1993, when the ‘usury-free banking scheme’, which later 
became known as the ‘Islamic banking scheme’, was introduced whereby the funds 
derived from Islamic banking window transactions were separated from the 
conventional banks.572 The IBA 1983 has now been repealed and replaced by the 
Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA 2013). Similarly, BAFIA 1989 was repealed 
and replaced by the Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA 2013).  
 
Apart from IFSA 2013 and FSA 2013, Islamic banking and financial institutions in 
Malaysia are also governed by several other pieces of legislation including, but not 
limited to, the Government Investment Act 1983, the Development Financial Institution 
Act 2002 (DAFIA 2002) and the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 (CBA 2009).573  
 
Strong governmental support for the Islamic financial services sector has positioned 
Malaysia as one of the most developed Islamic finance markets in the world.  Several 
bodies were established by the Malaysian government such as the Islamic Capital 
                                                 
570 Ibid., p.164 
571 Islamic Banking Act 1983 
572 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011, p.164 
573 Ibid. 
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Market (ICM), the National Sharia Advisory Council (NSAC) (the highest Sharia 
authority for Islamic finance in Malaysia), the Law Harmonisation Committee (the 
Committee that reconcile and harmonise the Malaysian laws and Islamic financial 
contracts), the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC) (the Centre for 
Islamic financial activities), the Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation (MDIC) (a 
company that protects depositors against the loss of their deposits in the case of 
bank’s failure – the scheme provided is available for Islamic banks’ depositors), 
academic and research centres such as - the Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance 
Malaysia (IBFIM), the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF), 
the International Sharia Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA). There is also 
the Securities Industry Development Corporation (SIDC) (a learning centre for capital 
markets in Malaysia). Malaysia is also the host country for the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) (an international standards-setting regulator for the Islamic 
financial sector) and the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation 
(IILM) (an international body that facilitates cross-border Sharia-compliant liquidity 
management).574 
 
4.1.2 THE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH – PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR 
ISLAMIC BANKS 
Malaysia adopts a dual regulatory framework, which enables the conventional and 
Islamic financial services to operate in parallel.  It can be seen that the creation of a 
dual regulatory framework is an indication of a serious effort by the Malaysian 
government to treat all financial services on a level-playing field. This can be 
evidenced from the legislative enactment whereby the creation of IBA 1983, which 
                                                 
574 Supra, Note. 433 
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specifically governed the fully fledged Islamic banks, is separate from BAFIA 1989, 
which governed the conventional banks.  The abolition of these two pieces of 
legislation followed the more recent enactment of IFSA 2013 and FSA 2013 that aim 
to develop a better regulatory framework for both conventional and Islamic financial 
services. The Central Bank of Malaysia (CBM) commented that with the creation of 
these two pieces of legislation, ‘the Bank (CBM) will be able to provide an appropriate 
level of oversight over financial holding companies to ensure that the activities of 
financial groups do not pose undue risks to the safety and soundness of financial 
institutions.’575  Moreover, the CBM believe that the new legislation could ‘maintain a 
clear focus on risk and fair conduct towards consumers while allowing for 
differentiation between financial institutions, supports healthy competition and 
productive innovation’, and improve regulatory efficiency, as well as providing 
necessary safeguards for a sound financial system.576 
 
In furtherance to the idea of treating all the banking and financial services institutions 
in Malaysia on a level-playing field, the KLRCA i-Arbitration Rules were established in 
2012 to provide dispute resolution for Islamic finance disputes, which includes the 
Sharia-compliant aspects of the contracts.  Notably, the Rules adopt the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, which were devised for Islamic finance dispute resolutions. 577 
 
The regulatory principles and policies for Islamic banks in Malaysia have evolved 
starting from detailed and prescriptive rules and moving towards a principles-based 
                                                 
575 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Financial Stability and Payment Systems Report 2012, p.7 
576 Ibid., p.61 
577 Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) via <http://klrca.org/about/> accessed: 29 
May 2015 
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approach.578 Although this approach is the same as the UK practice, the concept of its 
implementation differs slightly with the Malaysian regulatory framework giving special 
attention to the specificity of the Islamic financial contracts. In addition, therefore, to 
the principle-based approach, which is also being implemented in the conventional 
financial services sector, the regulatory framework governing Islamic banks in 
Malaysia is also a contract-based regulatory framework. The contract-based 
regulatory framework, as viewed by the Malaysian regulators, will reinforce Sharia 
principles, which could help to maintain the financial stability of the Islamic financial 
sector.  In contrast to the Malaysian practice, the contract-based regulatory framework 
does not exist in the UK, because the UK regulators chose to allow Islamic banking 
and financial institutions to operate independently as long as the financial products are 
in compliance with the regulations provided by the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).   
 
The rudimentary principle underlying the Malaysian contract-based regulatory 
approach is based upon end-to-end Sharia governance and compliance in the Islamic 
financial services sector within the IFSA 2013 legislative framework.579  The diagram 
below shows the contract-based regulatory framework governing Islamic banks in 
Malaysia: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
578 Supra, Note. 575, p.90 
579 Ibid., p.80 
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Source: BNM, Financial Stability and Payment Systems Report 2012 
 
The regulatory framework mentioned above is aimed at reducing the legal and 
operational risk in Islamic financial transactions.580  Section 6 of the IFSA 2013 inserts 
the principal regulatory objectives of the Act, which is to promote financial stability and 
compliance with Sharia objectives.  By these principles, the CBM aims to foster:- 
(i)  the safety and soundness of Islamic financial institutions;  
(ii) the integrity and orderly functioning of the Islamic money market and Islamic 
foreign exchange market;  
(iii)  safe, efficient and reliable payment systems and Islamic payment instruments;  
(iv)  fair, responsible and professional business conduct of Islamic financial 
institutions; and  
                                                 
580 Bank Negara Malaysia, Financial Sector Blueprint 2011-2020, p.36 
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(v)  strive to protect the rights and interests of consumers of Islamic financial 
services and products.  
 
Other policies includes maintaining the stability of the overall financial system, 
enhancing the resilience of financial institutions through sound risk management 
practices and strengthening market confidence in, and the competitiveness of, the 
Islamic financial system.581  
 
With regards to the policy objective enumerated in the IFSA 2013, the legislation, 
however, did not expressly mention that the regulators aimed to provide a level-playing 
field between Islamic financial services and conventional financial services.  In spite 
of this, the creation of separate legislation in IFSA 2013 and FSA 2013 is seen to 
provide an implied understanding that there is an idea of a level-playing field behind 
the dual regulatory framework.  As such, the Malaysian approach is in contrast with 
the UK approach, where the government expressly states the level-playing field 
approach for all types of financial services requires no separate regulatory framework.  
Despite the differences in the regulatory framework, it can be argued that, while the 
dual regulatory framework represents level-playing field treatment for Islamic and 
conventional banks, the general framework of IFSA 2013 contains rather similar 
wording and provisions to FSA 2013 in almost all parts of the entire legislation, apart 
from the fact that specific sections such as in Parts IV, VI and X of IFSA 2013 are 
dedicated to Islamic financial institutions and wording has been inserted such as 
‘Islamic’ or ‘Sharia’.  In other words, FSA 2013 and IFSA 2013 is twin-legislation, 
                                                 
581 Supra, Note. 575, p.41 
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although there are some improvements in IFSA 2013 when compared to the previous 
Islamic Banking Act 1983.  
 
Such an argument was also made by Rodney Wilson, when, in 2012, he argued that 
the separate legislation (the then Islamic Banking Act 1983) for Islamic banks had not 
seen much progress over the past three decades in Malaysia.  The unique features of 
the Islamic banking sector or specific requirements for Sharia-based financing were 
not reflected in the separate legislation.  He argued that:  
“In short, although the Islamic Banking Act of 1983 was a commendable attempt to 
ensure that Islamic bank operations in Malaysia were put on a sound footing and there 
is little reference to the unique features of Islamic banking or provision for the specific 
requirements of Sharia-based financing.  There has been much progress on these 
matters over the last three decades in Malaysia, but this has not yet been reflected in 
the legislation which remains largely unchanged.”582 (emphasis added) 
 
Such issues pertaining to the content of Islamic finance legislation raise the question 
of the real need to have separate legislation for the Islamic financial sector instead of 
incorporating the issues into a single piece of legislation.  In particular, does the idea 
of treating all the banking and financial institutions on a level-playing field really require 
dual legislation or is the incorporation of Islamic financial provisions into conventional 
legislation sufficient?  It is not, however, within the scope of this thesis to discuss the 
issue of single or dual legislation further.  This is because such a question would 
require more focus on the constitutional law aspect, which is rather different from the 
current focus and objective of this thesis.  
                                                 
582 Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance, (2012), p.107 
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Notably, the dual regulatory framework in Malaysia reflects that the regulators 
perceived the effectiveness of level-playing field regulations when Islamic banks are 
accommodated separately from the conventional banks. While the Malaysian 
government strongly promotes a separate framework that represents a level-playing 
field for both banking and financial services, evidence has shown that more attention 
is being given to the Islamic financial services sector than its conventional counterpart.  
For instance, the regulators have inserted a specific provision that requires the CBM 
to promote Malaysia as an international hub for the Islamic financial services sector 
per se. 
 
Section 60 of the CBA 2009 provides that the CBM; 
“shall incorporate with the authority or international or supranational, organisation, 
develop and promote Malaysia as an international Islamic financial centre.”583 
 
It can be argued that the term ‘shall’ in Section 60 (1) CBA 2009 indicates an obligation 
imposed on the CBM to promote Malaysia as a hub for the Islamic financial sector.  
Additionally, the CBM is also allowed by the legislation to provide financing ‘for the 
development and promotion of Malaysia as an international Islamic financial centre.’584  
There is, however, an absence of such a provision indicating the same obligation for 
the CBM to promote the conventional financial services sector.  The only reference to 
a general provision, which is aimed at the whole financial services sector, is where the 
                                                 
583 Section 60 (1) Central Bank Act 2009  
584 Section 60 (2) (b) Central Bank Act 2009 
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role of the CBM is defined as ‘to promote a sound, progressive and inclusive financial 
system’.585  
 
While this is the case, it can be suggested that the emphasis given to focussing on 
and developing the status of Malaysia as an international hub for the Islamic financial 
services sector indicates a lack of equality at the substantive level between the 
conventional and Islamic financial sectors in Malaysia. Viewed from the conventional 
financial services perspective, therefore, the lower emphasis on promoting the 
conventional financial services sector leads the question of whether the conventional 
financial services sector is less significant in the eyes of the Malaysian regulators.  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapters two and three, the regulatory accommodation 
for Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia involves the question of public policy and 
political economy. For Malaysia, the concepts of ‘New Malays’ (Melayu Baru) and 
‘New Economic Policy’ (Dasar Ekonomi Baru) have been the driving factors for the 
government to focus on developing the Islamic financial sector. Besides this, the 
Malaysian government would not be exposed to political-societal issues for giving 
more attention for the development of Islamic finance for the fact that Malaysia is a 
Muslim majority country. As such, it can be seen that a greater accommodation for 
Islamic finance is more obvious in Malaysia for there is more political will as opposed 
to the UK (more of the influencing factors which contribute to the existing regulatory 
accommodation have been discussed in chapter two). Moreover, in the UK, the 
question of the cost and benefit of regulations is crucial and thus, the regulation should 
bring more economic benefit than the cost incurred. While in Malaysia, although the 
                                                 
585 Section 5 (f) Central Bank Act 2009 
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cost and benefit of regulation plays a role in the regulatory decision making, 
nevertheless, the government’s aim to promote the Islamic financial sector appears to 
be greater than the economic justification for regulating the Islamic financial services.  
 
Now that the regulatory principles and policies have been highlighted, the rest of this 
chapter analyses the extent to which the Malaysian regulators have enabled a level-
playing field in the existing regulatory framework – the same approach is taken as in 
the previous chapter.  The two test questions are: 
(v) Whether Islamic banks in Malaysia are treated equally before the law; and  
(vi) Whether Islamic banks are given a fair opportunity to compete alongside 
conventional banks. 
 
The next section examines and analyses whether the dual regulatory accommodation 
reflects the idea of a level-playing field for Islamic banks and conventional banks in 
Malaysia.  The same approach is used to examine the elements of a level-playing 
field.  This approach will examine whether the existing regulatory framework consists 
of the elements of an ideal law (clarity, certainty, predictability) as well as using the 
two test questions above (equality before the law and fair opportunity to compete) to 
analyse the level-playing field in the regulatory framework – at the transactional level 
and the institutional level.  The regulatory framework in the next section is divided into 
five sub-sections which includes authorisation, Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), 
Islamic finance cases before the Malaysian courts, Sharia-compliant liquidity 
management and taxation.  
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4.2 LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD AND THE REGULATORY ACCOMMODATION 
FOR ISLAMIC BANKS  
 
(a)  AUTHORISATION 
Thus far, there is no evidence to prove that the regulatory framework governing the 
authorisation of Islamic banks in Malaysia faced substantive issues as opposed to the 
authorisation process in the UK.  As mentioned earlier, fully-fledged Islamic banking 
and financial institutions in Malaysia are governed by IFSA 2013 and used to be 
governed by the Islamic Banking Act 1983.  Historically, before the legislative 
enactment of FSA 2013 and IFSA 2013, the conventional financial institutions that 
operate ‘Islamic windows’ were allowed to perform not only Islamic banking business 
but also Islamic financial business.  In other words, the absence of a provision in 
regards to Islamic financial business in IBA 1983 indicates that fully-fledged Islamic 
banks in Malaysia were only allowed to conduct Islamic banking business. This, 
therefore, created inequality at the substantive level.  The establishment of IFSA 2013 
and FSA 2013 has, however, solved the issue.   
 
With regards to the authorisation process, it can be argued that the dual regulatory 
framework governing both banking sectors in Malaysia represents a more level-
playing field as opposed to the UK approach.  As has been observed in the previous 
chapter, Islamic banks had to compromise certain aspects at the substantive level to 
suit the conventional regulatory framework in the UK, thus creating inequality at the 
substantive level.  On the other hand, the regulatory accommodation for the 
authorisation of Islamic banks in Malaysia represents formal and substantive equality 
between the institutions.  For instance, IFSA 2013 is applicable to a financial institution 
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that is carrying on a fully-fledged Islamic banking business, while the authorisation 
process for a conventional financial institution, which intends to operate ‘Islamic 
windows’, is governed by FSA 2013.  For a conventional financial institution intending 
to operate Islamic banking or financial business, therefore, a consultation process 
must be conducted with the Central Bank of Malaysia.586  Compliance with the 
provisions in Parts IV, VI, IX, X and XIII of IFSA 2013 shall be observed by a financial 
institution wishing to operate a certain type of approved business under ‘Islamic 
windows’ operation. 587 
 
Secondly, conventional financial banks that operate ‘Islamic windows’ must be a 
member institution under the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation, (MDIC) also 
known as Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia.588  Notably, MDIC is equivalent to 
the UK Deposit Guarantee Scheme designed to protect Islamic finance depositors as 
well as maintaining stability in the financial system and consumer confidence.589  MDIC 
is defined as: 
‘a system established by the Government to protect depositors against the loss of their 
insured deposits placed with member institutions in the event the member institution 
fails.’590  
 
The level-playing field in the dual regulatory framework can be inferred where an 
authorisation for establishing an ‘Islamic window’ by a conventional bank is similar to 
                                                 
586 Section 15 of Financial Services Act 2013 
587 Section 15 (2) (a) Financial Services Act 2013 
588 MDIC is governed by Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 2005. MDIC is also known as 
Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM) 
589 MDIC (2013) via <http://www.pidm.gov.my/>  accessed: 20 December 2013 
590 Ibid. 
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an authorisation for a fully-fledged Islamic bank.  It shall acquire the recommendation 
from the CBM by virtue of Section 8 IFSA 2013.  Accordingly, an Islamic bank must 
also be a member institution under MDIC.  Such procedures represent equality at the 
formal and substantive level.  In this regard, the procedure is generally the same with 
the UK practice; however, the difference is that separate legislation is applicable in 
Malaysian practice.   
 
While the general practice is similar, nevertheless, greater equality at the substantive 
level can be inferred in the Malaysian practice in the case where a bank is in default. 
Both Islamic and conventional deposits are protected equitably.  The regulatory 
accommodation pertaining to deposit protection provides an opportunity for the Islamic 
banks to compete alongside the conventional banks - where Islamic deposits are 
covered separately from conventional deposits.591 
 
The level-playing field in the dual regulatory framework shows that the separated funds 
received from the conventional banks and Islamic banks are grouped separately into 
the Islamic Deposit Insurance Fund or Conventional Deposit Insurance Fund.  Section 
55 of the MDIC Act 2011 states that: 
All payments made by the Corporation in respect of: 
(a) Islamic deposits and all costs associated therewith shall be made from the Islamic 
deposit insurance fund; and 
(b) conventional deposits and all costs associated therewith shall be made from the 
conventional deposit insurance  fund. 
                                                 
591 Section 47 PIDM Act 2011. Also see, PIDM Deposit Insurance Handbook (2011) via 
<http://www.pidm.gov.my/downloads/2011/HandbookDI_2011.pdf> accessed 20 December 2013 
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The funds received by depositors are made from these separate channels.  The 
Islamic financial depositors are assured that the funds are not intermingled with 
conventional funds, hence market confidence is created through this regulatory 
accommodation.  Moreover, MDIC guarantees no transfer of funds from these groups 
in the case where there is shortage of funds.  In the case of Islamic banking depositors, 
notably, the priority among Islamic depositors and types of Islamic deposits are 
determined based on the contracts underlying the deposits.  For instance, ‘non-
Mudaraba (non-profit sharing) deposits such as Wadiah deposits have priority over 
Mudaraba (profit sharing) deposits.’592  Furthermore, the investments by MDIC through 
the permitted investment channels are managed in accordance with Sharia 
principles.593  In this regard, the Malaysian regulatory framework reflects a more level-
playing field as opposed to the UK practice - where the latter does not separate the 
depositors’ funds from the conventional and Islamic financial deposits.  
 
(b) SHARIA SUPERVISORY BOARD (SSB)  
As opposed to the UK practice where there is no regulatory accommodation for Sharia 
supervision, the regulatory framework governing Sharia supervision for Islamic banks 
and financial institutions, which also includes banks with Islamic windows, in Malaysia 
is considered to be well structured. The regulatory accommodation placed the Sharia 
                                                 
592 MDIC Annual Report 2005, p.57 
593 MDIC Annual Report 2005 and Section 30 (3) MDIC Act 2011. It is also permitted for the MDIC to 
borrow from the government if extra funds are needed and in the case of a payout for Islamic depositors, 
this borrowing will be in compliance with Sharia principles.” See, Abdul Karim Aldohni, The Legal and 
Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking, (2010), p.199 
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committee or Sharia Advisory Board as the most influential department for banking 
and financial institutions carrying out Islamic financial transactions.  
 
One may argue about how Sharia supervision relates to level-playing field regulation.  
At first glance, the significance of highlighting the regulatory accommodation for Sharia 
supervision appears not to be closely related to the question of a level-playing field.  
This is because a glance at this issue does not demonstrate the first and second 
element of what a level-playing field is (equality before the law and a fair opportunity 
to compete between conventional and Islamic banks). The supervision of Islamic 
banks is simply part of the bank’s corporate governance due to its Sharia nature and 
certainly, one may argue that there is no issue of a level-playing field.  Such an 
argument, however, may be right to a certain extent should this issue be viewed at a 
superficial level.   
 
There is, however, a significant point in highlighting the regulatory accommodation 
governing Sharia supervision.  Sharia supervision is regarded as a significant aspect 
of an Islamic bank’s corporate governance and an appropriate regulation is crucial in 
ensuring an Islamic bank’s competitive position. An appropriate corporate governance 
regulation that could help to promote a level-playing field for Islamic banks is, 
therefore, justified for several reasons.  Firstly, the purpose of establishing a sound 
regulatory framework for Sharia supervision or governance is to preserve market 
confidence in the Islamic financial services industry.594  Secondly, without proper 
guidelines for Sharia supervision or a corporate governance framework, Islamic banks 
could potentially be exposed to several types of risk such as regulatory risk, 
                                                 
594 Global Islamic Finance Report 2011, p.217-219 
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operational risk, the risk of non-Sharia compliance and other types of risks that can be 
associated with Islamic banks.  Thirdly, the existence of these risks could ultimately 
lead to reputational risk, which eventually may cause the collapse of the Islamic 
financial sector at a macro level.595  Fourthly, proper Sharia supervision is needed to 
monitor the prudential aspect and market discipline for Islamic banks to promote the 
stability of the Islamic financial sector. Finally, since the Sharia-compliant aspect of 
the Islamic financial transaction is the crux of Islamic financial services, the 
establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework is significant to monitor the 
Islamic nature of the transactions.  
 
The Sharia compliance of a transaction is arguably the unique marketing asset of the 
entire Islamic financial services sector.  Relating the factors above, which are crucial 
to the survival of the Islamic financial services sector, this leads to an understanding 
that the first element of a level-playing field (equality before the law) is vital and, 
therefore, merits further analysis. A sound regulatory framework for Sharia supervision 
will help to promote the competitiveness of the Islamic financial services sector as the 
factors listed above are, indeed, significant in distinguishing the Islamic and 
conventional financial services sectors.  In short, it can be suggested that the survival 
of the Islamic financial services sector, in particular, market confidence depends 
heavily on whether the regulators provide a sound regulatory accommodation for 
Sharia governance – on the form and substance of the Islamic banking business – 
while such a form and substance issue is not required for conventional banking 
business.  Following this, the relation to the second element of a level-playing field 
(fair opportunity to compete) is also worthy of analysis. 
                                                 
595 Ibid., p.219 
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While the UK’s regulatory framework considers Sharia supervision as part of the 
conventional corporate governance regulation, in Malaysia, the regulation pertaining 
to Sharia supervision is reflected in a specific provision through the recent amendment 
of the Central Bank Act 2009 (CBA 2009).  CBA 2009 mandated the establishment of 
the CBM’s Sharia Advisory Council (SAC) by virtue of Section 51 of the Act, making 
the SAC highest authority to be referred to for issues pertaining to Islamic financial 
business.  (Notably, the SAC of the CBM is separate from the SAC of the Securities 
Commission, which is given the mandate ‘to ensure that the running of the Islamic 
capital market (ICM) complies with Sharia principles’ and to advise the SAC on all 
matters in relation to the development of the ICM.596)  Part VII of CBA 2009 provides 
the rulings, which include its appointment, functions and the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the SAC. The SAC of the CBM is considered as the National Sharia Advisory 
Council (NSAC), which comprises 11 members appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong597 on the advice of the Minister after consulting the CBM ‘who are qualified in 
the Sharia or who have knowledge or experience in the Sharia and in banking, finance, 
law or such other related disciplines.’598  
 
The appointment process for an NSAC member is similar to the appointment of a Court 
judge and this reflects the prestigious status of its members. Arguably, this exclusive 
appointment indicates that no exclusive appointment is applicable to a conventional 
counterpart. Of course, this is mainly due to the fact that there is no corporate 
                                                 
596 Securities Commission, ‘Islamic Capital Market’, (2013) via <http://www.sc.com.my/>  accessed: 9 
August 2013 
597 Yang di-Pertuan Agong = King (the) 
598 Section 53 Central Bank Act 2009, See <http://www.bnm.gov.my/> accessed: 9 August 2013 
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committee at the national level to supervise the legitimacy of conventional financial 
products.  Therefore, this surely does not provide a strong justification for the lack of 
equality at the substantive level between institutions.   
 
Notably, the functions of the NSAC are mainly:- 
(a) to ascertain the Islamic law on any financial matter and issue a ruling upon 
reference made to it in accordance with this Part (Part VII); 
 (b) to advise the Bank on any Sharia issue relating to Islamic financial business, the 
activities or transactions of the Bank;  
(c) to provide advice to any Islamic financial institution or any other person as may be 
provided under any written law; and  
(d) such other functions as may be determined by the Bank (CBM).599 
 
The functions provided above, therefore, indicates that the function of the NSAC is to 
advise on the Sharia-compliant aspect of Islamic finance contracts but not to decide 
whether such contract is valid as that decision is bestowed upon the Civil court.600  It 
can, therefore, be suggested that the regulatory accommodation above represents the 
element of formal equality for all banking and financial institutions in Malaysia, which 
requires Islamic financial businesses to consult the NSAC for any issues concerning 
Islamic financial business.  The establishment of the NSAC means that there is a 
specific establishment at the national level for the regulatory decision-making process 
as opposed to the UK practice where the regulators combine both financial services 
                                                 
599 Section 52 of Central Bank Act 2009 
600 Tun Abdul Hamid and Adnan Trakic, ‘The Sharia Advisory Council’s Role in Resolving Islamic 
Banking Disputes in Malaysia: A Model to Follow?’, (2012), p.8 
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sector through a single body.  This issue has, however, been discussed in the UK 
chapter.  
 
(i) ‘Fit and Proper’ Criteria   
It was observed earlier that the UK’s fit and proper requirement governing Sharia 
board members is based on the conventional corporate governance guidelines 
representing a non-specific approach to cater to the Islamic nature of an Islamic bank’s 
corporate governance.  In Malaysia, the approach taken by the regulators is similar in 
regards to the fit and proper criteria.  Instead of having dual regulatory guidelines, a 
single guideline was issued, namely the Fit and Proper Criteria for the Islamic banking 
and Takaful industry catered for both ‘conventional banking and financial institutions’ 
and ‘Islamic banking and financial institutions’.601  
 
It can be suggested that the applicability of the guidelines for all the banking and 
financial institutions is the representation of formal equality between all the financial 
institutions in Malaysia as the guideline is issued in pursuant to IFSA 2013 and FSA 
2013.602  The standard minimum requirements for the fit and proper requirements are: 
(a) probity, personal integrity and reputation, (b) competency and capability; and (c) 
financial integrity.603  Notably, these minimum requirements are the same as listed in 
Section 60 of FSA 2013 and Section 69 of IFSA 2013.  The requirements are applied 
to persons at the top management level of a financial institution, which includes the 
directors, members of the Sharia committee, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
                                                 
601 Section 2, ‘Fit and Proper’ Criteria, (2013) via <http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines> accessed: 11 
August 2013 
602 Section 3, Ibid.  
603 Section 60 Financial Services Act 2013, Section 69 Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
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senior officers as well as the company secretary.  In fulfilling the probity, personal 
integrity and reputation criteria, a person must not be disqualified by virtue of the 
criminal and civil offences provided in the guidelines.604  
 
(ii)  ‘Competent’ requirement 
Competency and capability entails a person who possesses ‘relevant knowledge, 
experience and ability to understand the technical requirements of the business, the 
inherent risks and the management process required to perform his role in a key 
function in the relevant capacity effectively.’605  Finally, a person with financial integrity 
is ‘a person who manages his own financial affairs properly and prudently.’606 
 
While the Fit and Proper guideline consists of general provisions, the details of the 
criteria are left to the banking and financial institution to provide their own requirements 
and policies internally.607  An Islamic bank shall consist of a Sharia committee608 
composed of at least three members; a qualified Sharia committee member is to 
possess necessary knowledge, expertise or experience in the area of Islamic 
jurisprudence (Usul-al-Fiqh) or Islamic commercial law (Fiqh al-Muamalat).  This rule, 
however, is flexible in the sense that paper qualifications on the mentioned subjects 
are not mandatory as long as the candidate possesses the necessary expertise or 
                                                 
604 Section 11, ‘Fit and Proper’ Criteria, (2013) via <http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines> accessed: 11 
August 2013 
605 Section 12, Ibid. 
606 Section 11, Ibid. 
607 Section 7.2, Ibid. 
608 Section 30 IFSA 2013 
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experience in the subject areas.609 Furthermore, there is no specific requirement in 
regards to the number of years required to qualify as an ‘experienced’ person, thus it 
is left to the financial institution to decide accordingly. 610  Hence, it can be suggested 
that this lack of standardisation in terms of the eligibility of Sharia committee members 
produces lack of equality at the substantive level between institutions, since the 
regulation is flexible in relation to paper qualifications and years of experience.   
 
Research has shown that the presence of a competent supervisor having accounting 
or finance experience on an SSB makes a positive and significant impact on the 
financial performance of an Islamic bank.  (Some SSBs may not have enough banking 
and financial experience).611  Thus, while the existing regulation is seen to be flexible, 
the choice of an eligible member in an Islamic bank remains crucial so as to minimise 
the potential legal risk or operational risk.  Additionally, earlier research has also 
questioned the impact and efficiency of an SSB as a value-creator for Islamic banks.612 
Such question can be supported with existing evidence from Islamic financial cases 
brought before the court, which highlights the fact that the Sharia-compliant aspects 
of Islamic financial contracts can be brought into question (This will be discussed 
further in the next section).  
 
Notably, the CBM has seriously considered the importance of Sharia supervision to 
ensure the smooth running of the Islamic financial sector thus establishing the NSAC 
                                                 
609 ‘Bank Negara Malaysia Guidelines on the Governance of Sharia Committee’, via 
<http://www.bnm.gov.my/> accessed: 12 July 2013  
610 Ibid. 
611 Hamadi Matoussi and Rihab Grassa, ‘Is Corporate Governance Different for Islamic Banks? A 
Comparative Analysis between the GCC Context and the SEA Context’, (2012), p.11-12 
612 Ibid., p.11 
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to solve disputes arising at the subordinate level (SSB in an Islamic bank).  A good 
approach can be seen in the standardised framework established for each member of 
the Sharia committee to serve for a renewable period of two years in order to minimise 
any conflict of interest.613  It is also noteworthy that the IFSB has higher expectations 
(preferable) in terms of the criteria for a Sharia committee member where it states: 
“It is reasonable to expect a member of a Sharia board to have strong skills in the 
philosophy of Islamic law (Usul al-Fiqh), as he or she must know exactly the 
appropriate Fiqh methodologies for deriving juristic opinions; and good knowledge of 
written Arabic, as he or she needs to be very conversant with the primary sources of 
the Sharia.”614 
 
Moreover, the IFSB standards require higher qualifications for one to be a Chairman 
of a Sharia committee.  For instance, the person must have ‘at least three years of 
experience of making Sharia pronouncements or resolutions or at least four years 
post-qualification experience in teaching or research in Islamic finance...’615  These 
requirements are recommended to all Islamic banking and financial institutions 
globally.  Notably, the Malaysian regulators did not indicate expressly that IFSB 
requirements should be the preferred guideline for all Islamic banking and financial 
institutions in Malaysia – similar to the UK practice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
613 Supra, Note. 609 
614 Islamic Financial Services Board Guidelines-10,Guiding Principles on Sharia Governance Systems  
For Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services, (2009) 
615 Ibid. 
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Below is the structure representing the Sharia governance framework in Malaysia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia  
 
 
The above structure shows the Sharia governance framework, which is applied by the 
fully-fledged Islamic banks in Malaysia.  It shows that a detailed framework has been 
put in place to ensure that Islamic banking and financial institutions are operating to a 
standard imposed by the CBM.  While the overall structure of the framework is similar 
to the conventional practice, nevertheless, it provides a specific focus for Islamic 
banks’ corporate governance.  Such a model reflects the level-playing field in the 
regulation as well as reduces legal risk and operational risk. The structure above is, 
however, not a requirement imposed by the UK regulators.  As mentioned in the UK 
chapter, Sharia supervision is treated in a similar way to conventional corporate 
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governance practice, hence Islamic banks are given the freedom to operate their own 
cooperate governance as long as the banks comply with the conventional regulatory 
framework.  
 
Now that the regulatory framework governing Sharia supervision has been discussed, 
the next section analyses the regulatory accommodation governing Islamic financial 
disputes before the Malaysian courts in which regulatory clarity and standardisation 
will be examined. 
 
(c) ISLAMIC FINANCE CASES BEFORE THE MALAYSIAN COURTS 
It can be argued that the application of the formal equality element for Islamic finance 
litigation in the Malaysian court system is rather unique, because the litigation is 
conducted within the Civil courts’ jurisdiction and not the Sharia courts’ jurisdiction.  
There are two main courts that operate in Malaysia - the Civil courts and the Sharia 
courts.  The jurisdictional power of the Malaysian courts is governed by the Federal 
Constitution (FC).  The courts’ scope of jurisdiction are listed in the FC, which states 
that all matters provided in the Federal List of the FC shall be heard before the Civil 
courts and matters, which falls under the State List of the FC, will be dealt with by the 
Sharia courts.616 This practice has, therefore, led to the understanding that level-
playing field regulation for the Islamic financial sector in Malaysia is not entirely within 
the dual system, because the scope of the jurisdiction for Sharia is limited.  
 
The Civil courts’ jurisdiction covers all civil and criminal law matters excluding matters 
within the jurisdiction of Sharia courts.  The Sharia courts’ jurisdiction covers only 
                                                 
616 Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Ninth Schedule  
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Islamic law matters that fall within the remit of family law and religious offences617 and 
is limited to hearing cases only ‘over person professing the religion of Islam.’618  In 
other words, since an Islamic banking and financial institution is not considered to be 
a ‘person professing the religion of Islam’ – disputes concerning Islamic finance cases 
in Malaysia are governed by the Civil courts – as indicated earlier.  The regulatory 
framework for disputes in the Islamic financial sector in Malaysia is, therefore, 
governed by a mixture of civil and Islamic legislation including but not limited to IFSA 
2013, CBA 2009, Rules of Court 2012, National Land Code 1965, Civil Law Act 1956, 
Hire Purchase Act 1967 and Contracts Act 1950.  
 
The level-playing field in the regulatory accommodation governing Islamic finance 
disputes represents formal equality between the banking and financial institutions; 
nevertheless, its application in practice is limited to a certain extent.  In other words, 
there are still issues at the substantive level for Islamic banks.  This can be shown in 
two examples.  Firstly, while Islamic finance cases in Malaysia are tried before the 
Muamalat619 Division of the High Court (the Muamalat Division was created mainly for 
administrative arrangements) as an additional division to the existing divisions at the 
High Courts of Kuala Lumpur – such as ‘criminal, family and property, commercial, 
appellate and special powers.’620  The creation of the Muamalat court is merely to 
allocate Islamic finance cases to a specific division and not necessarily to decide 
Sharia issues.  This could be inferred in the decided cases hereinafter.  It is also worth 
noting that the Muamalat court is only established in Kuala Lumpur and not in any 
                                                 
617 Ibid. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Muamalat = Islamic transaction 
620 Supra, Note. 600, p.11   
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other states in Malaysia. Tun Hamid and Trakic asserts that ‘at other places, especially 
where there is only one Judge, all type of cases are registered in the same court and 
heard by the same Judge.’621  
 
Secondly, the application of formal equality is limited to a certain extent depending on 
the judges’ view of Islamic financial cases.  Generally, the Malaysian courts’ judges 
have viewed Islamic financial contracts as contract law similar to the UK’s judicial 
practice.  For example, in Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v. Adnan Omar622 the 
defendant defaulted in the loan facility granted by the plaintiff under a Bai Bithaman 
Ajil623 agreement.  One of the objections given by the defendant was that the Civil 
court had no jurisdiction to hear the case by virtue of Article 121A of the Federal 
Constitution.  The provision states that the ‘High Courts and the inferior courts (the 
Session and the Magistrates courts) shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter 
within the jurisdiction of the Sharia courts.’624  In this case, N. H Chan J held that a 
Sharia court has no jurisdiction over Islamic financial cases due to the fact that matters 
pertaining to banking and finance fall within the Federal List of the FC.  As such, only 
Civil courts have the power to hear Islamic financial cases and not the Sharia courts.   
                                                 
621 Ibid. 
622 [1994] 3 CLJ 735 
623 Bai Bithaman Ajil is equivalent to the credit sale under conventional financing. It is inferred that BBA 
is equivalent to the credit sale under conventional financing and prohibited under the Hanafi, Maliki and 
Hanbali schools because the aim of this financing structure is based on lending on interest – which is 
similar to a type of sale known as Bay-Al-Inah. Nevertheless, as argued by Hegazy, ‘many Islamic 
banks in Malaysia use a special structure of BBA as a legal artifice, Hila, to circumvent the prohibition 
of Riba.’ See, Walid Hegazy, ‘Islamic Finance in Malaysia: A tax perspective’, (2011), p.218-220 
624 Mohd Illiayas Seyed Ibrahim, ‘The Regulatory Framework and Legal Aspects of Islamic Banking and 
Finance in Malaysia’, in Daud Bakar and Engku Rabiah Adawiah Engku Ali (eds), Essential Readings 
in Islamic Finance, p.277, See, Ninth Schedule, Federal Constitution of Malaysia.  
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Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the State List of the FC enumerates that Sharia courts 
shall have jurisdiction only ‘over person professing the religion of Islam’.  Therefore, 
as the Plaintiff is a corporation and cannot have a religion, the existing dispute could 
not be brought to the Sharia court.  Moreover, Ranita Hussein JC in a judgement made 
earlier at the High Court held that parties were ad idem625 in treating the granted 
amount of RM583,000 as the facility amount given to the defendant by the plaintiff.  In 
particular, the judge held that: 
“In the present case there is no question of there being any interest because of the 
Islamic nature of the loan. The defendant’s default is in respect of the instalment 
payments and this has been duly particularised by the plaintiff.”626 
 
The Islamic financial dispute in the present case was viewed as merely a breach of 
contract law. Similarly, in the case of Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad v. 
Emcee Corporation Sdn. Bhd627, the judge ruled that although the dispute is 
concerning an Islamic financial contract (Bai Bithaman Ajil contract), the Court viewed 
that the applicable law and principles are similar to the law and principles of 
conventional banking.  In this case, Abdul Hamid JCA held;  
“As was mentioned at the beginning of this judgment the facility is an Islamic banking 
facility.  But that does not mean that the law applicable in this application is different 
from the law that is applicable if the facility were given under conventional banking.  
The charge is a charge under the National Land Code. The remedy available and 
sought is a remedy provided by the National Land Code. The procedure is provided by 
                                                 
625 Ad Idem = mutual consent 
626 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v. Adnan Bin Omar [1994] 4 BLJ 372 
627 [2003] 1 CLJ 635 
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the Code and the Rules of the High Court 1980. The court adjudicating it is the High 
Court.  So, it is the same law that is applicable, the same order that would be, if made, 
and the same principles that should be applied in deciding the application.”628  
 
Based on the above judgment, it can be asserted that Islamic financial disputes in 
Malaysia are not treated differently from conventional financial disputes in the Civil 
courts.  In another example such as the case of Tinta Press Sdn.Bhd v. Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad629, the Court viewed the Ijara transaction as merely a conventional 
leasing transaction dealing with the common law principles on leasing.  Similarly, in 
the case of Tahan Steel Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Bank Islam the application of the 
common law principle of equity was applied by the court.630 
 
While generally the judicial practice in Malaysia is similar to the UK, a slightly different 
approach was taken by the Malaysian regulators with regards to the jurisdictional 
power of the Court and the Sharia Advisory Council (SAC).  A special provision was 
enacted in the Central Bank Act 2009 that shows that the regulator has made an effort 
to implement substantive equality for Islamic banks.  For example, Section 56 (1) of 
the Central Bank Act 2009 obliged the Court or Arbitrator to refer to the Sharia Advisory 
Council rulings when a dispute pertaining to Sharia matters arises in an Islamic 
financial dispute before the Court or Arbitrator.  Section 56 (1) of the Central Bank Act 
2009 (CBA 2009) reads: 
                                                 
628 Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad v. Emcee Corporation Sdn. Bhd [2003] 1 CLJ 635 
629 [1987] 1 CLJ 474 
630 [2004] 6 CLJ 25 
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(i) Where in any proceedings relating to Islamic financial business before any court or 
arbitrator any question arises concerning a Sharia matter, the court or the arbitrator, case 
may be, shall—  
(a) take into consideration any published rulings of the Sharia Advisory 
Council; or 
(b) refer such question to the Sharia Advisory Council for its ruling.  
 
It can be argued  that based on the term ‘shall’ in the provision above, the Courts are 
obliged to refer to the SAC rulings should there be any question concerning Sharia 
matters and the decisions made by  the SAC are binding upon the court or arbitrator 
by virtue of Section 57 of CBA 2009.  The latter’s section states: 
 “Any ruling made by the Sharia Advisory Council pursuant to a reference made under 
this Part shall be binding on the Islamic financial institutions under Section 55 and the 
court or arbitrator making reference under Section 56.” 
 
It can be inferred that while the regulators’ effort is to impose equality at the substantive 
level by solving Islamic financial disputes at the NSAC, an arising question is to what 
extent the provision above could be applied by the Civil courts in Malaysia; this is due 
to the fact that Civil courts in Malaysia are also governed by other civil law legislation.  
This means that Section 56 of the CBA is rather limited to a certain extent.  Moreover, 
it can also be argued that although some sitting judge may be willing to refer to the 
SAC for its ruling on Sharia matters and adopt it in the existing case, some judges 
could take the view that the rulings of the SAC should not overrule the independent 
powers given to the judiciary. Thus, the judiciary is given full liberty to decide whether 
the Sharia issues should be brought to the SAC; the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 
284 
 
grants the judiciary an independent power to judge cases without the influence of the 
executive and the legislature. 
 
This fact can be inferred from a judgment made in Sugumar Balakrishnan,631 where 
the relationship between the organs of the government was elaborated by Gopal Sri 
Ram JCA that held: 
“The Federal Constitution has entrusted to an independent judiciary the task of 
interpreting the supreme law and indeed all laws enacted by the legislative arm of the 
government.  Hence, it is to the court that citizens must turn to enforce their rights.  It 
is important to ensure that powers of the judiciary are not usurped by the legislature or 
the executive.  This would maintain the separation of powers which aims to prevent 
concentration of powers that may increase the likelihood of abuse of powers.  The 
Federal Court also has the inherent jurisdiction under the common law to deal with 
cases with a view to preventing injustices in limited circumstances.  This is in line with 
Section 3 (1) (a) of the Civil Law Act 1956, which was promulgated in accordance with 
Cl.(c) of Art.121 (2) of the Constitution which confers the Federal Court such 
jurisdiction as may be conferred by or under federal law.”632 
 
The separation of powers between the executive (Article 39), the legislature (Article 
44) and the judiciary (Article 121) are stated in the FC of Malaysia.  The judgment 
made in the above case, therefore, leads to the conclusion that, although the 
Malaysian regulators have granted special power to the NSAC to decide on Sharia 
matters, nothing can change the fact that independent power is granted to the 
judiciary.  This means that, legally, the judiciary has the right to refuse to refer issues 
                                                 
631 [1976] 2 MLJ 262 
632 MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2002] 2 MLJ 673, FC  
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to the NSAC for its ruling.  This further leads to the conclusion that the creation of the 
separate provision could not deny the absolute power of the provisions of the FC of 
Malaysia.  Ultimately, it can be argued that the level-playing field in the dual regulatory 
framework has seen a coalition between the existing legislations hence producing a 
lack of standardisation in the regulatory and judicial practice. 
  
The judgments cited above have shown that in reality, the exclusive power for the 
NSAC to impose rulings and to be the subject of reference for Islamic financial disputes 
is rather limited.  This can be due to several factors.  
 
Firstly, the sitting judge takes the view that the disputed issue in an Islamic financial 
case is not considered to be a Sharia issue, because, based on the facts presented 
by disputing parties, there is no Sharia issue to be tried.  The cases are, therefore, 
decided based on common law principles per se.  For example, in the case of in the 
case of Malayan Banking Bhd v. Marilyn Ho Siok Lin 633  the common law doctrine of 
equity was applied.  David Wong JC stated that: 
“I am fully aware that the BBA documents are drawn up based on Islamic principles 
and I am applying the common law principle of equity in construing the same.  This 
approach is available to me as everyone knows the principle of equity is consistent 
with Islamic teachings. (emphasis added)”634 
 
Next, in the case of Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & 
Ors635, Abdul Wahab Patail J held that :- 
                                                 
633 [1984] 2 CLJ 23 
634 [2006]3 CLJ 821 
635 [2008] 5 MLJ 632 
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“the Civil court’s function, in this case, to render a judicially considered decision before 
it according to law and not apply Islamic law as if it were Sharia court.  Its function is 
to examine the application of the Islamic concept and to ensure that the transactions 
in the cases before it do not involve any element not approved in Islam.” 
 
Secondly, the Malaysian courts apply the common law principle of stare decisis and 
the principle of judicial precedent.  The stare decisis principle or ‘ to stand by decided 
matters’ is the doctrine of precedent, which essentially requires that judges apply the 
same reasoning to the existing lawsuits as has been used in previous judicial decisions 
(of the similar kind).’636  Therefore, should the Malaysian judges opt to apply this 
principle, similar English law cases or earlier cases decided by the Malaysian court, 
which involve similar issues, would be followed by the sitting judge in the existing case. 
 
Thirdly, there is the application of the civil and common law for the Civil courts in 
Malaysia.  Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 states that the application of English 
common law and the rules of equity to be applied by the courts in Malaysia and where 
there are lacunae in the law, Section 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956 provide that the 
English common law shall be referred.  In particular, Section 5 of the Civil Law Act 
1956 states that: 
“In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the States of 
Peninsular Malaysia other than Malacca and Penang with respect to the law of 
partnerships, corporations, banks and banking, principals and agents ... the law to be 
administered shall be the same as would be administered in England in the like case 
at the date of the coming into force of this Act.” 
                                                 
636 The Longman Dictionary of Law, (2007), p.552 
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The factors above, therefore, lead to the argument that although Section 56 (1) of the 
Central Bank Act 2009 as mentioned earlier imposed such an obligation, the obligation 
remains open to the sitting judge to refer to the SAC rulings.  For example, in the case 
of Affin Bank Bhd v. Zulkifli Abdullah637, Abdul Wahab Patail J decided that based on 
the disputed issue of this case, the reference to the SAC was not necessary as there 
was no question of Sharia law, although this case involved an Islamic financial contract 
(BBA).  Abdul Wahab Patail J held: 
“Since the question before the court is the interpretation and application of the terms 
of the contractual documents between the parties and of the decisions of the courts, 
reference of this case to another forum for a decision would be an indefensible 
abdication of this court of its function and duty to apply established principles to the 
question before it.  It is not a question of Sharia law.  It is the conclusion of this, 
therefore, that there is no need to refer the question to another forum.” (emphasis 
added).638 
 
As such, it can be viewed that the judgements made by the Malaysian judges reflect 
the neutral approach in deciding Islamic financial disputes – similar to the practice of 
the UK’s judiciary. The existing judicial practice shows that Islamic principles are 
considered, however, it will not turn the Civil court into a Sharia court.  This means 
that although there may be a Sharia-compliance aspect in a disputed case, the 
practice in the Malaysian judicial system will generally be based on the common law 
approach and the question of the Sharia-compliant aspect of the contract is left to the 
judge’s discretion. 
                                                 
637 [2006] 1 CLJ 438 
638 Ibid. 
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The level-playing field in the Malaysian regulatory framework also poses another issue 
with regards to the scope of the law in resolving Islamic financial disputes.  While the 
Malaysian regulators have enacted separate legislation for the Islamic financial sector, 
the regulators, however, did not consider further the implication of the provision in the 
existing legislation (IFSA 2013).  In particular, questions arise as to which law should 
be applied in the case of a conflict of laws. The application of other laws was seemingly 
solved by Section 279 of IFSA 2013, which states that: 
“... but where there is any conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of the 
Companies Act 1965 and this Act in their respective application to the person or 
operator, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.”  
 
The above provision indicates that should there be any conflict pertaining to the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1965, which is inconsistent with the provision of IFSA 
2013, the latter’s provision shall prevail.  This raises an issue as to whether the 
conflicts of law are only limited to Companies Act 1965.  What about the conflicts of 
law in other Civil law legislation or common law principles?  Hence the question arises 
as to whether the regulators applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another).  In this 
regard, the existing regulatory framework has led to the issue of conflicts of law 
between the IFSA 2013 provision and other common law legislation.   
 
While formal equality appears to exist through the dual regulatory framework, the 
existing regulatory framework contains lack of regulatory clarity and has hence created 
inconsistency in the application of the law.  Some authors have argued that legislative 
amendments should be made to the existing civil law legislation if the regulators aim 
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to avoid conflicts of law and to resolve the issue of compatibility of laws.  It has been 
suggested that Section 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956 should be amended by adding: ‘(in 
the absence of any written law, the applicable law is the English law) not including 
Islamic finance and any trading under Islamic finance.’639  It has also been proposed 
that ‘the area of conflict between the Islamic Banking Act and other laws which 
influence Islamic banks, such as National Land Code, Hire Purchase Act and 
Companies Act need to be resolved’640 and it has also been proposed that ‘Malaysia 
needs to have Islamic Hire Purchase Act, Islamic Contract Act as well as Islamic 
Companies Act in order to ensure that the practices are in accordance with Syara’ 
(Sharia).’641  Indeed, it can be asserted that such proposals may potentially solve the 
issue of conflicts of law and could possibly promote equality at the substantive level 
between the institutions.  Nevertheless, the extent to which the legislative amendment 
would be useful is questionable since the majority of issues disputed in Islamic 
financial cases are not related to the Sharia-compliant aspects of the contract.   
 
As has been argued earlier, most of the cases stated above were disputes related to 
the issue of payment default and little dispute were raised concerning Sharia.  
Furthermore, the initial concern of the parties in the above cases was not related to 
the principles of Sharia law.  The question of Sharia law only arises when the parties 
defaulted in payment.  This is similar to the judgment held by Morison J in Beximco’s 
case as cited in an earlier chapter.  It can, therefore, be argued that the introduction 
                                                 
639 Hakimah Yaacob, ‘The New Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 (Act 701): Enhancing the Integrity 
and Role of the Sharia Advisory Council (SAC) in Islamic Finance’, (2010), p.14 
640 Norhashimah Yassin, ‘Legal Aspects of Islamic Banking: Malaysian Experience’, (2003), p.18 
641 Mustafa ‘Afifi, ‘Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Legal Infrastructure: A Study on Legal issues and 
Other Challenges of Islamic Banking and Finance in Malaysia’, p.12 
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of new legislation ‘to ensure that the practices are in accordance with Syara’ (Sharia)’ 
is not practical.  Furthermore, the question of the Sharia compliant aspects of a 
transaction would not be affected without having specific legislation.  Moreover, 
procedurally, an Islamic bank should have sought approval from their SSB for their 
Sharia-compliant transaction. It can, therefore, be argued that enacting new legislation 
would not provide a strong basis to ensure that the transaction in each individual case 
could be said to be Sharia compliant.  
 
In furtherance to the above, the issue arises as to what type of madhab (Islamic school 
of thought) should be chosen for the legislative enactment in the case involving 
international Islamic financial transactions.  One may suggest that should Malaysia 
aim to be a global hub for Islamic finance, a universal legislation should be made 
available to tailor all types of Islamic financial disputes from all schools of thought.  
Nevertheless, such an approach is rather unfeasible.  The suggestion to have the 
regulatory amendments especially in regards to the conflicts of law, however, could 
be the preferred approach as it would provide more regulatory clarity in the law and 
promote substantive equality at the institutional level.  
 
In sum, the dual regulatory framework has shown that the reference to the SAC rulings 
in the Central Bank Act 2009 is limited – where it covers only the reference to its rulings 
on Sharia disputes per se, but ultimately the SAC judgment is not regarded as a 
binding decision by the Civil courts in Malaysia.  For instance, Abdul Hamid Mohamad 
JCA stated that: 
“the ruling of the SAC is not binding on the Court in any case.  It is not necessary to 
refer to the SAC of BNM, as such reference is discretionary, its rulings are not binding, 
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and the issue in the particular case was not one of Sharia compliance of the BBA 
facility but the interpretation of its terms, which the judges of the Civil court would 
interpret on the basis of the principles of common law.”642 
 
In Mohamad Alias Ibrahim v. RHB Bank Bhd & Anor643 , Mohd Zawawi Salleh J held: 
“For questions concerning a Sharia matter, the Civil court is bound to take into 
consideration any published rulings of the SAC or refer such questions to the SAC for 
its ruling and any such ruling made shall be binding on the court.  The issue of whether 
the facility is Sharia compliant or not is only one of the issues to be decided by the 
court.  And although the ascertainment of Islamic law as made by the SAC will be 
binding on the court as per the Impugned Provisions, it will be up to the court to apply 
the ascertained law to the facts of the case. The court still has to decide the ultimate 
issues which have been pleaded.  Consequently, the final decision remains with the 
court.” 
 
The learned judge further held: 
“The SAC did not perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Its function was confined 
to the ascertainment of Islamic law on a financial matter.  The court still had to decide 
the ultimate issues which had been pleaded.”644 
 
It is asserted that the regulators’ vast effort to introduce substantive equality between 
institutions produces conflicts of law.  It represents the collision between the power 
given to NSAC and the independent power given to the court.  The judgments made 
by the Civil court judges above thus demonstrates that the test to be applied by the 
                                                 
642 Supra, Note. 639, p.8 
643 [2011] 4 CLJ 654 
644 Ibid. 
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Civil court in deciding Islamic financial disputes is by questioning whether the Islamic 
financing facilities are approved by the basic principles of Islam and must be 
universally acceptable by all madhabs.  As held by Abdul Wahab Patail J: 
“The Islamic financing facilities are presented as Islamic to Muslims of all madhabs.  
The facilities do not say they are offered only to Muslims of a certain madhabs, for 
example Shafie. If a facility is to be offered as Islamic to Muslims generally, regardless 
of their madhab, then there is no element not approved by the Religion of Islam under 
the interpretation of any of the recognised madhabs.  That it is acceptable to one 
madhab is not sufficient to say it is acceptable in the Religion of Islam when it is not 
acceptable by the other madhabs.”645 
 
The example justifies the approach of the civil court judges who consider Islamic 
financial contracts on the common law principles, hence resulting in a reluctance to 
refer cases to the NSAC.  Moreover, the conflict of law also poses problems with 
regards to the application of madhabs.  For example, the Islamic financial contract of 
Bai Bithaman Ajil is only approved by Malaysian regulators, which adopt the Shafie 
school of thought, but not in other jurisdictions.646   
 
In sum, it can be asserted that in this respect, the approach by the Malaysian judges 
shares similarities with the approach taken by UK judges.  The dual regulatory 
framework, which seems to treat the Islamic and conventional financial sectors 
equally, is not being fully implemented with regards to Islamic financial disputes before 
the Malaysian courts. There is still lack of regulatory clarity and standardisation in the 
dual regulatory framework.  
                                                 
645 Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 5 MLJ 632 
646 See, Walid Hegazy, ‘Islamic Finance in Malaysia: A tax perspective’, (2011),  p.220 
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The next section discusses the liquid management regulation in the Malaysian dual 
regulatory framework. Similar to the UK chapter, the section examines whether the 
regulator has enabled a level-playing field in the dual regulatory framework and 
whether there are problems relating to a level-playing field in the framework.  
 
(d) SHARIA-COMPLIANT LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT REGULATION  
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Islamic banks require an appropriate 
liquidity management framework to help them remain liquid in the financial market.  
 
The establishment of the Islamic Inter-Bank Money Market (IIMM) in Malaysia is a 
platform for Islamic banks and banks participating in the Islamic Banking Scheme 
(IBS) to manage their liquidity.647  This means that the IIMM is open not only to Islamic 
banks, but also conventional banks. The IIMM was established in 1994, ten years after 
the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Malaysia, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB).648  Prior to the establishment of the IIMM, BIMB had to rely on the Government 
Investment Certificate (GIC) to manage its liquidity.  Historically, the GIC which was 
acquired from the Central Bank of Malaysia (CBM) was the only option for BIMB.  GICs 
were bought by BIMB when they had a liquidity surplus and resold to CBM when they 
were in need of liquidity.  In light of the fact that the Islamic banking sector was 
developing rapidly, the GIC option was considered inadequate and there was no 
secondary market available for Islamic banks and Islamic windows.649  Due to this 
                                                 
647 Banks under IBS are ‘Islamic windows’ banks 
648 ‘Islamic banking’ via <http://www.bnm.gov.my/>  accessed: 23 May 2015 
649 Obiyatolla Batcha, ‘The Islamic Interbank Money Market and a Dual Banking System: The 
Malaysian Experience’, (2008), p. 5 
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problem, the IIMM was created as a platform for interbank trading of Islamic financial 
instruments and Mudaraba Interbank Instruments (MII). 650  MII is a concept where 
‘deficit Islamic banking institution (‘investee bank’) can obtain investment from a 
surplus Islamic banking institution (‘investor bank’) based on Mudaraba (profit-
sharing).’651  The profit-sharing ratio is negotiable among the parties and the investor 
bank will only know its actual return plus profits (if any) made by the investee bank at 
the end of the investment period.652  
 
The creation of IIMM represents an opportunity for all the banking and financial 
institutions to compete fairly.  As opposed to the UK practice, where there is an 
absence of a platform that functions similar to the IIMM, hence causing a lack of 
opportunity for Islamic banks to compete against their conventional counterparts.  The 
fact that the Islamic financial sector in the UK is rather small means, however, that an 
interbank money market for Islamic banks could be a difficult approach.  There is, 
however, an absence of empirical evidence to prove such an argument.  As has been 
mentioned earlier, the IIMM in Malaysia was created when the Islamic banking sector 
was relatively new.  Thus, it can be suggested that the Malaysian practice could be an 
example for the UK to assist liquidity management for Islamic banks.  
 
                                                 
650 ‘Islamic banking’ via <http://www.bnm.gov.my/>  accessed: 23 May 2015 
651 ‘Islamic Interbank’, Ibid. 
652 Apart from the GIC and MII, other liquidity instruments for all Islamic banks and participating banks 
are Sukuk Bank Negara Malaysia Ijara (SBNMI), Wadiah Acceptance (WA), Bank Negara Monetary 
Notes-i, Sell and Buy-Back Agreement, Cagamas Mudaraba Bonds, When Issue (WI) Islamic 
Negotiable Instruments of Deposit and Islamic Debt Certificate (INNID and NIDC), Islamic Private Debt 
Securities, and Ar-Rahnu Agreement. See, <http://iimm.bnm.gov.my/> accessed: 23 May 2015  
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Notably, during the IIMM’s earliest years, there was no model of liquidity management 
for Islamic banks.653  Bankers at that time were more familiar with the conventional 
banking framework, hence the operation of IIMM replicates its conventional 
counterpart.  Liquidity instruments available for Islamic banks, therefore, are generally 
‘Islamised’ versions of conventional liquidity instruments such as Islamic Bankers 
Acceptance, Malaysian Islamic Treasury Bills and Negotiable Islamic Instruments of 
Deposit (NIID).654  Additionally, the pricing of these instruments generally follows the 
conventional practice of discounting. The key difference, however, is that ‘the 
prevailing interest rate of appropriate term to maturity is used in conventional pricing 
whereas the profit-rate or mark-up rate is used in discounting Islamic instruments.’655 
 
 
The formal equality in the dual regulatory framework shows that conventional banks 
can invest in the IIMM, while Islamic banks are not allowed to invest in the conventional 
interbank money market.  This is due to the Sharia-compliant nature of Islamic banks 
hence investing in a conventional interbank money market is not allowed.  While in 
principle the creation of the IIMM is seen to represent a level-playing field for Islamic 
banks and appears to accommodate the inherent nature of Islamic finance, however, 
in practice, issues arise with regards to the liquidity investments in the existing dual 
regulatory framework.  Several types of risks are identified in the existing IIMM.  For 
instance, Islamic banks in the IIMM are exposed to interest-rate risk similar to 
conventional banks where in theory Islamic banks should not be exposed to such risk 
                                                 
653 Supra, Note. 649, p.11  
654 Ibid., See, via <http://iimm.bnm.gov.my/> accessed: 23 May 2015 
655 Supra, Note. 649, p.11 
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due to their interest-free nature.  Earlier research has examined the correlation 
between rates of return for Islamic banks and the three- month interest rates of 
conventional banks.  It has been found that ‘there is extensive interest rate exposure 
for the Islamic banking sector.’  It was also found that: 
 
“Deposit formation across both banking sectors was strongly linked.  The free flow of 
funds between the two banking sectors and the large pool of non-Islamic clients that 
Islamic banks have, would ensure arbitrage flows if rates were different between the 
sectors.  As a result, not only were the rates similar across the banking sectors, they 
were also very closely related.”656 
 
Apart from the interest-rate and arbitrage risks, another type of risk, Sharia-compliance 
risk arises and this could not be overlooked.  The fact that the IIMM operates with both 
banking sectors and that the dual banking system is strongly interconnected, Islamic 
banking activities could not be completely detached from the conventional banking 
sector.  It has been argued that:  
 
“Since the IIMM replicates the conventional system, both in terms of trading processes 
and instruments, any yield differences between the IIMM and the rest of the system 
would constitute a pure arbitrage opportunity.  As such, a well-functioning IIMM 
operating within a dual system would inevitably have yields/profit rates that closely 
resemble the yields and interest rates in the conventional system.  Such synchronicity 
however, has a huge implication about the relevance of interest rate risk to a 
supposedly ‘interest-free’ market.”657 
                                                 
656 Ibid.,p.12-13 
657 Ibid., p.15 
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Due to the above issue, the Islamic banking sector is exposed to Sharia risk and hence 
raises the question of the real difference between the Islamic and the conventional 
banking practice.  The IIMM has undoubtedly provided the opportunity for both banking 
sectors to manage their liquidity in the inter-bank money market.  Despite this, Sharia-
compliance risk arises from the replication of the conventional banking practice.  To 
support the view that Islamic banks and the conventional banks in the inter-bank 
money market are operating with a very strong linkage, empirical research has been 
conducted on the daily quoted yields in the Malaysian IIMM and the conventional 
money market.  A total of four interbank yields with the daily quotes for the (i) overnight, 
(ii) one week, (iii) one month and (iv) three month interbank transactions were tested 
in a research exercise using an economic theory called the Granger Causality Test.  
Over the study period of 10 years, the results of this test have found very strong one-
way causation from the conventional and Islamic banking sector.  It also appears that 
there is a strong correlation across both sectors for both interest/profit rates and 
deposits.658  As a result, the users of the IIMM would face the same interest rate risk 
as the conventional players do.659   
 
This means that in the dual regulatory framework, which is supposed to serve the 
unique features of Islamic banks and treat them on a level-playing field, interest rate 
risk still exists, while theoretically Islamic banks should be interest free.660  
Furthermore, it has also been found that in the Malaysian dual regulatory framework 
                                                 
658Ibid., p.19 
659Ibid. 
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the ‘interest rate differentials between the Islamic and conventional money markets 
create arbitrage opportunity for the conventional financial institution, leaving Islamic 
financial institution at a disadvantage since these institutions are limited to transacting 
only in the Islamic financial market.’661  Such a finding has therefore led to the 
argument that Islamic banks remain at a disadvantage in a financial system that 
operates in parallel thus questioning the efficiency of having the dual regulatory 
framework.  
 
 
In sum, the fact that the Islamic banking sector is operating in the dominantly 
conventional sector shows that Islamic banks cannot be completely detached from 
interest-rate risk and Sharia-compliance risk.  It is rather difficult for Islamic banks to 
avoid such a situation, which is similar to the UK Islamic banking and financial sector.  
For the UK Islamic banks, however, the difference is that these banks are facing a lack 
of liquid assets options that they can hold.  On the contrary, in Malaysia, Islamic banks 
do not have the issue of liquid assets options but rather the issue pertains to the Sharia 
compliance of their liquidity management via the IIMM.   While the IIMM is seen to be 
able to provide a better level-playing field for Islamic banks to compete with 
conventional banks, the formal equality in the dual regulatory framework shows that 
substantive issues still exist.  Although a separate platform such as IIMM is available, 
the Sharia compliance aspect of Islamic banks is questionable and to a certain extent 
is compromised.  
 
                                                 
661 Salina Kassim, ‘The Information Content of the Islamic Inter-bank Money Market Rate in Malaysia’, 
(2008), p.310 
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We now turn to the next section, which highlights the taxation framework for the Islamic 
financial sector in Malaysia.  As noted in the UK chapter, the topic of taxation is not 
directly related to the topic of regulation. However, Islamic banks are affected by the 
regulatory accommodation on taxation for their retail mortgage products. Hence, the 
analysis of the regulatory accommodation pertaining to taxation is relevant. It does 
reflect the regulator’s treatment of the Islamic financial sector and the extent of a level-
playing field in the dual regulatory framework.  
 
(e) TAXATION - PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
 
There is an absence of explicit principles and policies for taxation adopted by the 
Malaysian government – other than aiming to have a taxation system that achieves a 
more equitable distribution of the tax burden and generating revenue for the 
government.662  It has been argued that ‘until the mid-sixties, it was difficult to cite any 
evidence to support the contention that tax policy in Malaysia is used to achieve any 
objective other than to raise revenue.’663  The possible rationalisation on the taxation 
objective since the 1970s was: 
(a) to promote investment and stimulate industrial development. 
(b) to promote national saving and improve the free flow of goods leaving the country 
through harmonisation of tax rates between Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and 
Sarawak. 
(c) to promote a more equitable distribution of income and wealth through a 
somewhat progressive Income tax structure and Real Property Gains Tax. 
                                                 
662 Barjoyai Badai, Malaysian Tax Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, (1993), p.27 
663 Ibid. 
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(d) to alleviate the burden of inflation especially on the lower income groups.664  
 
The taxation framework in Malaysia shows that there was no separate legislation 
governing Islamic financial instruments in Malaysia – similar to the UK practice.  While 
the UK established its Tax Technical Working Group, Malaysia established a Working 
Committee on tax neutrality in 2003 to approve a scheme of financing based on Sharia 
principles, which is eligible for tax neutrality treatment.  The tax neutrality committee 
comprises of senior officials from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Inland Revenue 
Board (IRB) and the CBM officers.665  The tax neutrality committee was established 
with the aim of creating a level-playing field between both financial services sectors, 
ensuring that Islamic financial transactions, which produce the same economic impact 
as conventional financial transactions, receive equivalent tax treatment. 666 
 
Several legislative amendments were made in order to accommodate the distinctive 
nature of Islamic financial instruments.  In Malaysia, the main legislation, which 
involved a regulatory accommodation for the taxation of Islamic financial instruments, 
comprises the Income Tax Act 1967, Stamp Duty Act 1949 and Real Property Gain 
Tax Act 1976.  
 
The Malaysian government has provided several tax incentives to promote the 
development of Islamic finance.  The tax incentives were given to Islamic banking and 
financial institutions licensed under IFSA 2013 such as tax exemption of 100% from 
                                                 
664 Ibid. 
665 BNM Annual Report 2004 via <http://www.bnm.gov.my> accessed: 9 July 2013  
666 BNM Financial Stability Report 2012, p.82 
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Year of Assessment (YA) 2007 to YA 2016 “on income derived from Islamic banking 
business conducted in international currencies.” 667  Secondly, ‘20% stamp duty 
remission on Islamic finance instruments as approved by the Central Bank of Malaysia 
and the Securities Commission from 2 September 2006 to 31 December 2015.’668  
Exemption on the Real Property Gains Tax was also given on ‘chargeable gains 
accrued on the disposal of any chargeable assets under Islamic principles.’669  This 
also applies to the ‘disposal of any chargeable assets in relation to the Sukuk al Ijara 
of Bank Negara Malaysia which are issued or to be issued by BNM Sukuk Berhad.’670  
The tax incentives in Malaysia, arguably, are considerably more than those provided 
by the UK regulators and promote a level-playing field for Islamic banks to further 
develop.  
 
(i)  Income Tax  
There is no definition for the term ‘income’ in the Income Tax Act 1967 (ITA 1967).  It 
can, therefore, be argued that the term income is to be derived from ‘the ordinary 
meaning of the term.’671  The tax levied under ITA 1967 is construed as: 
‘income tax...charged for each year of assessment upon the income of any 
person accruing in or derived from Malaysia or received in Malaysia from 
outside Malaysia.’672 
 
                                                 
667 MIA, ‘Tax Treatment on Islamic Finance Malaysia’ via <http://www.mia.org.my/> accessed: 25 
November 2013 
668MIFC, ‘Incentives for Islamic Banking’ via <http://www.mifc.com/> accessed: 15 November 2013 
669 Supra, Note. 667 
670 Ibid. 
671 Ibid. 
672 Section 3 of the ITA 1967 
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In order to accommodate the taxation treatment for Islamic financial products in 
Malaysia, there were several legislative amendments to ITA 1967 in 2003.673  The 
added provisions intended to place the taxation for Islamic financial transactions on a 
level-playing field with the taxation imposed on conventional financial transactions.  
For instance, Section 2 (7) of ITA 1967 states that: 
“Any reference in this Act to interest shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to gains or profits 
received and expenses incurred, in lieu of interest, in transactions conducted in 
accordance with the principles of Sharia.” 
 
The effect of the provision above represents the application of the element of formal 
equality and substantive equality in ITA 1967.  Prior to the legislative amendment of 
Section 2 (7) ITA 1967, the taxes on Islamic financial transactions were based on the 
reference to the generic provision in ITA 1967. Section 2 (7) ITA 1967 provides that 
the taxes levied for Islamic financial transactions are treated equally with conventional 
transactions.  It can be inferred that the reference to ‘interest’ (which refers to 
conventional transactions) in the provision above is taxed equally to ‘gains or profits’ 
received from the income of Sharia-compliant transactions.  In other words, all accrued 
tax on ‘interest’ mentioned in the legislation is applicable to ‘profits’ arising from Islamic 
financial transactions. 
 
The regulatory practice for taxation in Malaysia is similar to the UK, in principle and in 
practice.  In other words, the economic substance for Islamic financial transactions is 
based on conventional practice.  The regulatory accommodation, therefore, sees the 
                                                 
673 Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967 via <http://www.hasil.gov.my/> accessed: 9 July 2013>  accessed: 1 
May 2014 
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profits arising from the Islamic financial transactions such as Bai Bithaman Ajil674, 
Murabaha, Istisna’, or Ijara taxed in a similar way to tax levied on conventional financial 
transactions.  In regards to the disposal of an asset or a leased Islamic asset, however, 
such transactions are given tax neutrality as long as the scheme is in accordance with 
Sharia principles. In particular, Section 2 (8) ITA 1967 reads: 
“Subject to subsection (7), any reference in this Act to the disposal of an asset or a 
lease shall exclude any disposal of an asset or lease by or to a person pursuant to a 
scheme of financing approved by the Central Bank or the Securities Commission or 
the Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority as a scheme which is in accordance 
with the principles of Sharia where such disposal is strictly required for the purpose of 
complying with those principles but which will not be required in any other schemes of 
financing.”  
 
The diagram below provides an illustration of the taxation in operation in the case of 
Ijara before and after the legislative amendments. 
 
Ijara transaction 
(a) Before the legislative amendments     
          
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
674  Bai Bithaman Ajil – See, Glossary. 
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(b) After the legislative amendments  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
Based on the above diagram, the tax neutrality given upon the disposal of the asset 
or a lease represents equality at the substantive level between all the financial 
institutions. It can be inferred that the legislative amendment promotes fair competition 
between the Islamic and conventional financial transactions.  Such a practice is 
therefore similar to the UK practice.  
 
(ii) Real Property Gains Tax (RPGT) 
RPGT is ‘charged on gains arising from the disposal of real property, which is defined 
as any land situated in Malaysia and any interest, option or other right in or over such 
land. RPGT is also charged on the disposal of shares in a real property company.’675 
 
The Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 (RPGT 1976) is another piece of taxation 
legislation, which provides a regulatory accommodation for the taxation on Islamic 
                                                 
675 RPGT and Exemptions via <http://www.mia.org.my/> accessed: 28 May 2015  
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financial transactions.  Tax under RPGT 1976 applies to ‘gains accruing on the 
disposal of any real property’ or ‘the disposal of shares in real property companies.’676  
 
In placing the taxation for Islamic financial transactions equally, legislative 
amendments to the RPGT 1976 were made.  The insertion of Paragraph 3 (g) to 
Schedule 2 of the Act exempts: 
“the disposal of an asset by a person to an Islamic Bank under a scheme where that 
person (customer) is financed by such bank in accordance with the Sharia’ and; 
‘where such disposal will not be required for conventional financing schemes.”677  
 
Moreover, RPGT 1976 also gives exemption in regards to ‘chargeable gains accrued 
on the disposal of any chargeable assets.  In particular: (a) to or in favour of a special 
purpose vehicle; or (b) in connection with the repurchase of the chargeable assets, to 
or in favour of the person from whom those assets were acquired.  (exempted for 
securitisation transaction).’678  For example, the RPGT 1976 exempts the disposal of 
any chargeable assets in relation to the Sukuk al Ijara of the Central Bank of Malaysia 
(CBM), which are issued or to be issued by the CBM. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
676 RPGT Act 1976 
677 Malaysian Institute of Accountants, ‘Tax Treatment’ via <http://www.mia.org.my/> accessed: 25 
November 2013 
678 Securities Commission, ‘Special Incentives Bond Market’, via <http://www.sc.com.my/general-
section/special-incentives/bond-market/> accessed: 25 November 2013 
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An example of tax neutrality for Sukuk al-Ijara is provided below:- 
 
(a) Before legislative amendment   
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) Sukuk is issued based on the asset being sold to the Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) and the latter will lease back to the owner. 
(2) The underlying nature of Ijara requires the asset to be leased back hence tax is 
acquired at this stage of transaction which is not existed in the conventional system. 
(b) After legislative amendment     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers(PWC) 
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(1) Tax neutrality applied at the place marked due to the additional underlying 
transaction of Sukuk Al Ijara with the condition that Sukuk product is approved 
by the CBM, Securities Commission or Labuan Financial Services Authority.679  
 
(2) Tax neutrality is applied at the place marked (1) and (2) due to the additional 
underlying transaction of Sukuk Al Ijara with the condition that the Sukuk 
product is approved by the CBM, Securities Commission or Labuan Financial 
Services Authority.680  Such a tax-neutral policy is seen as enabling a level-
playing field between Islamic banks and its conventional counterparts. 
 
While Paragraph 3 (g) to Schedule 2 of the RPGT Act 1976 exempts the gains from 
the disposal of real property by the customer to an Islamic banking or financial 
institution, an arising issue is whether the disposal of the property from an Islamic 
banking or financial institution to the customer in a contract such as Bai Bithaman Ajil 
(BBA) (a contract of double sale) is exempted from the RPGT.  This is because there 
is an absence of provision in the legislation to clarify this issue.  Before proceeding 
further, below is a diagram of a BBA transaction:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
679 Pricewaterhouse Coopers,‘Common Cross Border Taxation Issues on Islamic Finance’, (2012),  
p. 9  
680 Ibid., p.8 
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Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA) Transaction                         
  
      
    
   
     
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own  
 
 
(i) The Islamic bank purchased the property on behalf of the customer for 
the original price of RM 500,000. 
(ii) The property is sold to the customer on a mark-up (profit) basis.  For 
instance, RM 600,000. 
(iii) The customer repays the purchase of the property by instalment/lump 
sum over a pre-agreed period.  Tax under RPGT is incurred at the 
disposal stage.  The profit made by the Islamic bank is considered to be 
appropriately taxed under ITA 1967 as ‘business income’.681 
The nature of the BBA contract entails a deferred payment sale under which the 
financier sells a product or equipment to one of its customers for a deferred price 
(which is often higher than the market price) – that is to be paid in the future on an 
instalment basis or as a lump sum.  It has been argued that ‘the difference in price 
between the two sale contracts (representing the bank’s profits) should be taxed under 
the ITA 1967 as business income and should not be subject to RPGT.’  Moreover, the 
                                                 
681 Ibid.  
(iii)Customer repay by fixed instalment/lump sum 
Islamic 
Bank 
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BBA transaction is argued to be similar to a charge or mortgage.682  Paragraph 3 (g) 
of Schedule 2 of the RPGT Act 1976 states that:  
“there is an exemption from the disposal of chargeable asset pursuant to a 
scheme of financing approved by the Central Bank, Labuan Financial Services 
Authority, Malaysian Co-operation Societies Commission or the SC as a 
scheme which is in accordance with the principles of Sharia.” 
 
Indeed, some concerns arise from the fact that profits are taxed under Section 4 (a) of 
ITA 1967 as business income and are not subject to RPGT at the disposal stage of 
the property.  The absence of an express provision pertaining to the issue of RPGT in 
relation to the BBA financial contract exposes a lack of fair competition with the 
conventional financial product because the latter is less costly than an Islamic financial 
contract of BBA. 
 
(iii)  Stamp Duty Tax 
Stamp duty is a tax levied on legal, commercial and financial instruments specified in 
the First Schedule of the Stamp Duty Act 1949 (SD 1949).  In promoting the usage of 
Islamic financial instruments, Malaysian regulators have made Stamp Duty 
exemptions under the Stamp Duty (Exemption) Orders 2000, 2002 and 2004. 
 
In 2000, for instance, an exemption from stamp duty is granted on all instruments that 
involve ‘the Asset Sale Agreement or the Asset Purchase Agreement executed 
between a customer and a bank made under the principles of Sharia law for the 
purpose of renewing any Islamic overdraft financing facility with the condition that the 
                                                 
682 Ibid. 
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Islamic overdraft financing facility have been duly stamped.’683  In another example, 
Stamp Duty (Exemption) (No.3) Order 2004 provides exemption to all types of financial 
instruments, conventional or Islamic, relating to the ‘purchase of property for the 
purpose of lease back under the principles of the Sharia or under a principle sale and 
purchase agreement by which the financier assumes the contractual obligation of 
customer.’684  This legislative amendment was in force in 2003.  Such regulatory 
accommodations demonstrate that the element of formal and substantive equality 
between institutions and transactions are applied by the Malaysian regulators.  
Moreover, it can be inferred that the clarity in the existing law promotes the usage of 
Islamic financial transactions in the country as well as fair competition between the 
two types of financial services.  
 
In 2002, legislative amendments were made to produce fair treatment for all banking 
and financial institutions.  In particular, tax exemption on stamp duty for the issuance 
of credit cards is granted by the Malaysian regulator.  This reflects formal and 
substantive equality at the institutional and transactional level.  Under Stamp duty 
(Exemption) (No.38) Order 2002, the Order provides: 
“the exemption of stamp duty on all instruments of the Bai Inah Sale Agreement or the 
Bai Inah Purchase Agreement executed between a customer and a financial institution 
made under the principles of the Sharia law for the purpose of the issuance of credit 
cards. 
For the purpose of this Order: 
‘a financial institution’ means any financial institution licensed under: 
(i) the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 1989; 
                                                 
683 Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Tax Treatment, Stamp Duty (Exemption) (No.9) Order 2000  
684 Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Tax Treatment, Stamp Duty (Exemption) (No.3) Order 2003 
311 
 
(ii) the Islamic Banking Act 1983; 
(iii) development financial institutions supervised under Section 2 of the 
Development Financial Act 2002; or 
any institution approved by Bank Negara Malaysia.” 
 
From the above regulatory accommodation, it can be suggested that the stamp duty 
taxation regulation governing Islamic financial transactions provides a fair opportunity 
for the Islamic financial and conventional financial sectors to compete. Moreover, the 
fact that the calculation of Stamp duty is imposed on ad valorem685 rates for 
conventional and Islamic financial transactions represents equal treatment at the 
formal and substantive level. 
 
4.3 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed the regulatory framework for Islamic banks in Malaysia 
and analysed the level-playing field in the dual regulatory framework.  From the 
analysis above, it can be concluded that the dual regulatory framework governing 
Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia represents a clear effort by the 
government and the regulators to promote a level-playing field between both banking 
sectors.  While both countries have the idea of treating all banking and financial 
services institutions on a level-playing field, a different approach in the regulatory 
accommodation for Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia has been adopted.  The UK 
regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks is seen to have a reactive approach, 
whereas the Malaysian practice is a more proactive approach.  A number of 
similarities, however, were identified in the regulatory accommodation of both 
                                                 
685 Ad Valorem – according to the value of the property  
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countries as well as in practice.  These include the regulatory accommodation on 
taxation and judicial interpretation / treatment on Islamic financial cases.  
 
In the existing dual regulatory framework, the regulation pertaining to authorisation of 
Islamic banks is seen as providing a fairer system for the banks. The deposit insurance 
scheme under MDIC which separates the conventional and Islamic pooled funds 
promotes transparency, market confidence and Sharia-compliance of investment. This 
approach is, however, not yet being implemented in the UK. With regards to Sharia 
supervision, the specific regulations on ‘Fit and Competent’ requirement were made 
to tailor to the nature of Islamic banking operation. It can be inferred that the specific 
requirements that were established could help Islamic banks to operate in sound 
corporate governance. Such requirements for Islamic banks’ corporate governance 
are regarded as crucial to minimise the operational risk and legal risk. Such a 
framework is also not being implemented in the UK. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the ‘Fit and Proper’ requirement in the UK is made to all banks and there is 
no additional requirement which suits the nature of Islamic banks’ nature.  
 
With regards to the Islamic financial disputes before the Malaysian courts, the dual 
regulatory framework is rather unique. It has been shown earlier that Islamic banks 
are governed by a separate regulatory accommodation. In principle, the NSAC is given 
the liberty to decide on disputes governing Islamic banks but the Malaysian courts are 
reluctant to admit such empowerment given by the CBA 2009 as the practice of the 
English common law is favoured. The judicial decision to decide on the prevailing law 
is very much depend on the judges’ discretion. The question on conflicts of law is also 
another issue at the substantive level. In reality, the reference to the NSAC rulings by 
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the Malaysian courts is therefore limited. Such a reality therefore creates a lack of 
standardisation in the Malaysian judiciary system and leads to regulatory uncertainty 
pertaining to the Islamic financial disputes.  While in form, the dual regulatory 
framework represents a contrasting approach with the UK regulatory framework, in 
reality, the approach to deal with the Islamic financial cases is the same. Nevertheless, 
the Malaysian regulatory framework is a step ahead than the UK with regards to the 
NSAC. There has been an attempt by the Islamic financial sector in the UK to establish 
an NSAC, however, thus far there has not been any news to confirm its establishment.  
 
In respect of the legal accommodation for Sharia-compliant liquidity management 
regulation, the separate legal accommodation for Islamic banks in the interbank 
money market has, in form, shown a level-playing field. Nevertheless, there is interest-
rate risk, arbitrage risk and Sharia-compliance risk in the IIMM that result from the 
mixed investment by conventional banks. Such a problem is seen to be slightly 
different than the problems of Islamic banks in the UK. As mentioned earlier, the fact 
that there is limited interbank investment for Islamic banks in the UK, the banks have 
been suffering from liquidity risk. Both situations have therefore led to the conclusion 
that further improvements toward a level-playing field can be made. Specifically, in the 
UK, the limited Sharia compliant liquid asset investments for Islamic banks has 
exposed the banks to liquidity risk, whereas the separate regulatory accommodation 
for Islamic banks in Malaysia has provided better liquidity management alternatives 
for Islamic banks but questions remain over whether the overall outcome is Sharia-
compliant in nature. With respect to regulatory accommodation in the area of taxation, 
it can be inferred that there is a level-playing field for Islamic banks to compete fairly 
with the conventional banks – similar to the UK practice.  
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The Malaysian regulators’ focus is geared more toward providing a dual regulatory 
framework for every aspect contained in the conventional regulatory framework.  Less 
substantive compromises are, therefore, observed in the Malaysian regulatory 
framework.  On the other hand, the UK’s single regulatory framework for all banking 
and financial services institutions has resulted in more substantive compromises for 
Islamic banks while meeting formal equality requirements, thereby leading to a lack of 
opportunity to compete. While it can be inferred that the dual-regulatory framework 
provides a better level-playing field, it must be said that the regulators have not 
enabled a complete level-playing field due to the fact that there is still substantive 
compromises that has to be made by Islamic banks. Hence, if a complete level-playing 
field cannot be achieved and there are substantive issues that require certain 
compromises on the part of Islamic banks, both in single or dual regulatory 
frameworks, the question is whether there should be more regulation for Islamic 
banks? As the comparisons on the regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks in the 
UK and Malaysia have been highlighted and analysed, the next section examines the 
rationale of regulating Islamic banks and question whether Islamic banks should be 
given more regulation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD AND THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS 
FOR ISLAMIC BANKS  
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
5.2  LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS AND THE IMPACT OF 
REGULATIONS FOR ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
5.2.1   CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE REGULATIONS HAVE CHANGED ISLAMIC       
BANKS  
(i) Capital Certainty Requirement  
(ii) Sukuk  
(iii)Taxation 
(iv)Sharia-compliant Liquid Assets  
 
5.2.2 CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE NO REGULATION HAS CHANGED FOR 
ISLAMIC BANKS AND NO IMPACT TO LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD 
(i)  Sharia Supervision  
(ii) Islamic Finance before the English courts  
 
5.2.3 CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE NO REGULATION HAS CHANGED FOR 
ISLAMIC BANKS AND LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD REGULATIONS LESS 
EFFECTIVE 
(i) Diminishing Musharaka Home Purchase Plan  
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The preceding chapters have examined the regulatory accommodation for Islamic 
banks in the UK and Malaysia and the extent of which the regulators have enabled 
level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks.  It was found that the UK and 
Malaysian approaches to accommodate Islamic banks in their regulatory frameworks 
differ although the regulators of both states have always believed that Islamic banks 
should be treated on a level-playing field basis.  As the earlier chapters have argued, 
however, despite the regulators’ desire to create a level-playing field between Islamic 
and conventional banks, the concept of level-playing field regulations has never been 
clear.  In other words, the concept of level-playing field regulations was never at the 
forefront of the regulators’ minds when drawing up regulations for Islamic banks.  As 
a result, in some cases level-playing field regulations may even be ineffective, while 
in other cases it may be effective.  
 
This chapter examines the extent to which the existing regulatory accommodation fits 
with the concept of level-playing field regulations.  This chapter proceeds by 
considering examples, which give rise to three criteria: (i) under the level-playing field 
regulations, specific regulatory accommodations have changed for Islamic banks 
resulting in an effective level-playing field, (ii) no regulations have changed for Islamic 
banks resulting in no impact on the level-playing field, (iii) no regulations have changed 
for Islamic banking resulting in less effective level-playing-field regulations.   
 
Note that in this chapter, heavy reference is made to the UK practice.  As the previous 
chapters have shown, the regulations for Islamic banks in the UK are based on the 
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conventional regulatory framework.  There are, therefore, more issues are found within 
UK practice.  Reference to Malaysian practice is made when relevant.  This is due to 
the fact that in light of the dual regulatory framework, there are regulatory 
accommodations for almost every aspect of Islamic banking operations and therefore, 
fewer issues arise.  The final section contains the conclusions.  
 
5.2   LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD AND THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS FOR ISLAMIC 
BANKS  
 
5.2.1 Circumstances where regulations have changed Islamic banks – 
effective level-playing field 
This section provides three examples where regulations have changed for Islamic 
banks and resulted in an effective level-playing field.  These are: capital certainty 
requirements, regulations on Sukuk and regulations on taxation.   
 
(i)  Capital Certainty Requirement 
In Chapter 3, it was mentioned that the regulation under the Regulated Activities 
Order (RAO) obliged banking institutions including Islamic banks to have capital 
certainty.  As has been discussed earlier, the capital certainty requirement is 
contradictory to the original practice of Islamic banks which rely on PLS modes, 
therefore, the profit stabilisation reserve (PSR) has been established for Islamic 
banks to guarantee the deposit repayment for the depositors.686  In this regard, the 
regulatory accommodation has allowed Islamic banks to operate on a level-playing 
                                                 
686 As mentioned in chapter 3, PSR is aimed to smooth the volatility in the profit payments that are 
provided by the bank. 
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field with their conventional counterparts, although such accommodation is 
conflicting with profit-loss-sharing principles (as argued earlier, there are 
substantive compromises on the part of Islamic banks). The regulatory 
accommodation is seen to fit with the objective of banking regulation, which is 
mainly to protect bank depositors. Therefore, while such regulatory accommodation 
which is viewed earlier to be conflicting with PLS principles, it may have changed 
the original nature of Islamic banking. It is arguably for a positive purpose - to protect 
the depositors. 
 
(ii) Sukuk 
For Islamic investment banks, the changes to tax laws certainly aided the 
development of the Sukuk market where, as a consequence, they are able to 
replicate the treasury operations of their conventional counterparts.687  Without the 
changes in the tax laws, issuing Sukuk would not have been feasible because of the 
prohibitively high costs of taxation.  Islamic investment banks would not, therefore, 
have been able to adequately manage their short-term liquidity because, unlike 
conventional financial institutions, Islamic investment banks are prohibited from 
investing in interest-bearing conventional treasury securities (e.g. bond instruments).   
 
The legislative amendments in the UK were explicitly designed for the issuance of 
Sukuk that have economic equivalence to debt, not economic equivalence to equity.  
[This can also be observed from the terminology chosen by the UK tax authorities 
whereby the type of Sukuk  receiving these taxable benefits comes under the definition 
of an alternative type of ‘bond’ (i.e. Alternative Finance Investment Bond)].  The result 
                                                 
687 HM Treasury, ‘Government Sterling Sukuk Issuance: A consultation’, ( November 2007), p.8 
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of this is that – in order to benefit from the favourable tax environment – Sukuk have 
been structured in such a way that they are no longer ‘asset-backed’, but rather, they 
are designed to replicate the structure of a conventional bond.  Such structures have 
come to be known as ‘asset-based’ Sukuk.   
Sukuk al-Ijara 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1       Source: Author’s own 
As can be observed from the Sukuk al-Ijara structure above, the proceeds collected 
from the investors is used to purchase an asset and the investors become owners of 
the asset.  Income (in this case, rental payments from the lease) is ultimately derived 
from the use of the asset.  Furthermore, at maturity, the asset can then be sold to 
another party and the purchase price would be distributed to the investors according 
to their share in the Sukuk.  Essentially, this sale price is not to be pre-determined and 
fixed, but rather the price would be agreed at the end of the lease and should reflect 
market conditions prevailing at that time.   
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Following from this example, it should be clear that in the case of Sukuk the income 
stream is derived from the cash-flow generated by use of the asset688.  Sukuk are, 
therefore, distinct from bonds, which, by contrast, have their income stream secured 
by a pre-agreed interest-payments schedule, which involves no asset.  By definition, 
Sukuk are ‘asset-backed’ equity investments, whereas bonds are designed as ‘asset-
less’ debt instruments.  Rather than allowing Sukuk investors to hold an equity stake 
in the asset, ‘asset-based’ Sukuk are structured so that the title of the asset is never 
transferred to the investors.  Rather, the ‘asset-based’ Sukuk involves a purchase 
undertaking in the form of a unilateral promise (w’ad) by the obligor to pay an amount 
equal to the principal.  Moreover, the ‘asset-based’ Sukuk is structured so that the 
‘sale’ of the underlying asset at maturity can only be made to the originator and not 
any third party.  As a result, the obligor retains a hold on the asset while the principal 
amount paid at maturity is fixed and guaranteed.  
 
Therefore, there is no true sale or use of an asset but rather income is generated 
through the transfer of financial rights via debt obligations689.  Thus, the economic 
characteristics of the ‘asset-based’ Sukuk are identical to a debt-based conventional 
bond.  As stated earlier, however, the key feature of genuine Sukuk is that income is 
to be derived through the performance of the underlying asset.  Despite this, from an 
investor’s perspective, the risk and return of the ‘asset-based’ Sukuk is based on the 
                                                 
688 Jhordy Kashoogie Nazar, ‘Regulatory and Financial Implications of Sukuk’s Legal Challenges for 
Sustainable Sukuk Development in Islamic Capital Market’, (2011), 8th International Conference on 
Islamic Economics and Finance Research Paper, p.5 
689 Razi Pahlavi Abdul Aziz and Anne-Sophie Gintzburger, ‘Equity-Based, Asset-Based and Asset-
Backed Transactional Structures’, (2009), p.276 
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creditworthiness of the obligor to pay the promised amount and, consequently, the risk 
and return have no relation to the economic performance of the asset. 
 
Therefore, the regulatory amendments that have successfully created a level-playing 
field between Sukuk and the bond market have inadvertently created a conflict with 
the Sukuk market and the objectives of Shariah and Islamic finance.  The level-playing 
field encouraged the development of the Sukuk market into an alternative bond market 
with a debt-based, fixed-return structure; whereas the objective of Sharia is to promote 
Sukuk as an equity investment instrument where investors own and derive their 
returns from an underlying asset.  
 
(iii) Taxation 
In regards to taxation, the UK’s regulatory authorities have made several legislative 
changes in the Finance Acts.690 The legislative changes are made to accommodate 
the issues on double-taxation, in particular, the Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) 
accrued on Islamic mortgages – as opposed to the conventional mortgages where 
there is no issue of double-taxation.  The existing law has, therefore, demonstrated 
that the regulators have enabled level-playing field regulations between Islamic 
banking mortgages and conventional banking mortgages.  
 
(iv) Sharia-compliant Liquid Assets   
In the third chapter, it was highlighted that the recent regulatory accommodation 
which enables Islamic banks to purchase a lower asset quality has indeed changed 
liquidity management for Islamic banks to a better level.  The regulations have to 
                                                 
690 Finance Acts 2003,2005,2007 
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some extent created a better future for the sustainability of Islamic banks.  One may 
argue, however, that the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks (when they 
can purchase a lower quality of asset) can cause a lack of level-playing field on the 
part of the conventional banks. 
 
5.2.2 Circumstances where no regulations have changed for Islamic banks – 
no impact to level-playing field  
This section highlights the examples of where no conventional regulations have 
changed for Islamic banks giving rise to no impact to the level-playing field.  These 
are: Sharia supervision and Islamic financial disputes before the English courts.   
 
(i) Sharia supervision  
As mentioned in the earlier chapter, there is an absence of regulation in regards to 
the Sharia supervision process in the UK.  The absence of regulation is an indication 
that the regulatory authorities have enabled level-playing field regulations in relation 
to all financial services in the UK.  It can be argued that the absence of regulation 
for the Sharia scholar or Sharia advisor of an Islamic bank does not have any impact 
on the concept of creating level-playing field regulations.  Moreover, there is no 
reported data which shows that the absence of regulation on the competency of 
Sharia scholars would affect the consumers’ confidence that leads to a lack of fair 
competition.   
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(ii) Islamic finance disputes before the English courts  
With regards to the settlement of Islamic financial disputes before the English courts, 
it is argued that the adoption of the English common law for these disputes could 
not possibly have any impact on achieving the objective of a level-playing field.   
 
5.2.3 Circumstance where no regulation has changed for Islamic banks –the 
level-playing field regulations less effective 
 
This section describes an example where no regulations have changed for Islamic 
banks and the level-playing field regulation is seen to be less effective.  
 
(i) Diminishing Musharaka HPP 
As discussed in the previous chapter on the regulatory framework in the UK, it was 
observed that a Diminishing Musharaka (DM) model is used to offer Home Purchase 
Plan (HPP) products to customers as an alternative to conventional home mortgage 
financing.  Because conventional financing arrangements are based on debt, they are 
intrinsically distinct from the application of DM, which is intended to be based on equity.  
 
According to the ideals of Islamic finance, DM should operate on the basis that 
ownership of an asset/property is shared (i.e. between an Islamic bank and a client) 
and, subsequently, one party (i.e. the client) purchases shares of the asset/property 
from the other party (i.e. the Islamic bank) until all the shares have been purchased 
and one party (i.e. the client) becomes the sole owner691. In practice, however, Islamic 
                                                 
691 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, (2002), p. 57  
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banks have chosen to incorporate a number of arrangements in addition to the DM 
agreement, such as an Ijarah (i.e. leasing) contract, which generates rental payments 
(akin to interest payments).692 Although such arrangements are permissible according 
to Sharia when each contract is viewed in isolation, the final structure of the HPP 
product is such that it no longer operates on an equity basis but rather it is structured 
to largely to mimic the debt-based conventional financing arrangements.693    
 
The UK regulators effectively encouraged this distortion of the DM HPP by amending 
tax laws, which ensured that DM transactions in Islamic finance were treated the same 
as conventional loan financing arrangements.  In this regard, Her Majesty Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC) explained the new treatment of DM transactions: 
“a customer and a financial institution contribute to jointly acquire an asset.  The 
customer makes a series of capital payments to the financial institution to acquire that 
institution’s interest in the asset.  The customer makes other payments, a ‘return’ to 
the institution in addition to the amount paid to acquire the institution’s interest - these 
other payments represent an amount equivalent to the commercial rate of interest on 
a conventional loan… under the new rules from 22 March 2006 the ‘return’ is taxed as 
if it were interest.”694 
 
Based on the above regulatory treatment, the level-playing field regulations 
encouraged the development of a DM HPP model that goes contrary to the inherent 
nature of Islamic finance; a model based on debt and a cash-flow that mimics interest 
                                                 
692 Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, ‘PERG 14: Guidance on Home Reversion and Home 
Purchase Plans’ via <www.handbook.fca.org.uk> accessed: 1 September 2015 
693 Ibid. 
694 HMRC, ‘The Benefits Code: Beneficial Loans: Alternative Finance Arrangements; Islamic Finance’, 
via <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/eimanual/eim26515.htm> accessed: 6 August 2015 
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payments.  The regulatory amendments have not, therefore, been sufficient to create 
an environment that enables the full application of DM based on equity-based 
ownership of a property.  Furthermore, repeated bank failures have pushed regulators 
towards discouraging retail banks from undertaking direct equity investments.  For 
example, the approach of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which is 
responsible for supervising Islamic banks in the UK, can further discourage Islamic 
banks from partaking in equity-based Musharaka transactions.  The PRA publish in 
their Approach to Banking Supervision that,  
“The PRA examines the threats to the viability of a firm’s business model…  The 
analysis includes an assessment of where and how a firm makes money, the risks 
it takes in so doing, and how it funds itself.”695 
 
In the absence of any regulatory accommodation to enable Islamic banks to offer 
equity-based HPP products, the underlying substance of HPP products offered by 
Islamic banks are no different to debt-based conventional financing arrangements.  As 
a result, the essential elements of a DM transaction, such as assuming risks relating 
to the asset are not satisfied.  In this regard, Ka & Ng state: 
“the form and substance of Islamic products must be consistent with each other.  
Nevertheless, the form of partnership here does not serve the substance of 
financing.  As an unequal playing field will be created, effect is given to the form 
over substance… Here, an economic benefit shapes the legal landscape, and not 
vice versa.”696  
 
                                                 
695 Bank of England, ‘The Prudential Regulatory Authority’s Approach to Banking Supervision’, (June, 
2014), p.17  
696 Adam Ng Boon Ka,  (2009) ‘Shari’ah and Legal Issues of Musharakah Mutanaqisah’, NewHorizon, 
Issue 173, p.47 
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Following this, it is apparent that better regulations are needed to enable a DM HPP 
product that is true in both its legal form and economic substance according to the 
objectives of Sharia and Islamic finance.  Moreover, it can be argued that due to the 
discouragement of equity investments, retail banks’ participation in various other 
applications of Musharaka is also negatively affected.  This further impedes the 
opportunity for Islamic retail banks to realise the higher objectives of Islamic finance.  
On the other hand, one may also argue that while the regulatory framework may 
impede Islamic banks in achieving the objectives of Sharia, in reality; Islamic banks 
are probably not ready to accept losses under the PLS modes.  While Islamic banks 
have to make substantive compromises to fit into the existing regulatory 
accommodation, it can be argued that the regulatory framework for Islamic banks with 
regards to HPP is indeed promoting a level-playing field.  
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
The previous two chapters have shown that UK and Malaysian regulators have not 
enabled the level-playing field regulations in totality within the conventional regulatory 
framework (UK) and dual regulatory framework (Malaysia).  It was also found that 
Islamic banks in the UK were governed by simple regulations under the conventional 
regulatory framework, whereas in Malaysia, more regulation is established for Islamic 
banks within their dual regulatory framework.  In the system of both countries, the 
level-playing field regulations have led to the establishment of several criteria and have 
resulted in notable impacts on Islamic banks.  The first section of this chapter has 
categorised three notable results arising from the three criteria. – (i) specific regulatory 
accommodations for Islamic banks have produced  effective level-playing field 
regulations (ii) the absence of specific regulations for Islamic banks has resulted in 
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there being no impact on level-playing-field regulations (iii)  the absence of specific 
regulation has prevented Islamic banks from fulfilling Sharia requirements, making 
level-playing-field regulation less effective.  
 
Under the first criteria, it is found that the regulations for Islamic banks with regards to 
capital certainty requirements, Sukuk and the abolition of double taxation have 
resulted in an effective level-playing field.  Under the second criteria, it is found that 
the absence of regulations pertaining to Sharia supervision of Islamic banks and the 
approach of the regulators pertaining to Islamic financial disputes (where the common 
law system applied) do not produce any impact on the level-playing field. With regards 
to the third criteria, Islamic financial contracts such as Diminishing Musharaka Home 
Purchase Plan (HPP) have shown that the absence of regulations does not allow 
Islamic banks to fulfil their Sharia ideals, hence making the level-playing-field 
regulations less effective(in the sense  that equality at the substantive level is 
compromised).  It was, however, mentioned in this chapter, that PLS modes of 
transaction have only been practiced on a small scale. One may argue, therefore, that 
the existing level-playing-field regulations do not change any aspect of Islamic banking 
practice. On another hand, one may also argue that the absence of regulations has 
not allowed Islamic banks to realise their theoretical nature (the PLS modes). Finally, 
it can also be inferred that from the analysis of the impact of level-playing field 
regulations and the Islamic finance ideals, the regulators have not enabled absolutely 
level-playing-field regulations for Islamic banks and ultimately, the concept of the level-
playing-field regulations for Islamic banks are not workable.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION  
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
6.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS  
6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.5 FINAL REMARKS  
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This research was principally designed to analyse the level-playing field regulations 
governing Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia. The main objective of this research 
was to examine the extent to which the regulatory accommodation governing Islamic 
banks in the UK and Malaysia reflects the notion of level-playing field regulations. This 
research was also conducted to analyse the areas within the level-playing field 
regulations which exposes Islamic banks to risks. In light of these objectives, several 
other subsidiary objectives that were aimed by this research which includes: analysing 
whether the regulators have enabled the level-playing field regulations in the UK and 
Malaysia, whether the level-playing field regulations is indeed a useful concept, 
analysing the extent to which the regulators have reconciled the level-playing field 
regulations within the existing complexities and uncertainties in the financial system 
as well as examines the need of more banking regulations for Islamic banks in light of 
the objectives of banking regulations.  
 
In achieving the principal and subsidiary objectives, this thesis has developed  test 
questions which allows the research to reach its findings which comprises of (i) 
whether Islamic banks are treated equally before the law (formal equality and 
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substantive equality) and (ii) whether Islamic banks are given a fair opportunity to 
compete alongside the conventional banks. In reaching the ultimate conclusion of this 
chapter, an extended question was used apart from the two test questions above. As 
mentioned in chapter one of this research (Section 1.6), the test question of whether 
the playing field is level, is by asking when the level-playing field is seen to be distorted 
(in this regard, whether the outcome depicts an obvious negative outcome and not a 
mere negative outcome).  
 
This research is believed to be the first of its kind in the subject of Islamic banking for 
three main reasons. Firstly, it has been as argued in the first chapter that while there 
are number of literatures which have suggested that Islamic banks should be treated 
on a level-playing field and the regulators are expected to provide the level-playing 
field regulations, nevertheless, there is no literature which has identified the elements 
that can be constituted as level-playing field regulations. Secondly, there is an 
absence of extensive research which has talked about the challenges, realities, and 
the objective of banking regulations which is seen to coincide with the notion of level-
playing field regulations. Thirdly, this research has provided an analysis of these 
criteria using the theory as well as the comparative law method. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no literature which has made an analysis of the level-playing field 
regulations by using comparative law methodology.  
 
6.2  RESEARCH FINDINGS  
This research has set out that the regulatory architecture for level-playing field 
regulations governing Islamic banks between Malaysia and the UK differs where the 
former established dual-regulatory framework whereas the latter’s approach is treating 
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all the banking institutions in the single framework (conventional). Returning to the 
questions posed in this research, the following paragraphs provide the findings that 
can be drawn from the present research:  
 
This research has found that generally, the UK approach with regards to the level-
playing field regulations is more reactive as opposed to the Malaysian approach which 
is more proactive. It can be inferred that in term of success in providing the level-
playing field regulation, the analysis drawn from this research has shown that 
Malaysian approach is more successful than the UK approach as there is less 
substantive compromises on the part of Islamic banks to serve the element of formal 
equality. On the other hand, the UK conventional regulatory framework has led Islamic 
banks to have more substantive compromises. Despite this outcome, this research 
does not suggest that the Malaysian model should be followed by the UK regulators.  
 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that the regulators in 
the UK and Malaysia have not enabled the level-playing field regulations in totality for 
Islamic banks (in totality in the sense that the idea of level-playing field should 
represent fairness as a whole within the financial sector, and not in some aspect of the 
regulations). While on the one hand, some regulatory accommodation is seen to reflect 
that there is a level-playing field, however, in most cases level-playing field regulations 
has not been effective. These arguments can be supported with the implications 
provided in the following paragraphs on the impacts of the level-playing field 
regulations. The results of investigating the level-playing field regulations show that 
there are three notable impacts deriving from the legal accommodations to Islamic 
331 
 
banks.697 These are: positive impact, negative impact (in the sense that level-playing 
field is less effective), neutral impact. We now begin with the UK level-playing field 
regulations.  
 
In the UK, the finding suggests that the positive impact of the level-playing field 
regulations can inferred from the regulatory accommodation on Sukuk, the regulatory 
decision making process, taxation, Sharia compliant liquid assets regulations and 
capital certainty requirements. The Sukuk listing requirement (if it is a public debt) has 
resulted to regulatory standardisation and transparency in the level-playing field 
regulations. It is also found that this regulation could minimise regulatory arbitrage.  
 
For taxation, the regulatory accommodation that abolished the double taxation also 
creates a positive impact of level-playing field regulations. The recent regulatory 
accommodation on Sharia-compliant liquid assets regulation has enable a positive 
impact of level-playing field regulations on the part of Islamic banks, however, it was 
argued in chapter three that this regulatory accommodation may be regarded as lack 
of level-playing field on the part of the conventional banks due to the fact that Islamic 
banks can purchase lower quality of assets. In other words, from the perspective of 
conventional banks, it can be argued that the latter is disadvantaged for there is 
inequality at the substantive level when Islamic banks are given the privilege to 
                                                 
697 Note that the findings provided in this section can arguably be said to be similar with the discussion 
in chapter five, however, the emphasis provided is slightly differ in dimension. Chapter five provided a 
more detailed discussion on the impact of the regulations to Islamic banks and its ideals as well as the 
effectiveness of the level-playing regulations, whereas the current section provides the results on the 
impact of the regulatory accommodation based on the level-playing field regulations as well as the focus 
on treating Islamic banks on a level-playing field.  
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purchase the lower quality of assets whereas the conventional banks were not entitled 
to.  
 
The examination of this research has also found that the capital certainty requirements 
provide a positive impact deriving from the level-playing field regulations. The analysis 
has found that while there is the question of conflicting with the profit-loss sharing 
principles (and Islamic banks have to make substantive compromise), nevertheless, 
this research has found that the regulatory accommodation leads to a level-playing 
field between Islamic banks and the conventional banks. Therefore, while the 
rudimentary principle of Islamic finance is based on profit-loss sharing contract where 
the latter represents a significant trademark of the Islamic financial sector, 
nevertheless, the dominating conventional financial system has a bigger influence 
over other financial forms of finance.   
 
Pertaining to the negative impacts, there are five aspects, which have been extracted 
from the research analysis. These include: Sukuk, Sharia supervision, Home 
Purchase Plan, and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme.  
 
For the regulatory treatment of Sukuk, in the case where the economic outcome of 
Sukuk is similar to the conventional bonds, no separate regulatory accommodation is 
provided by the UK regulators. It has been argued earlier that in the case where the 
regulators understand the Sukuk products fully and the matching conventional bonds, 
it can be assumed that there is no arising issues. However, there may be regulatory 
issues if the nature of a particular Sukuk is not understood fully or being misunderstood 
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by the regulators. Arguably, such regulatory issues would also arise in the case of new 
financial innovative products from the conventional financial sector.  
 
Another negative impact to the existing level-playing field regulations is concerning the 
Home Purchase Plan regulations whereby the content of the regulations and the 
practice indicate a different contextual meaning. However, it has been argued in 
chapter three that the lack of clarity of the regulation could only affect the legal context 
but not the economic justification.  
 
Finally, the level-playing field regulations on the Deposit Guarantee Scheme have led 
the UK Islamic banks to make substantive compromises which results to inequality at 
the substantive level. The implication of this is that the funds are intermingling with the 
conventional funds hence resulted to non-Sharia compliance investment and this has 
created a negative outcome from the level-playing field regulations. As a 
consequence, there is the non-Sharia compliance risk and reputational risks as Islamic 
banks are unable to implement the Islamic financial model. 
 
Pertaining to Sharia supervision, as highlighted earlier, there is no specific regulatory 
accommodation on Sharia supervisory board or supervisor for Islamic banks. The 
element of formal equality shows that Islamic banks are free to place any Sharia 
supervisor which they prefer and this may possibly lead to a lack of product quality 
control and may also exposes Islamic banks to legal risk when there is no minimum 
requirement provided by the regulators. This can be evidenced from the Sharia-
compliant disputes that were brought before the court of law. However, one may argue 
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that the absence regulations for Sharia supervision do not pose any impact to the 
question of level-playing field.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of this research has found that the English courts’ treatment 
towards Islamic financial disputes results to a neutral impact relating to the context of 
treating Islamic banks on a level-playing field. There is no clear evidence to prove that 
the courts’ treatment could result to a lack of level-playing field for Islamic banks. The 
element of the level-playing field regulations (in particular, the fair opportunity for 
Islamic banks to compete) cannot be seen to relate with the issue regarding the courts’ 
treatment on the Islamic financial disputes. The evidence suggests that treating 
Islamic banking under the common law principles is not problematic since the court 
has the means to call expert witnesses on Sharia issues to testify the authenticity of 
the Sharia contract. Ultimately, the earlier paragraph have stated that the level-playing 
field regulations which do not provide specific regulatory requirement for Sharia 
Supervisory Board or a Sharia supervisor do not seem to provide any impact to the 
question of treating Islamic banks on a level-playing field. 
 
We now move on the conclusive analysis on the Malaysian level-playing field 
regulations. This research has found that generally, the regulatory accommodation for 
Islamic banks is proven to be more positive than the UK in the sense that there are 
less substantive compromises to meet the formal equality requirement. One of the 
reasons could be that, as argued before, the Malaysian regulators took the proactive 
approach for the regulations of Islamic banks. Another reason that this research has 
inferred is the greater government’s interest to establish Malaysian as the international 
hub for Islamic financial sector. This is not to mean that the UK’s government has 
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lesser interest (in fact, the UK government has the same vision to be the international 
hub for Islamic finance), however, the reality is that the making of regulation is also 
influenced by several other factors such as the political-social-economical interest (this 
factor is discussed in chapter two (2.3.2 (v) of this research). This discussion in chapter 
two have also talked about the societal background of Malaysia which is dominated 
by Muslims, and the government’s support on Islamic finance somehow reflects the 
encouragement for Modern Muslim society , and to pursue the Vision 2020 objectives. 
It has also been argued earlier that the greater support of the Malaysian government 
towards the Islamic financial sector is to represent the national identity.  In chapter 
four, it has been highlighted that the Central Bank Act 2009 only indicates the 
obligation of the Central Bank of Malaysia to promote the Islamic financial services 
sector and does not impose such obligation for the conventional financial sector 
because there is an absence of such a provision indicating the same obligation for the 
CBM to promote the conventional financial services sector. As a result, it can be 
inferred that the conventional financial sector is rather disadvantaged. 
 
The positive impact of the level-playing regulations in Malaysia is on the regulations 
pertaining to the authorisation of Islamic banks. The separate establishment for Islamic 
deposit insurance scheme has helped Islamic banks to invest the depositors’ fund in 
a Sharia-compliant way. This research has argued that the separate Islamic deposit 
insurance scheme established under the Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(MDIC) is seen to be a fairer system for Islamic banking sector and promotes 
transparency and market confidence to the depositors for the Sharia-compliant 
investment.  This approach has been argued as a better approach than the UK system 
where it contained all of the elements for the level-playing field regulations (equality 
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before the law and fair opportunity for Islamic banks to compete). However, it was also 
opined that the separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme as in Malaysia is partly 
due to the bigger size of the Islamic banking market compared to the UK. Malaysia 
has more retail Islamic banks as opposed to the UK where it has only one fully fledged 
Islamic bank. Moreover, it can also be assumed that the UK regulators feels that there 
is no such need due to their clear statement on level-playing field regulations, which 
is ‘no obstacles, but no special favours’.698 Therefore, it may be unfeasible for the UK 
to implement such approach; however, it is not an impossible one. Nevertheless, there 
is no supporting data to show the reasoning behind the lack of interest of the UK 
regulators to establish a separate Islamic deposit guarantee scheme.  
 
Another positive impact of the level-playing field regulations in Malaysia is the 
regulatory accommodation on taxation. Similar to the finding in the UK on the 
abolishment of double taxation, the regulatory accommodation is seen to create a fair 
opportunity for Islamic banks to compete with the conventional banks.  
 
With regards to Sharia supervision, this research has found that the level-playing field 
regulations in Malaysia have created a positive impact to Islamic banks where there 
is the minimum requirement in terms of the eligibility criteria of a Sharia scholar and 
Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB). The implication to this is that Islamic banks could 
have better corporate governance as well as minimising operational risk and legal risk 
(in terms of product quality control). This resulted to a more positive impact arising 
from the dual-regulatory framework. However, as argued in the UK context earlier, the 
                                                 
698 Michael Ainley, Ali Mashayeki, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman and Ali Ravalia, ‘Islamic Finance 
in the UK: Regulation and Challenges’, (2008),p.13  
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regulatory accommodation for Sharia supervision can also be said to produce a neutral 
impact to the question of treating Islamic banks on a level-playing field. This is because 
there is no direct link to the elements of level-playing field (equality before the law and 
the fair opportunity to compete).   
 
Another neutral impact that could be inferred from the level-playing field regulations in 
Malaysia is in regards to the Islamic financial disputes. As discussed in chapter four, 
while there is the establishment of the National Sharia Advisory Council (NSAC) to 
decide on disputes on matters governing Islamic banks, the Malaysian courts seem 
reluctant to admit such empowerment given to the NSAC. While there is also 
Muamalat Division (Commercial Division) established in Malaysian court, however, it 
was highlighted that not all Malaysian courts has such specific division. As such, in 
most of the States in Malaysia, Islamic banking cases are brought before the 
commercial division (of a civil court) which is not specifically hear Islamic banking 
cases only, but also hear conventional banking cases. It was also highlighted in 
chapter four that there were lack of standardisation pertaining to the Islamic financial 
disputes as the Civil court judges prefer that their jurisdictional power is not interfered, 
and the English common law is a preferred approach. This research has also 
suggested that the establishment of the similar type of NSAC in the UK. Nonetheless, 
this research found that this issue resulted to a neutral impact to the question of level-
playing field. This is because, there is no clear relevance to the elements of the level-
playing field regulations (in particular, fair opportunity for Islamic banks to compete).  
 
One negative impact that this research has found from the Malaysian level-playing 
field regulations is relating to the liquidity management regulation. As have been 
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analysed in chapter four, the separate regulatory accommodation for the Islamic inter-
bank money market is in form has shown that it represents the level-playing field 
regulations. However, in substance, the conventional banks were allowed to invest in 
the Islamic Interbank Money Market hence the outcome of the whole investment in the 
IIMM may lead to a non-Sharia compliance risk, interest –rate risk as well as arbitrage 
risk. As a result of this shortcoming, the level-playing field regulations have not been 
enabled by the Malaysian regulators. This research has therefore found that the issue 
pertaining to the liquidity regulations in Malaysia and the UK is essentially different.  
 
The discussion above is summarised in the table below where it highlights the general 
differences of the regulatory accommodation for retail Islamic banks in the UK and 
Malaysia, as well as the impact to the concept of level-playing field regulations. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
 
 
Unified    699 
Regulation/ 
Separate  
Formal 
Equality  
Substantive 
equality 
Level-playing 
field 
Authorisation     
 Collective 
Investment 
Scheme 
Unified  Partially Yes Partially useful 
 Home 
Purchase 
Plan 
Unified Yes Yes Useful  
 Capital 
certainty 
requirement 
Unified Yes No Useful 
Sharia Supervisory 
Board  
 Competent 
requirement 
Unified No No N/A 
                                                 
699 * Unified = Islamic banks are regulated within the same regulation as the conventional banks 
     * Separate = There are designated provisions for Islamic banks in some cases 
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 Relevant 
experience 
Unified No No N/A 
Islamic finance 
cases before the 
English courts  
Unified  Yes Yes N/A 
Regulatory decision 
making process 
Unified and 
separate  
Yes Yes Useful 
Sharia – compliant 
liquid assets  
Unified and 
separate 
Partially Yes Partially useful 
Taxation  
 Stamp duty 
land tax 
 
Unified and 
separate 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Useful 
 Corporation 
tax 
Unified  Yes  Yes Useful 
 Value-Added 
tax 
Unified  Yes  Yes  Useful 
 
 
 
MALAYSIA 
 
 Unified 
Regulation/ 
Separate 
Regulation 
Formal 
Equality  
Substantive 
equality 
Level-
playing 
field 
Authorisation     
 Islamic 
Financial 
Services 
Act 2013 
Separate Yes  Yes  Useful  
 Deposit 
Insurance 
Scheme  
Separate  Yes Yes Useful 
Sharia 
Supervisory Board  
 Fit and 
Proper 
Separate  Yes  Yes  N/A 
 Competent 
requirement 
Separate  Yes Yes N/A 
Islamic finance 
cases before the 
English courts  
Unified  Yes Yes N/A 
Sharia – compliant 
liquid assets  
Unified and 
Separate 
Yes  Yes  Useful 
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Taxation  
 Income tax  
 
Unified and 
separate  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Useful 
 Real 
Property 
Gains Tax  
Unified and 
separate  
Yes  Yes Useful 
 Stamp duty 
land tax 
Unified and 
separate  
Yes  Yes  Useful 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
Moving on further, the overall analysis of this research has found that there are 
several types of risks exposed to Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia based on the 
level-playing field regulations. The table below provides the types of risk and country: 
 
Country Type of Risk  
 
The United Kingdom 
 
Transparency risk, operational risk, 
regulatory risk, reputational risk, liquidity 
risk  
 
Malaysia 
 
Interest-rate risk, arbitrage risk, 
reputational risk 
Source: Author’s own 
 
These findings suggest that Islamic banks in Malaysia are exposed to less type of risks 
as compared to the UK. The implications of these results raise several assumptions. 
Firstly, it can be assumed that the dual regulatory framework helps Islamic banks to 
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face lesser risks. Secondly, the effect of these risks to the stability of Islamic banks is 
difficult to prove since there is no empirical evidence to prove it. The available data 
which shows the failure of the former Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) did not cause 
contagion effect to the banking system. However, as argued in the earlier chapter, 
systemic risk may happen in the country where there is bigger presence of Islamic 
banks such as Malaysia. Furthermore, this research assumes that the risks affected 
to Islamic banks are still within control because thus far, there is no evidence to prove 
otherwise. Moreover, the issue of liquidity risk faced by Islamic banks in the UK has 
been resolved by the regulators through the Sharia-compliant liquid assets 
requirements.  
 
In light of the arguments on whether Islamic banks should be given more regulation, 
the results of the analysis on the objectives of banking regulation suggests that simple 
regulation is desirable for Islamic banks. The analysis has been made in chapter two 
considering two perspectives of the arguments on more and simple regulations. The 
outcome of the analysis suggests that the existing level-playing field regulations do 
not seem to pose serious harm that could affect the stability of Islamic banks. Although 
Islamic banks are regulated within the conventional banking framework in the UK, 
there is no prove to show that Islamic banks are badly affected by the existing 
regulations. However, the stability of Islamic banks may be affected in the country 
where there is a bigger presence of the sector such as Malaysia. Additionally, the 
evidence has proved that Islamic banks are not listed as systemically important 
financial institution by the Financial Stability Board.  
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 As have been highlighted earlier (chapter one - section 1.5.2, chapter two - section 
2.5), an extended question to the two test questions (equality before the law and fair 
opportunity for Islamic banks to compete) is to be asking: when the level-playing field 
is seen to be distorted? In order to determine whether the playing field is level, the 
outcome of the level-playing field regulations must depict a positive outcome. If the 
level-playing field regulations are found to have a negative outcome, it must be an 
obvious negative outcome and not a mere negative outcome. An obvious negative 
outcome is argued as the outcome which affects the stability of Islamic banks and 
crisis emerged deriving from the regulatory treatment. A mere negative outcome 
involves negative effects which does not pose any major threat to the stability of 
Islamic banking sector. Therefore, this research suggests that more regulation for 
Islamic banks do not mean more regulation in terms of volume, but in terms of 
addressing risks which could affect the stability of Islamic banks, such as liquidity risk 
and operational risk. As such, the approach to simple regulation for Islamic banks is 
seen to be sufficient to accommodate the lack of regulation governing Islamic banks. 
This has therefore leads to the conclusion that is not necessary to have a dual 
regulatory framework merely to provide the level-playing field treatment for Islamic 
banks.  
 
Level-playing field regulations can be said to be a positive approach in developing 
Islamic banks in the financial sector. Certain regulatory changes that were made by 
regulators to accommodate the unique features of Islamic finance have led to the rapid 
development of the Islamic banking sector within the last 30 years. Therefore, while 
on the one hand level-playing field regulations is a positive approach to develop this 
new sector, however, level-playing field regulations has its constraining nature. As 
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discussed earlier, the unique features of Islamic finance means that there are certain 
types of risks which are seen to be the same as the risks faced in conventional finance 
but differ in dimension. Furthermore, due to the level-playing field regulations and the 
different nature of Islamic finance, substantive compromises were needed to be made 
by Islamic banks in order to fit into the level-playing field regulations. This has led to 
the inequality at the substantive level and the level-playing field regulations ultimately 
posed challenges for Islamic banks to operate according to its unique features (the 
challenges have been discussed throughout this thesis), and potentially could impede 
the development of Islamic finance. While it is acceptable to have dual regulatory 
framework for Islamic banks like the Malaysian model, it can be suggested that the 
regulatory approach may not necessarily be confining to the idea of ‘level-playing field’. 
This is because Islamic banks could not be fairly or equally placed in the same 
regulatory environment similar to the conventional banks for both of these sectors are 
operating on different principles. Islamic banks, therefore, can be better developed 
with the set of regulations which are tailored to its unique risks and features.  
 
The impacts of the level-playing field regulations in the UK and Malaysia have indeed 
poses several implications to both jurisdictions. The positive impacts of level-playing 
field regulations have indeed resulted to regulatory certainty and clarity that could 
promote the development of Islamic financial sector. Moreover, a good regulation that 
produces positive impacts to Islamic banking sector could enhance liquidity in the 
financial sector domestically as well as internationally. Market confidence, regulatory 
transparency, and product attractiveness can be created with a sound regulatory 
accommodation that tailored to the specificity of Islamic finance. On the other hand, 
the negative impacts to the level-playing field regulations have produced lack of 
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regulatory clarity and uncertainty in both countries’ regulatory framework.  As 
mentioned throughout this thesis, the lack of regulatory clarity and uncertainty could 
therefore produces several types of risks to Islamic banks and ultimately, causing the 
lack of confidence the Islamic banking sector. This could not only affect the liquidity 
market of the Islamic banking sector but also impede its development. Lesser interests 
for Islamic banking investments may happen and reputational risks may be caused 
due to the absence of regulation for Islamic banks. Whereas the neutral impacts which 
derive from the level-playing field regulations, arguably, could not affect the liquidity 
market for both jurisdictions. It can also be argued that the impacts of the level-playing 
field regulations could produce similar impacts to other jurisdictions. Notably, based 
on the research findings, it can be inferred that in reality, the regulatory 
accommodation for Islamic banks regardless of the regulatory architecture (either 
unitary regulatory framework or dual regulatory framework) is irrelevant. What is 
important for Islamic banking sector is the availability of regulation that could 
accommodate the specificity of Islamic financial principles and risks exposed to Islamic 
banks. Possibly, the approach to soft-law such as guidelines, core principles or codes 
of conduct which could serve the need of the Islamic banking sector is a better 
mechanism to be adopted.700 
  
One of the most notable implications of the level-playing field regulations against the 
regulatory frameworks of both jurisdictions, as argued earlier, is derived from a 
particular causality arising from the public policy and institutional frameworks of each 
country. As has been discussed in chapters two and three, the UK’s level-playing field 
                                                 
700 Aldohni, ‘Soft law, Self-regulation and Cultural Sensitivity: The case of regulating Islamic banks in 
the UK’, (2014), p.167 
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regulations for all the financial institutions is the ‘no special favours’ among the banking 
and financial institutions which is embedded in its regulatory policy. As such, a 
particular regulatory accommodation is only given based on the need of regulating the 
product as well as the potential of having positive outcome from such accommodation. 
In this regards, chapter two and three have shown that while the UK government 
strongly supports the development of the Islamic banking sector, the regulatory policy 
in the UK is mainly based on the idea that the benefits of regulation should outweigh 
the cost - for instance, the regulatory accommodation on abolishing the double 
taxation for Islamic financial mortgages, the regulation for certain classes of Sukuk 
and the recent liquid asset regulation for Islamic banks. As such, another causality 
that can be linked to the existing level-playing field regulations in the UK is that the 
spirit of regulating the Islamic banking sector is mainly for the purpose of enriching the 
liquidity in the market – not necessarily to support the Islamic financial principles and 
its features per se. Therefore, it is inferred that the religious aspect or Sharia-compliant 
aspect of the product or the institution is left to the bank to manage it.  
 
Furthermore, the regulatory development in the level-playing field regulations 
represents that the regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks covers only on certain 
aspect while ignoring other aspects which could affect the operations of Islamic banks. 
The regulated aspect is, however, only given to the regulators’ attention when it is 
brought forward by the market players and Islamic bankers. And the initiative to 
develop a particular regulatory accommodation is heavily based upon the ‘voice’ of the 
sector rather than the initiative taken by the regulators to promote the regulatory 
development for Islamic banks (this is somewhat contrary to the Malaysian 
environment). As such, it can be inferred that the regulatory development of the level-
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playing field regulations in the UK is mainly based on the real need of regulating the 
sector than merely regulating without justification. Moreover, chapter three has 
highlighted that the objective of the UK is to become the leading Islamic financial 
gateway in the Western world. Therefore, it can be inferred that the regulatory strategy 
in the UK’s level-playing field regulations is towards reaching its objective as a 
competitive Islamic financial market in the world.  
 
On the contrary, in Malaysia, the stronger support of the government and policy 
makers represent the establishment of vast regulatory framework for the Islamic 
banking sector. The dual regulatory framework representing the idea of treating 
Islamic banks on a level-playing field with the conventional banks shows that almost 
every aspect of Islamic banking is regulated. From the analysis of this research, it can 
be inferred that the stronger political will as well as the national’s agenda to make 
Malaysia as the hub for Islamic finance in the world motivates the government and 
policy makers to work towards achieving this objective. Therefore, it can be argued 
that as opposed to the UK’s policy, the level-playing field regulations in Malaysia is 
systematically developed - without necessarily focusing on the cost and benefit of a 
particular regulatory accommodation for the Islamic banking sector.  
 
Moreover, the Malaysian government and regulators are seen to be more motivated 
and proactive to regulate the sector throughout the years as opposed to the UK’s 
environment. Arguably, there is a deeper ‘faith’ on the part of the Malaysian 
government and policy makers towards Islamic finance. As such, there is little need 
for the Islamic financial market players to propose for the level-playing field regulations 
in contrast to the UK. As a result of the vast level-playing field regulations, Islamic 
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banking sector in Malaysia is often referred to be the better regulatory model for the 
sector’s development. While it is agreeable that a particular regulatory framework or 
architecture for each country could not be totally followed by another country, however, 
the dual regulatory framework in Malaysia is found to have caused lesser substantive 
compromises on the part of Islamic banks. A better development and sustainability of 
the sector from such regulatory approach can be seen where Islamic banking sector’s 
growth in Malaysia is stable, unlike in the UK where a number of Islamic banking 
windows has stopped its operations. As such, the lack of regulations for Islamic banks 
in the UK affects the sustainability of Islamic banks.  
 
 
 It is also apparent that establishing a separate regulatory framework for Islamic 
finance could enable a bigger market confidence and market presence, such as in 
Malaysia. However, one criticism regarding the dual regulatory framework is that while 
the level-playing field regulations resulted to the creation of two separate legislations, 
the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 contained mostly similar provisions with the 
Financial Services Act 2013 thus question the need of having the separated 
regulations.  Therefore, it can be argued that an important factor for a good Islamic 
banking regulation is to have a comprehensive set of regulations that provides more 
clarity and transparency, as well as regulations which are created to address the 
nature and risks exposed to Islamic banks. However, the existing challenge is to 
harmonise the conventional financial system with the Islamic financial system. While 
these two systems are operating side by side, nevertheless, they do not exist in 
harmonious way. Finally, the cross-cultural sensitivity701 is also the inherent factor that 
                                                 
701 Supra, Note 700. 
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has its influence to the policy making of the Islamic banking sector which resulted to 
the degree of regulatory accommodation for Islamic banks in a particular country. 
Therefore, by taking into consideration the factors that influence the regulatory policy 
and institutional policy for Islamic banks, the establishment of the level-playing 
regulations in the UK and Malaysia can be said to be appropriate in its own right.  
 
  
6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
A number of caveats need to be noted regarding the present research.  
Firstly, this research does not cover all aspects within retail Islamic banks. The 
analyses made in this research are some examples that are viewed as relevant within 
the context of level-playing field regulations. In this research, not all aspects between 
the retail Islamic banks and the conventional banks are shown. This is for the fact that 
the research context of level-playing field regulations gave the emphasis on the part 
of Islamic banks, and it is outside the scope of this research to analyse on the level-
playing field regulations on the conventional banking context. Additionally, this 
research is limited by the lack of available information on retail Islamic banks.  
 
Secondly, chapter one (section 1.5.1) has discussed on the limits of comparative law 
methodology. It was highlighted that there are disadvantages of using this method. 
These are: the regulatory approach of both countries differs, as well as the variations 
of political, social, history, and economic interest between both countries.  There is 
also no standard methodology for comparative lawyer to adopt. Moreover, as have 
been argued in chapter one, the task to determine a meaningful comparison is harder 
and the clear cut answers in a comparative legal research has been argued as 
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somewhat rare. Therefore, the factors above has therefore led to the third limitation 
whereby this research is unable to suggest which regulatory framework is more 
suitable to adopt the level-playing regulations – either within the single or dual 
regulatory framework. However, what can be suggested by this research is that it is 
not necessary to adopt a dual regulatory framework to create the level-playing field 
regulations for Islamic banks.  
 
Fourthly, another important limitation of this research is that the reference to Islamic 
bank in the UK is concentrated on one bank, which is Al Rayan Bank (formerly known 
as the Islamic Bank of Britain). This is because, Al Rayan Bank is the only fully fledged 
Islamic bank in the UK, and the available data is viewed to be consistent and reliable.  
 
Fifthly, the current research was not specifically designed to evaluate two other areas. 
One, this research was not intended to discuss the detailed aspect of the political-
social-economic factor of both countries for the fact that the main focus of this research 
is pertaining to the level-playing field regulations. Two, the current research was not 
intended to provide a detailed analysis on the context of legal transplant or legal 
pluralism which can also be argued to influence the existing legal accommodation for 
Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia. While both of these factors can be argued to 
be one of the influencing factors for the legal culture of both countries, however, it is 
felt that these factors require a separate research of its own nature.  
 
Next, chapter three has briefly mentioned that the UK regulations are also subjected 
to the European Union Directives. This research does not discuss the regulations 
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under the European Union Directives. This is because the focus of this research is 
mainly focusing on the UK’s domestic regulations.  
 
Finally, one major limitation in this research is the limitation of available resources on 
the meaning of level-playing field. It has been difficult for this research to find any 
available data which provide an in-depth research on the idea of level-playing field.  
On top of that, the fact that there is no previous study on the level-playing field 
regulations (especially on Islamic banks), this has ultimately limit the arguments in the 
current research.  
 
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of possible future studies using the same test questions of level-playing 
regulations would be interesting.  
 
Firstly, the fact that this research is literature-based, it would be worthwhile to conduct 
further research on the level-playing field regulations of Islamic banks by conducting 
a cross-field study  involving economic study and law. The cross-field study could 
produce interesting findings by using economic variables and possibly, combining the 
comparative law methodology. Other possible cross-field study for future research 
would be to investigate why the level-playing field regulations are treated in varied way 
by different jurisdictions through political – economy discipline. It can be suggested 
that the two cross-filed studies could provide more information on why the level-playing 
field regulations for Islamic banks is structured as it is. In particular, how the political-
economy of a country influence the level-playing field regulations for Islamic banks. In 
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addition, the same methodology and concept of this research can be used to conduct 
future research between other jurisdictions.  
 
Future research should assess the impact of level-playing field regulations in other 
areas within the Islamic banking sector. As this research was focusing on retail Islamic 
banks, further research should therefore concentrate on the investigation of wholesale 
Islamic banks. Other focus areas could be the investigation of the level-playing field 
regulations between the Islamic insurance (Takaful) and the conventional insurance, 
the Islamic securities and the conventional securities.  Additionally, future research 
can be conducted on other sector such as the level-playing field for the conventional 
banks.  
 
Thirdly, due to the fact the analyses of this research was conducted by a limited review 
of the literature, more information on the effect of the level-playing field regulations 
towards the stability of Islamic banks would help us to establish a greater degree of 
accuracy on this matter.  
 
Finally, the two test questions of level-playing field regulations are not exhaustive. 
Future studies investigating other potential test question to determine what constitute 
as level-playing filed regulations would be very interesting.   
 
6.5  FINAL REMARKS  
This research has demonstrated the extent of the level-playing field regulations on 
Islamic banks in the UK and Malaysia. This is the first research that has established 
two test questions to be used to analyse the level-playing field regulations for Islamic 
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banks as well as incorporating the comparative law methodology. It is viewed that in 
spite of the existing caveats which has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, in 
general, the main objectives of this research has been achieved.  
 
Two major significant findings to emerge from this research are that the regulators 
have not enabled the level-playing field regulations in totality for Islamic banks, and 
the level-playing field regulations are found to be a useless concept.  
 
For the first major finding, the regulators have not enabled the level-playing field 
regulations. The test questions used in this research has shown that there have been 
substantive compromises on the part of Islamic banks to serve the element of formal 
equality. As a result, the substantive compromises which have been described earlier 
leads to a lack of equality at the substantive level.  In some areas of the regulatory 
accommodation, there is the lack of opportunity for Islamic banks to compete fairly 
with the conventional banks. Despite this finding, chapter one (Section 1.5.2) and 
chapter 2 (Section 2.3) have argued that it is not necessary to always have equality at 
the substantive level to exist. In other words, formal equality can somewhat help 
Islamic banks to have a fair opportunity to compete with the conventional banks, such 
as the capital certainty requirements and deposit insurance scheme - although Islamic 
banks has made compromises at the substantive level.  
 
Therefore, this research has argued that while it is desirable that substantive equality 
exists in most instances, nevertheless, the absence of equality at the substantive level 
does not necessarily render the existing law as invalid law. It can be argued that an 
invalid law is only when the outcome of the law depicts an obvious negative outcome, 
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and not a mere one. This research argues that an invalid law with respect to the Islamic 
banking context is when the law could pose serious harm to Islamic banks in terms of 
its stability. Since there is no empirical evidence to proof that Islamic banks are 
suffering from instability, for instance, pertaining to the capital certainty requirements, 
the lack compromises at the substantive level could not regard the law as invalid.  
 
The second major finding was that the level-playing field regulations are found to be a 
useless concept. While in some aspect of the regulatory accommodation have proven 
that there is the effective level-playing field regulations, nevertheless, from a larger 
perspective, the idea of level-playing field regulations is not an ideal approach to 
regulate Islamic banks within the complex financial environment. As have been argued 
in Chapter two, the notion of level-playing field is nothing more than a metaphorical 
term to standardise the uncertainties, complexities and diversity in the financial 
system. It can be said that the regulators have not been able to reconcile the level-
playing field regulations within the existing financial system. Moreover, the criteria of 
equality, fairness, justice in regulation are difficult to be interpreted in certain form and 
cannot be equalised. Chapter two and chapter five have presented the realities and 
challenges that have resulted to the problems of enabling the level-playing field 
regulations. Thus, level-playing field regulations which is seen as the benchmark to 
equalise the uncertainties and diversity that exists in the financial system is not a 
workable concept.  
 
Moreover, to have the absolute level-playing field regulations is nothing more than a 
wishful thinking. The fact that financial system constantly evolved, the latest financial 
innovations has made the concept of level-playing field regulations more difficult to be 
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enabled. And regulations, too, is not meant to be static. Following Jeremy Bentham’s 
argument, law is temporary by nature and by institutions. Law is said to have “its 
duration and upon which it may be contracted to any length by the express will of the 
legislator.”702 This statement indicates that the law is temporary based on the legislator 
(or regulators) intention to have the law as long as it is believed to be relevant at the 
point of time. Once the law is believed as no more relevant at a particular time, the law 
will be changed according to the suitability of the current situation.  Applying 
Bentham’s argument in the case of banking law, it can be argued that the banking law 
will evolve from time to time to accommodate the changes in the financial system.  It 
is, therefore, difficult to imagine that the Ievel-playing field regulations can successfully 
be enabled to accommodate the diversity and complexity in the financial system.  
Furthermore, it can be said the creation of regulations is not only to prevent harmful 
conduct, but it is also created to prevent harmful consequences and harmful risk. It 
can be argued that the creation of regulations do not rely solely on  the risks attached 
to Islamic banks, but also other factors which influence the making of regulations such 
as economic issues and political-cultural issues.  
 
Finally, since this research has found that the level-playing field regulations for Islamic 
banks have not been fully enabled in both countries, this research suggests that the 
regulators should only provide appropriate regulations for Islamic banks. However, the 
term appropriate regulations are subjective and it is not an easy task to determine 
whether the objective to provide appropriate regulations has been achieved. The term 
‘appropriate’ as defined in the Oxford’s Dictionary refers to “something suitable, 
                                                 
702 H.L.A Hart (ed), Of Laws in General: Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, (1970), p.74 
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acceptable, or correct for the particular circumstances.”703 By definition, the term is still 
vague and quite problematic.  This has raises an issue as to how could we regard 
something as appropriate or inappropriate, acceptable or unacceptable?  It has been 
argued by Goodhart that, so far, there is no authoritative attempt to present any 
quantitative or qualitative information to present the ‘appropriate’ criteria for a 
regulation.704 He suggests that three economic objectives which can be referred by 
regulators when enacting regulation. Firstly, the regulator’s objective for regulation is 
to prevent a systemic failure of financial institutions, and/or financial markets. 
Secondly, to prevent competitive losses and thirdly, to provide consumer protection 
(i.e. to prevent ill-informed (retail) customers from being exploited).705 He goes on to 
argue that what can be regarded as appropriate regulations is left in the hands of the 
regulators.  This research supports his view and would like to extend the opinion that 
another party who could decide whether the regulations are appropriate is the sector 
that is regulated. In regards to this research, it is the Islamic banking sector.  
 
This research suggests that to have appropriate regulations for Islamic banks, the 
reasonable approach to deal with this issue is to have the regulators to incorporate or 
imposed the established international regulatory standards for Islamic banks form the 
International Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing 
                                                 
703 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (2000)  
704 Charles E. Goodhart, ‘Regulating the Regulator – An Economist’s Perspective’ in  Eilís Ferran and 
Charles E.Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First Century, 
(2002), p.152 
705 Ibid., p.152-154. Goodhart asserts, “…Unless such external criteria are presented, and in such form 
as they are capable of measurement and assessment, then it seems that judgment about what was 
‘appropriate’ is left entirely in the hands of the FSA. The FSA will, therefore, be its own judge about 
whether it has acted appropriately in the light of this objective. Most judges rule in their own favour.”  
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Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) in their existing regulatory 
framework. Based on the analysis made in this research, another additional 
suggestion to improve the regulation for Islamic banks is pertaining to the liquidity 
management of Islamic banks.  
 
In terms of having the best outcome for the regulations of Islamic banks, what should 
be expected is the readiness of the regulators to develop the regulations to promote 
the competitive nature of the banking sector. However, the burden is still left to the 
Islamic financial sector to lobby for the issues that they encountered to the regulators 
in order to receive the most appropriate regulations for the sector to develop. 
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